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Long. East 10 of Gn 



THE 

FRENCH REVOLUTION 
AND NAPOLEON 



BY 
CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN 

Professor of History in Columbia University 



WITH MAPS 




NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
1917 



•H 



Copyright, 1917, 

BY 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 
Published February, iqij 



MAR 22 19 i 7 

THE QUINN & BODEN CO. PRESS 
RAHWAV, N. J. 

©CI.A455998 
*VUQ ( 



PREFACE 

No historian believes that history repeats itself. 
Yet, between different ages there are frequently- 
striking analogies and resemblances. It is prob- 
lems that repeat themselves, not the conditions 
which determine their solution. One of these 
problems, recurrent in European annals, is that 
of the maintenance of a certain balance of power 
among the various nations as essential to their 
freedom, the maintenance of a situation to which 
they are accustomed and which they have found 
tolerable, a change in which would be prejudicial 
or dangerous to their peace and safety. Several 
times in modern history this balance has been 
threatened and Europe has purchased immunity 
from servitude by freely giving its life blood 
that life might remain and might be worth 
living. 

To an age like our own, caught in the grip of 
a world war, whose issues, however incalculable, 
will inevitably be profound, there is much in- 
struction to be gained from the study of a 
similar crisis in the destinies of humanity a cen- 



iv PREFACE 

tury ago. The most dramatic and most impres- 
sive chapter of modern history was written by 
the French Revolution and by Napoleon. And 
between that period and our own not only are 
there points of interesting and suggestive com- 
parison but there is also a distinct line of causa- 
tion connecting the two. 

For the convenience of those who may wish 
to review this memorable and instructive period 
I have brought together in this volume the 
chapters dealing with it in my Modern European 
History. In the opening twentieth century, as 
in the opening nineteenth, mankind has been 
driven to the ordeal by battle by the resolve to 
preserve the most cherished things of life. 
Now, as then, civilization hangs upon the arbitra- 
ment of the sword. It is not churches alone that 
owe their existence and their power to the blood 
of the martyrs. The most precious rights of 
nations and of individuals have not only been 
achieved, but have been maintained inviolate, by 
the unconquerable spirit of the brave. 

" Great is the glory, for the strife is hard! " 

C. D. H. 

January 10, 1917. 



CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction : The Old Regime in Europe . i 

CHAPTER 

I. The Old Regime in France 55 

II. Beginnings of the Revolution . . . ioo 

III. The Making of the Constitution . . 129 

IV. The Legislative Assembly . . . . 152 
V. The Convention 180 

VI. The Directory 229 

VII. The Consulate 267 

VIII. The Early Years of the Empire . . . 290 

IX. The Empire at Its Height .... 318 

X. The Decline and Fall of Napoleon . . 338 

Index 371 



MAPS 

IN COLOR 

Europe in 1789 Frontispiece 

Europe in 1740 1 

Italy in the Eighteenth Century, 1770 . . . . 14 

The Growth of Prussia under Frederick the Great . 26 

Germany in 1789 32 

The Partition of Poland 54 

France before the Revolution 62 

France by Departments 140 

Northern Italy Illustrating Bonaparte's First Campaign 244' 

Europe in 181 1 340" 

in black 

Egypt and Syria 257 - 

Map Illustrating Campaigns of Napoleon . ,. . 364 




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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 
AND NAPOLEON 

INTRODUCTION 
THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 

ANY ONE who seeks to understand the stirring 
period in which we are now living becomes 
quickly aware that he must first know the his- 
tory of the French Revolution, a movement that 
inaugurated a new era, not only for France but 
for the world. The years from 1789 to 181 5, the 
years of the Revolution and of Napoleon, effected 
one of the greatest and most difficult transitions 
of which history bears record, and to gain any 
proper sens-e of its significance one must have 
some glimpse of the background, some concep- 
tion of what Europe was like in 1789. That back- 
ground can only be sketched here in a few broad 
strokes, far from adequate to a satisfactory ap- 
preciation, but at least indicating the point of 
departure. 

What was Europe in 1789? One thing, at 
least, it was not: it was not a unity. There were 
states of every size and shape and with every 
form of government. The States of the Church 
were theocratic; capricious and cruel despotism 



2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

prevailed in Turkey; absolute monarchy in Rus- 
sia, Austria, France, Prussia; constitutional mon- 
archy in England; while there were various 
kinds of so-called republics — federal republics in 
Holland and Switzerland, a republic whose head 
was an elective king in Poland, aristocratic re- 
publics in Venice and Genoa and in the free cities 
of the Holy Roman Empire. 

Of these states the one that was to be the most 
persistent enemy of France and of French ideas 
throughout the period we are about to describe 
was England, a commercial and colonial empire of 
the first importance. This empire, of long, slow 
growth, had passed through many highly signifi- 
cant experiences during the eighteenth century. 
Indeed, that century is one of the most momen- 
tous in English history, rendered forever memo- 
rable by three great series of events which in im- 
portant respects transformed her national life 
and her international relations, giving them the 
character and tendency which have been theirs 
ever since. These three streams of tendency or 
lines of evolution out of which the modern power 
of Britain has emerged were: the acquisition of 
what are still the most valuable parts of her 
colonial empire, Canada and India; the estab- 
lishment of the parliamentary system of gov- 
ernment, that is, government of the nation 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 3 

by its representatives, not by its royal house, 
the undoubted supremacy of Parliament over 
the Crown; and the beginnings of what is 
called the Industrial Revolution, that is, of the 
modern factory system of production on a vast 
scale which during the course of the nineteenth 
century made England easily the chief industrial 
nation of the world.^/ 

The evolution of the parliamentary system of 
government had, of course, been long in progress 
but was immensely furthered by the advent in 
1714 of a new royal dynasty, the House of Han- 
over, still at this hour the reigning family. The 
struggle between Crown and Parliament, which 
had been long proceeding and had become tense 
and violent in the seventeenth century in connec- 
tion with the attempts of the Stuart kings to 
make the monarchy all-powerful and supreme, 
ended finally in the eighteenth century with the 
victory of Parliament, and the monarch ceased 
to be, what he remained in the rest of Europe, 
the dominant element in the state. 

In 1701 Parliament, by mere legislative act, 
altered the line of succession by passing over the 
direct, legitimate claimant because he was a 
Catholic, and by calling to the throne George, 
Elector of Hanover, because he was a Protes- 
tant. Thus the older branch of the royal family 



4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

was set aside and a younger or collateral branch 
was put in its place. This was a plain defiance of 
the ordinary rules of descent which generally 
underlie the monarchical system everywhere. It 
showed that the will of Parliament was superior 
to the monarchical principle, that, in a way, the 
monarchy was elective. Still other important 
consequences followed from this act. 

George I, at the time of his accession to the 
English throne in 1714 fifty-four years of age, 
was a German. He continued to be a German 
prince, more concerned with his electorate of 
Hanover than with his new kingdom. He did 
not understand a word of English, and as his 
ministers were similarly ignorant of German, he 
was compelled to resort to a dubious Latin when 
he wished to communicate with them. He was 
king from 1714 to 1727, and was followed by his 
son, George II, who ruled from 1727 to 1760 and 
who, though he knew English, spoke it badly 
and was far more interested in his petty German 
principality than in imperial Britain. 

The first two Georges, whose chief interest 
in England was the money they could get out 
of it, therefore allowed their ministers to carry 
on the government and they did not even attend 
the meetings of the ministers where questions of 
policy were decided. For forty-six years this 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 5 

/ 

royal abstention continued. The result was the 
establishment of a regime never seen before in 
any country. The royal power was no longer 
exercised by the king, but was exercised by his 
ministers, who, moreover, were members of Par- 
liament. In other words, to use a phrase that 
has become famous, the king reigns but does not 
govern. Parliament really governs, through a 
committee of its members, the ministers. 

The ministers must have the support of the 
majority party in Parliament, and during all this 
period they, as a matter of fact, relied upon the 
party of the Whigs. It had been the Whigs who 
had carried through the revolution of 1688 and 
who were committed to the principle of the limi- 
tation of the royal power in favor of the sover- 
eignty of Parliament. As George I and George 
II owed their throne to this party, and as the 
adherents of the other great party, the Tories, 
were long supposed to be supporters of the dis- 
carded Stuarts, England entered upon a period 
of Whig rule, which steadily undermined the au- 
thority of the monarch. The Hanoverian kings 
owed their position as kings to the Whigs. They 
paid for their right to reign by the abandonment 
of the powers that had hitherto inhered in the 
monarch. 

The change that had come over their position 



6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

did not escape the attention of the monarchs con- 
cerned. George II, compelled to accept minis- 
ters he detested, considered himself " a prisoner 
upon the throne." " Your ministers, Sire," said 
one of them to him, " are but the instruments of 
your government." George smiled and replied, 
" In this country the ministers are king." 

Besides the introduction of this unique form 
of government the other great achievement of 
the Whigs during this period was an extraordi- 
nary increase in the colonial possessions of Eng- 
land, the real launching of Britain upon her 
career as a world-power, as a great imperial 
state. This sudden, tremendous expansion was 
a result of the Seven Years' War, which raged 
from 1756 to 1763 in every part of the world, in 
Europe, in America, in Asia, and on the sea. 
Many nations were involved and the struggle 
was highly complicated, but two phases of it 
stand out particularly and in high relief, the 
struggle between England and France, and the 
struggle between Prussia on the one hand and 
Austria, France, and Russia on the other. The 
Seven Years' War remains a mighty landmark 
in the history of England and of Prussia, its 
two conspicuous beneficiaries. 

England found in William Pitt, later Earl of 
Chatham, an incomparable leader, a great orator 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 7 

of a declamatory and theatrical type, an incor- 
ruptible statesman, a passionate patriot, a man 
instinct with energy, aglow with pride and con- 
fidence in the splendor of the destinies reserved 
for his country. Pitt infused his own energy, his 
irresistible driving power into every branch of 
the public service. Head of the ministry from 
1757 to 1761, he aroused the national sentiment 
to such a pitch, he directed the national efforts 
with such contagious and imperious confidence, 
that he turned a war that had begun badly into 
the most glorious and successful that England 
had ever fought. On the sea, in India, and in 
America, victory after victory over the French 
rewarded the nation's extraordinary efforts. Pitt 
boasted that he alone could save the country. 
Save it he surely did. He was the greatest of 
war ministers, imparting his indomitable resolu- 
tion to multitudes of others. No one, it was said, 
ever entered his office without coming out a 
braver man. His triumph was complete when 
Wolfe defeated Montcalm upon the Plains of 
Abraham. 

By the Peace of Paris, which closed this 
epochal struggle, England acquired from France 
the vast stretches of Nova Scotia, Canada, and 
the region between the Alleghanies and the Mis- 
sissippi River, and also acquired Florida from 



8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Spain. From France, too, she snatched at the 
same time supremacy in India. Thus England 
had become a veritable world-empire under the 
inspiring leadership of the " Great Commoner." 
Her horizons, her interests, had grown vastly 
more spacious by this rapid increase in military 
renown, in power, in territory. She had mounted 
to higher influence in the world, and that, too, at 
the expense of her old, historic enemy just across 
the Channel. 

But all this prestige and greatness were im- 
periled and gravely compromised by the reign 
that had just begun. George III had, in 1760, 
come to the throne which he was not to leave 
until claimed by death sixty years later. " The 
name of George III," writes one English his- 
torian, " cannot be penned without a pang, can 
hardly be penned without a curse, such mischief 
was he fated to do the country." Unlike his two 
predecessors, he was not a German, but was a 
son of England, had grown up in England and 
had been educated there, and on his accession, 
at the age of twenty-two, had announced in his 
most famous utterance that he " gloried in the 
name of Briton." But wisdom is no birthright, 
and George III was not destined to show forth 
in his life the saving grace of that quality. With 
many personal virtues, he was one of the least 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 9 

wise of monarchs and one of the most obstinate. 

His mother, a German princess, attached to all 
the despotic notions of her native land, had fre- 
quently said to him, " George, be a king." This 
maternal advice, that he should not follow the 
example of the first two Georges but should mix 
actively in public affairs, fell upon fruitful soil. 
George was resolved not only to reign but to 
govern in the good old monarchical way. This 
determination brought him into a sharp and mo- 
mentous clash with the tendency and the desire 
of his age. The historical significance of George 
III lies in the fact that he was resolved to be the 
chief directing power in the state, that he chal- 
lenged the system of government which gave 
that position to Parliament and its ministers, 
that he threw himself directly athwart the recent 
constitutional development, that he intended to 
break up the practices followed during the last 
two reigns and to rule personally as did the 
other sovereigns of the world. As the new sys- 
tem was insecurely established, his vigorous in- 
tervention brought on a crisis in which it nearly 
perished. 

George III, bent upon being king in fact as 
well as in name, did not formally oppose the cabi- 
net system of government, but sought to make 
the cabinet a mere tool of his will, filling it with 



io THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

men who would take orders from him, and aiding 
them in controlling Parliament by the use of 
various forms of bribery and influence. It took 
several years to effect this real perversion of the 
cabinet system, but in the end the King abso- 
lutely controlled the ministry and the two cham- 
bers of Parliament. The Whigs, who since 1688 
had dominated the monarch and had successfully 
asserted the predominance of Parliament, were 
gradually disrupted by the insidious royal policy, 
and were supplanted by the Tories, who were 
always favorable to a strong kingship and who 
now entered upon a period of supremacy which 
was to last until well into the nineteenth century. 

After ten years of this mining and sapping the 
King's ideas triumphed in the creation of a min- 
istry which was completely submissive to his 
will. This ministry, of which Lord North was the 
leading member, lasted twelve years, from 1770 
to 1782. Lord North was minister after the 
King's own heart. He never pretended to be the 
head of the government, but accepted and exe- 
cuted the King's wishes with the ready obedience 
of a lackey. The royal autocracy was scarcely 
veiled by the mere continuance of the outer forms 
of a free government. 

Having thus secured entire control of ministry 
and Parliament, George III proceeded to lead 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE n 

the British Empire straight toward destruction, 
to what Goldwin Smith has called " the most 
tragical disaster in English history." The King 
and his tools initiated a policy which led swiftly 
and inevitably to civil war. For the American 
Revolution was a civil war within the British 
Empire. The King had his supporters both in 
England and in America; he had opponents both 
in America and England. Party divisions were 
much the same in the mother country and in 
the colonies, Whigs versus Tories, the uphold- 
ers of the principle of self-government against 
the upholders of the principle of the royal pre- 
rogative. In this appalling crisis not only was 
the independence of America involved, but par- 
liamentary government as worked out in Eng- 
land was also at stake. Had George III tri- 
umphed not only would colonial liberties have 
disappeared, but the right of Parliament to be 
predominant in the state at home would have 
vanished. The Whigs of England knew this 
well, and their leaders, Pitt, Fox, Burke, gloried 
in the victories of the rebellious colonists. 

The struggle for the fundamental rights of free 
men, for that was what the American Revolu- 
tion signified for both America and England, was 
long doubtful. France now took her revenge for 
the humiliations of the Seven Years' War by 



12 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

aiding the thirteen colonies, hoping thus to 
humble her arrogant neighbor, grown so great 
at her expense. It was the disasters of the 
American war that saved the parliamentary sys- 
tem of government for England by rendering 
the King unpopular, because disgracefully unsuc- 
cessful. In 1782 Lord North and all his col- 
leagues resigned. This was the first time that 
an entire ministry had been overthrown. 

George the Third's attempt to be master in the 
state had failed, and although the full conse- 
quences of his defeat did not appear for some 
time, nevertheless they were decisive for the 
future of England. The king might henceforth 
reign but he was not to govern. To get this car- 
dinal principle of free government under mo- 
narchical forms established an empire was dis- 
rupted. From that disruption flowed two 
mighty consequences. The principles of repub- 
lican government gained a field for development 
in the New World, and those of constitutional 
or limited monarchy a field in one of the fa- 
mous countries of the Old. These two types of 
government have since exerted a powerful and 
an increasing influence upon other peoples de- 
sirous of controlling their own destinies. Their 
importance as models worthy of imitation has 
not yet been exhausted. 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 13 

But the disaster of the American war was so 
great that the immediate effect was a decided im- 
pairment of England's prestige. It is a curious 
fact that after that she was considered by most of 
the rulers of Europe a decaying nation. She had 
lost her most valuable colonies in America. The 
notion was prevalent that her successes in the 
Seven Years' War had not been due to her own 
ability but to the incapacity of Louis XV, 
whereas they had been due to both. The idea 
that it was possible to destroy England was cur- 
rent in France, the idea that her empire was 
really a phantom empire which would disappear 
at the first hostile touch, that India could be de- 
tached far more easily than the thirteen colonies 
had been. It was considered that as she had 
grown rich she had lost her virility and energy 
and was undermined by luxury and sloth. At 
the same time, although in flagrant contradiction 
to the sentiments just described, there was a 
vague yet genuine fear of her. Though she had 
received so many blows, yet she had herself in 
the past given so many to her rivals, and espe- 
cially to France, that they did well to have a lurk- 
ing suspicion after all as to her entire decadence. 
The rivalry, centuries old, of France and Eng- 
land was one of the chief elements of the general 
European situation. It had shown no signs of 



i 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

abating. The issues of the Revolution were to 
cause it to flame up portentously. It dominated 
the whole period down to Waterloo. In Eng- 
land the French Revolution was destined to find 
its most redoubtable and resolute enemy. 

In Italy, on the other hand, it was to find, 
partly a receptive pupil, partly an easy prey. 
The most important thing about Italy was that 
it was unimportant. Indeed, there was no Italy, 
no united, single country, but only a collection 
of petty states, generally backward in their politi- 
cal and economic development. Once masters in 
their own house, the Italians had long ago fallen 
from their high estate and had for centuries been 
in more or less subjection to foreigners, to 
Spaniards, to Austrians, sometimes to the French. 
This had reacted unfavorably upon their charac- 
ters, and had made them timid, time-serving, 
self-indulgent, pessimistic. They had no great 
attachment to their governments, save possibly 
in Piedmont and in the republics of Venice and 
Genoa, and there was no reason why they should 
have. Several of the governments were impor- 
tations from abroad, or rather impositions, which 
had never struck root in the minds or interests 
of the peoples. The political atmosphere was one 
of indifference, weariness, disillusionment. How- 
ever, toward the end of the eighteenth century 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 15 

there were signs of an awakening. The Italians 
could never long be unmindful of the glories of 
their past. They had their haunting traditions 
which would never allow them to forget or re- 
nounce their rights, however oppressed they 
might be. They were a people of imagination and 
of fire, though they long appeared to foreign- 
ers quite the reverse, as in fact the very stuff of 
which willing slaves are made, a view which was 
seriously erroneous. It cannot be said that there 
was in the eighteenth century any movement 
aiming at making Italy a nation, but there were 
poets and historians who flashed out, now and 
then, with some patriotic phrase or figure that 
revealed vividly a shining goal on the distant 
horizon toward which all Italians ought to press. 
" The day will come," said Alfieri, " when the 
Italians will be born again, audacious on the field 
of battle." Humanity was not meant to be shut 
in by such narrow horizons as those presented 
by these petty states, but was entitled to more 
spacious destinies. This longing for national 
unity was as yet the passion of only a few, of 
men of imagination who had a lively sense of 
Italy's great past and who also possessed an in- 
stinct for the future. A French writer expressed 
a mood quite general with cultivated people when 
she said: "The Italians are far more remark- 



16 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

able because of what they have been and because 
of what they might be than because of what they 
now are." Seeds of a new Italy were already 
germinating. They were not, however, to yield 
their fruit until well into the nineteenth century. 
Turning to the east of France we find Ger- 
many, the country that was to be the chief bat- 
tlefield of Europe for many long years, and that 
was to undergo the most surprising transforma- 
tions. Germany, like Italy, was a collection of 
small states, only these states were far more nu- 
merous than in the peninsula to the south. Ger- 
many had a form of unity, at least it pretended 
to have, in the so-called Holy Roman Empire. 
How many states were included in it, it is diffi- 
cult to say; at least 360, if in the reckoning are 
included all the nobles who recognized no supe- 
rior save the emperor, who held their power 
directly from him and were subject to no one 
else. There were more than fifty free or im- 
perial cities, holding directly from the emperor 
and managing their own affairs; and numerous 
ecclesiastical states, all independent of each 
other. Then there were small states like Baden 
and Wiirtemberg and Bavaria and many others. 
In all this empire there were only two states of 
any importance in the general affairs of Europe, 
Prussia and Austria, 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 17 

This empire, with its high-sounding names, 
" Holy " and " Roman," was incredibly weak and 
inefficient. Its emperor, not hereditary but elec- 
tive, was nothing but a pompous, solemn pre- 
tense. He had no real authority, could give no 
orders, could create no armies, could follow out 
no policies, good or bad, for the German princes 
had during the course of the centuries robbed 
him of all the usual and necessary attributes of 
power. He was little more than a gorgeous 
figure in a pageant. There were, in addition, an 
Imperial Diet or national assembly, and an im- 
perial tribunal, but they were as palsied as was 
the emperor. 

What was important in Germany was not the 
empire, which was powerless for defense, useless 
for any serious purpose, but the separate states 
that composed it, and indeed only a few of these 
had any significance. All these petty German 
princelings responded to two emotions. All 
were jealous of their independence and all were 
eager to annex each other's territory. They 
never thought of the interests of Germany, of 
the empire, of the Fatherland. What power 
they had they had largely secured by despoiling 
the empire. Patriotism was not one of their 
weaknesses. Each was looking out emphatically 
for himself, To make a strong, united nation 



18 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

out of such mutually repellent atoms would be 
nothing less than magical. The material was 
most unpromising. Nevertheless the feat has 
been accomplished, as we shall see, although, as 
in the case of Italy, not until well on into the 
nineteenth century. 

The individual states were everything, the em- 
pire was nothing, and with it the French Revo- 
lutionists and Napoleon were destined to play 
great havoc. Two states, as has been said, 
counted particularly, Austria and Prussia, ene- 
mies generally, rivals always, allies sometimes. 
Austria was old and famous, Prussia really quite 
new but rapidly acquiring a formidable reputa- 
tion. Then, as now, the former was ruled by 
the House of Hapsburg, the latter by the House 
of Hohenzollern. There was no Austrian na- 
tion, but there was the most extraordinary jum- 
ble of states and races and languages to be found 
in Europe, whose sole bond of union was loyalty 
to the reigning house. The Hapsburg dominions 
were widely, loosely scattered, though the main 
bulk of them was in the Danube valley. There 
was no common Austrian patriotism; there were 
Bohemians, Hungarians, Milanese, Netherland- 
ers, Austrians proper, each with a certain sense 
of unity, a certain self-consciousness, but there 
was no single nation comprehending, fusing all 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 19 

these elements. Austria was not like France or 
England. Nevertheless there were twenty-four 
millions of people under the direction of one man, 
and therefore they were an important factor in 
the politics of Europe. 

In the case of Prussia, however, we have a real 
though still rudimentary nation, hammered to- 
gether by hard, repeated, well-directed blows de- 
livered by a series of energetic, ambitious rulers. 
Prussia as a kingdom dated only from 1701, but 
the heart of this state was Brandenburg, and 
Brandenburg had begun a slow upward march as 
early as the fifteenth century, when the Hohen- 
zollerns came from South Germany to take con- 
trol of it. In the sixteenth century the pos- 
sessions of this family were scattered from the 
region of the Rhine to the borders of Russia. 
How to make them into a single state, responsive 
to a single will, was the problem. In each section 
there were feudal estates, asserting their rights 
against their ruler. But the Hohenzollerns had 
a very clear notion of what they wanted. They 
wished and intended to increase their own power 
as rulers, to break down all opposition within, 
and without steadily to aggrandize their do- 
mains. In the realization of their program, to 
which they adhered tenaciously from generation 
to generation, they were successful. Prussia 



20 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

grew larger and larger, the government became 
more and more autocratic, and the emphasis in 
the state came to be more and more placed upon 
the army. Mirabeau was quite correct when he 
said that the great national industry of Prussia 
was war. Prussian rulers were hard-working, 
generally conceiving their mission soberly and 
seriously as one of service to the state, not at all 
as one inviting to personal self-indulgence. 
They were hard-headed and intelligent in de- 
veloping the economic resources of a country 
originally little favored by nature. They were 
attentive to the opportunities afforded by Ger- 
man and European politics for the advancement 
of rulers who had the necessary intelligence and 
audacity. In the long reign of Frederick II, 
called the Great (1740- 1786), and unquestion- 
ably far and away the ablest of all the rulers of 
the Hohenzollern dynasty, we see the brilliant 
and faithful expression of the most characteristic 
features, methods, and aspirations of this vigor- 
ous royal house. 

The successive monarchs of Prussia justified 
the extraordinary emphasis they put upon mili- 
tary force by pointing to the fact that their 
country had no natural boundaries but was sim- 
ply an undifferentiated part of the great sandy 
plain of North Germany, that no river or no 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 21 

mountain range gave protection, that the way of 
the invader was easy. This was quite true, but 
it was also equally true that Prussia's neighbors 
had no greater protection from her than she from 
them. As far as geography was concerned, in- 
vasion of Prussia was no easier than aggression 
from Prussia. At any rate every Prussian ruler 
felt himself first a general, head of an army which 
it was his pride to increase. Thus the Great 
Elector, who had ruled from 1640 to 1688, had 
inherited an army of less than 4,000 men, and had 
bequeathed one of 24,000 to his successor. The 
father of Frederick II had inherited one of 
38,000 and had left one of 83,000. Thus Prussia 
with a population of two and a half millions had 
an army of 83,000, while Austria with a popula- 
tion of 24,000,000 had one of less than 
100,000. With this force, highly drilled and 
amply provided with the sinews of war by the 
systematic and rigorous economies of his father, 
Frederick was destined to go far. He is one of 
the few men who have changed the face of Eu- 
rope. By war, and the subsidiary arts that min- 
ister unto it, Frederick pushed his small state 
into the very forefront of European politics. 
Before his reign was half over he had made it 
one of the great powers, everywhere reckoned 
as such, although in population, area, and wealth, 



22 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

compared with the other great powers, it was 
small indeed. 

As a youth all of Frederick's tastes had been 
for letters, for art, for music, for philosophy and 
the sciences, for conversation, for the delicacies 
and elegancies of culture. The French language 
and French literature were his passion and re- 
mained his chief source of enjoyment all through 
his life. He wrote French verses, he hated mili- 
tary exercises, he played the flute, he detested 
tobacco, heavy eating and drinking, and the hunt, 
which appeared to his father as the natural manly 
and royal pleasures. The thought that this 
youth, so indifferent or hostile to the stern, bleak, 
serious ideals of duty incumbent upon the royal 
house for the welfare of Prussia, so interested 
in the frivolities and fripperies of life, so care- 
lessly self-indulgent, would one day be king and 
would probably wreck the state by his incom- 
petence and his levity, so enraged the father, 
Frederick William I, a rough, boorish, tyranni- 
cal, hard-working, and intensely patriotic man, 
that he subjected the Crown Prince to a Dra- 
conian discipline which at times attained a pitch 
of barbarity, caning him in the presence of the 
army, boxing his ears before the common people, 
compelling him from a prison window to witness 
the execution of his most intimate friend, who 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 23 

had tried to help him escape from this odious 
tyranny by attempted flight from the country. 
In such a furnace was the young prince's 
mettle steeled, his heart hardened. Frederick 
came out of this ordeal self-contained, cyni- 
cal, crafty, but sobered and submissive to the 
fierce paternal will. He did not, according to 
his father's expression, " kick or rear " again. 
For several years he buckled to the prosaic task 
of learning his future trade in the traditional 
Hohenzollern manner, discharging the duties of 
minor offices, familiarizing himself with the dry 
details of administration, and invested with 
larger responsibilities as his reformation seemed, 
in the eyes of his father, satisfactorily to pro- 
gress. 

When he came to the throne in 1740 at the 
age of twenty-eight he came equipped with a 
free and keen intellect, with a character of iron, 
and with an ambition that was soon to set the 
world in flame. He ruled for forty-six years 
and before half his reign was over it was evident 
that he had no peer in Europe. It was thought 
that he would adopt a manner of life quite dif- 
ferent from his father's. Instead, however, there 
was the same austerity, the same simplicity, the 
same intense devotion to work, the same single- 
ness of aim, that aim being the exaltation of 



24 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Prussia. The machinery of government was not 
altered, but it was now driven at unprecedented 
speed by this vigorous, aggressive, supple per- 
sonality. For Frederick possessed supreme 
ability and displayed it from the day of his 
accession to the day of his death. He was, as 
Lord Acton has said, " the most consummate 
practical genius that, in modern times, has in- 
herited a throne." 

His first important act revealed the character 
and the intentions of the ruler. For this man who 
as a youth had loathed the life of a soldier and 
had shirked its obligations as long as he could 
was now to prove himself one of the great mili- 
tary commanders of the world's history. He 
was the most successful of the robber barons in 
which the annals of Germany abounded, and he 
had the ethics of the class. He invaded Silesia, 
a large and rich province belonging to Austria 
and recognized as hers by a peculiarly solemn 
treaty signed by Prussia. But Frederick wanted 
it and considered the moment opportune as an 
inexperienced young woman, Maria Theresa, had 
just ascended the Austrian throne. " My soldiers 
were ready, my purse was full," said Frederick 
concerning this famous raid. Of all the inherit- 
ance of Maria Theresa " Silesia," said he, " was 
that part which was most useful to the House of 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 25 

Brandenburg." " Take what you can," he also 
remarked, " you are never wrong unless you are 
obliged to give back." In these utterances 
Frederick paints himself and his reign in im- 
perishable colors. Success of the most palpable 
sort was his reward. Neither plighted faith, nor 
chivalry toward a woman, nor any sense of per- 
sonal honor ever deterred him from any policy 
that might promise gain to Prussia. One would 
scarcely suspect from such hardy sentiments 
that Frederick had as a young man written a 
treatise against the statecraft of Machiavelli. 
That eminent Florentine would, it is safe to say, 
have been entirely content with the practical 
precepts according to which his titled critic 
fashioned his actual conduct. The true, authen- 
tic spirit of Machiavelli's political philosophy 
has never been expressed with greater brevity 
and precision than by Frederick. " If there is 
anything to be gained by being honest, honest 
we will be; and if it is necessary to deceive, let 
us be scoundrels." 

If there is any defense for Frederick's conduct 
to be found in the fact that his principles or his 
lack of them were shared by most of his crowned 
contemporaries and by many other rulers before 
and since, he is entitled to that defense. He him- 
self, however, was never much concerned about 



26 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

this aspect of the matter. It was, in his opinion, 
frankly negligible. 

Frederick seized Silesia with ease in 1740, so 
unexpected was the attack. He thus added to 
Prussia a territory larger than Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, and Rhode Island combined, and a 
population of over a million and a quarter. But 
having seized it, he was forced to fight intermit- 
tently for twenty-three years before he could be 
sure of his ability to retain it. The first two 
Silesian wars (1740-1748) are best known in his- 
tory as the wars of the Austrian Succession. 
The third was the Seven Years' War, a world 
conflict, as we have seen, involving most of the 
great states of Europe, but important to Fred- 
erick mainly because of its relation to his reten- 
tion of Silesia. 

It was the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) that 
made the name and fame of Frederick ring 
throughout the world. But that deadly struggle 
several times seemed about to engulf him and 
his country in utter ruin. Had England not 
been his ally, aiding with her subsidies 
and with her campaigns against France, in 
Europe, Asia, America, and on the high seas, 
thus preventing that country from fully co- 
operating against Prussia, Frederick must have 
failed. The odds against him were stupendous. 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 27 

He, the ruler of a petty state with not more than 
4,000,000 inhabitants, was confronted by a 
coalition of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden, 
and many little German states, with a total popu- 
lation perhaps twenty times as large as Prussia's. 
This coalition had already arranged for the divi- 
sion of his kingdom. He was to be left only 
Brandenburg, the primitive core of the state, the 
original territory given to the House of Hohen- 
zollern in 141 5 by the emperor. 

Practically the entire continent was united 
against this little state which a short time be- 
fore had hardly entered into the calculations of 
European politics. But Frederick was un- 
daunted. He overran Saxony, a neutral country, 
seized its treasury because he needed it, and, by 
a flagrant breach of international usage, forced 
its citizens to fight in his armies, which were 
thus considerably increased. When reproached 
for this unprecedented act he laconically replied 
that he rather prided himself on being original. 

The war thus begun had its violent ups and 
downs. Attacked from the south by the Aus- 
trians, from the east by the Russians, and always 
outnumbered, Frederick, fighting a defensive 
war, owed his salvation to the rapidity of his 
manoeuvres, to the slowness of those of his ene- 
mies, to his generally superior tactics, and to 



28 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

the fact that there was an entire lack of co- 
ordination among his adversaries. He won the 
battle of Rossbach in 1757, his most brilliant 
victory, whose fame has not yet died away. 
With an army of only 20,000 he defeated a com- 
bined French and German army of 55,000 in an 
engagement that lasted only an hour and a 
half, took 16,000 prisoners, seventy-two can- 
non, and sustained a loss of less than a thou- 
sand men himself. Immense was the enthusi- 
asm evoked by this Prussian triumph over 
what was reputed to be the finest army in Eu- 
rope. It mattered little that the majority of the 
conquered army were Germans. The victory 
was popularly considered one of Germans over 
French, and such has remained its reputation 
ever since in the German national consciousness, 
thus greatly stirred and vivified. 

Two years later Frederick suffered an almost 
equally disastrous defeat at the hands of the Aus- 
trians and Russians at Kunersdorf. " I have 
had two horses killed under me," he wrote 
the night after this battle, " and it is my mis- 
fortune that I still live myself. ... Of an 
army of 48,000 men I have only 3,000 
left. ... I have no more resources and, not to 
lie about it, I think everything is lost." 

Later, after another disaster, he wrote: "I 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 29 

should like to hang myself, but we must act the 
play to the end." In this temper he fought on, 
year after year, through elation, through depres- 
sion, with defeat behind him and defeat staring 
him in the face, relieved by occasional successes, 
saved by the incompetence and folly of his ene- 
mies, then plunged in gloom again, but always 
fighting for time and for some lucky stroke of 
fortune, such as the death of a hostile sovereign 
with its attendant interruption or change of 
policy. The story is too crowded, too replete 
with incident, to be condensed here. Only the 
general impression of a prolonged, racking, des- 
perate struggle can be indicated. Gritty, cool, 
alert, and agile, Frederick managed to hold on 
until his enemies were ready and willing to make 
peace. 

He came out of this war with his territories 
intact but not increased. Silesia he retained, but 
Saxony he was forced to relinquish. He came 
out of it, also, prematurely old, hard, bitter, mis- 
anthropic, but he had made upon the world an 
indelible impression of his genius. His people 
had been decimated and appallingly impover- 
ished; nevertheless he was the victor and great 
was his renown. Frederick had conquered Si- 
lesia in a month and had then spent many years 
fighting to retain it. All that he had won was 



3 o THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

fame, but that he enjoyed in full and overflowing 
measure. 

Frederick lived twenty-three years longer, 
years of unremitting and very fruitful toil. In 
a hundred ways he sought to hasten the 
recuperation and the development of his sorely 
visited land, draining marshes, clearing forests, 
encouraging industries, opening schools, welcom- 
ing and favoring immigrants from other coun- 
tries. Indeed, over 300,000 of these re- 
sponded to the various inducements offered, 
and Frederick founded more than 800 vil- 
lages. He reorganized the army, replenished 
the public treasury, remodeled the legal code. 
In religious affairs he was the most toler- 
ant ruler in Europe, giving refuge to the Jesuits 
when they were driven out of Catholic coun- 
tries — France, Portugal, Spain — and when their 
order was abolished by the Pope himself. " In 
Prussia," said he, " every one has the right to 
win salvation in his own way." 

In practice this was about the only indubitable 
right the individual possessed, for Frederick's 
government was unlimited, although frequently 
enlightened, despotism. His was an absolute 
monarchy, surrounded by a privileged nobility, 
resting upon an impotent mass of peasantry. 
His was a militarist state and only nobles 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 31 

could become general officers. Laborious, ris- 
ing at three in summer, at four in the winter, 
and holding himself tightly to his mission as 
" first servant to the King of Prussia," Frederick 
knew more drudgery than pleasure. But he was 
a tyrant to his finger tips, and we do not find in 
the Prussia of his day any room made for that 
spirit of freedom which was destined in the im- 
mediate future to wrestle in Europe with this 
outworn system of autocracy. 

In 1772 the conqueror of Silesia proceeded to 
gather new laurels of a similar kind. In conjunc- 
tion with the monarchs of Russia and Austria 
he partially dismembered Poland, a crime of 
which the world has not yet heard the last. The 
task was easy of accomplishment, as Poland was 
defenseless. Frederick frankly admitted that 
the act was that of brigands, and his opinion has 
been ratified by the general agreement of pos- 
terity. 

When Frederick died in 1786, at the age of 
seventy-four, he left his kingdom nearly doubled 
in size and with a population more than doubled. 
In all his actions he thought, not of Germany, 
but of Prussia, always Prussia. Germany was 
an abstraction that had no hold upon his practi- 
cal mind. He considered the German language 
boorish, " a jargon, devoid of every grace," and 



32 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

he was sure that Germany had no literature 
worthy of the name. Nevertheless he was re- 
garded throughout German lands, beyond Prus- 
sia, as a national hero, and he filled the national 
thought and imagination as no other German 
had done since Luther. His personality, his 
ideas, and his methods became an enduring and 
potent factor in the development of Germany. 

But the trouble with despotism as a form of 
government is that a strong or enlightened 
despot may so easily be succeeded by a feeble or 
foolish one, as proved to be the case when Fred- 
erick died and was succeeded in 1786 by 
Frederick William II, under whom and under 
whose successor came evil days, contrasting 
most unpleasantly with the brilliant ones that 
had gone before. 

Lying beyond Austria and Prussia, stretching 
away indefinitely into the east, was the other 
remaining great power in European politics, 
Russia. 

Though the largest state on the continent, 
Russia did not enter upon the scene of European 
politics as a factor of importance until very late, 
indeed until the eighteenth century. During 
that century she took her place among the great 
European powers and her influence in the world 
has gone on increasing down to the present mo- 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 33 

ment. Her previous history had been peculiar, 
differing in many and fundamental respects from 
that of her western neighbors. She had lived 
apart, unnoticed and unknown. She was con- 
nected with Europe by two ties, those of race and 
religion. The Russians were a Slavic people, 
related to the Poles, the Bohemians, the Serbs, 
and the other branches of that great family 
which spreads over eastern Europe. And as 
early as the tenth century they had been con- 
verted to Christianity, not to that form that pre- 
vailed in the West, but to the Orthodox Greek 
form, which had its seat in Constantinople. The 
missionaries who had brought religion and at 
the same time the beginnings of civilization had 
come from that city. After the conquest of Con- 
stantinople by the infidel Turks in 1453 the Rus- 
sians considered themselves its legitimate heirs, 
the representatives of its ideas and traditions. 
Constantinople exercised over their imaginations 
a spell that has only increased with time. 

But the great central fact of Russian history 
for hundreds of years was not her connection 
with Europe, which, after all, was slight, but her 
connection with Asia, which was close and pro- 
found in its effects. The Principality of Muscovy, 
as Russia was then called from its capital Mos- 
cow, was conquered by the Mongols, barbarians 



34 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

from Asia, in the thirteenth century, and for 
nearly three hundred years Russian princes paid 
tribute and made occasional visits of submission 
to the far-off Great Khan. Though constantly 
resenting this subjection, they did not escape its 
effects. They themselves became half-Asiatic. 
The men of Russia dressed in Oriental fashion, 
wearing the long robes with long sleeves, the 
turbans and slippers of the East. They wore 
their hair and beards long. The women were 
kept secluded and were heavily veiled when in 
public. A young girl saw her husband for the 
first time the day of her marriage. There was 
no such thing as society as we understand the 
term. The government was an Oriental tyranny, 
unrestrained, regardless of human life. In ad- 
dressing the ruler a person must completely 
prostrate himself, his forehead touching the floor, 
a difficult as well as a degrading attitude for one 
human being to assume toward another. 

In time the Russians threw off the Mongol 
domination, after terrible struggles, and them- 
selves in turn conquered northern Asia, that is, 
Siberia. A new royal house came to the throne 
in 1613, the House of Romanoff, still the reign- 
ing family of Russia. 

But the Russians continued to have only the 
feeblest connection with Europe, knowing little 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 35 

of its civilization, caring less, content to vegetate 
in indolence and obscurity. Out of this dull and 
laggard state they were destined to be roughly 
and emphatically roused by one of the most 
energetic rulers known to history, Peter the 
Great, whose reign of thirty-six years (1689- 
1725) marks a tremendous epoch, both by what 
it actually accomplished and by what it indi- 
cated ought to be the goal of national endeavor. 
As a boy Peter had been given no serious in- 
struction, no training in self-control, but had 
been allowed to run wild, and had picked up all 
sorts of acquaintances and companions, many of 
them foreigners. It was the chance association 
with Europeans living in the foreign quarter of 
Moscow that proved the decisive fact of his life, 
shaping his entire career. From them he got a 
most irregular, haphazard, but original educa- 
tion, learning a little German, a little Dutch, 
some snatches of science, arithmetic, geometry. 
His chief boyish interest was in mechanics and 
its relation to the military art. With him, 
playing soldier was more serious than with most 
boys. He used to build wooden fortresses, sur- 
rounded with walls and moats and bastions. 
Some of his friends would defend the redoubt 
while he and the others attacked it. Sometimes 
lives were lost, always some were wounded. 



36 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Such are the fortunes of war, though not usually 
of juvenile war. " The boy is amusing himself," 
was the comment of his sister, who was exercis- 
ing the regency in his name. Passionately fond 
of military games, Peter was also absorbingly 
interested in boats and ships, and eagerly learned 
all he could of navigation, which was not much, 
for the arts of shipbuilding and navigation were 
in their very infancy in Russia. 

Learning that his sister Sophia was planning 
to ignore his right to the throne and to become 
ruler herself, he dropped his sham fights and his 
sailing, swept his sister aside into a nunnery, and 
assumed control of the state. Convinced that 
Europe was in every way superior to Russia, 
that Russia had everything to gain and nothing 
to lose from a knowledge of the ways and insti- 
tutions of the western countries, Peter's policy 
from the beginning to the end of his reign was 
to bring about the closest possible connection 
between his backward country and the progres- 
sive and brilliant civilization which had been 
built up in England, France, Holland, Italy, and 
Germany. 

But even with the best intentions this was not 
an easy task. For Russia had no point of physi- 
cal contact with the nations of western Europe. 
She could not freely communicate with them, 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 37 

for between her and them was a wall consisting 
of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. Russia was 
nearly a land-locked country. Sweden controlled 
all that coast-line along the Baltic which is now 
Russian, Turkey controlled all the coast-line of 
the Black Sea. The only port Russia possessed 
was far to the north, at Archangel, and this was 
frozen during nine months of the year. To com- 
municate freely and easily with the West, Russia 
must " open a window " somewhere, as Peter ex- 
pressed it. Then the light could stream in. He 
must have an ice-free port in European waters. 
To secure this he fought repeated campaigns 
against Turkey and Sweden. With the latter 
power there was intermittent war for twenty 
years, very successful in the end, though only 
after distressing reverses. He conquered the 
Baltic Provinces from Sweden, Courland, Es- 
thonia, and Livonia, and thus secured a long 
coast-line. Russia might now have a navy and a 
merchant fleet and sea-borne commerce. " It is 
not land I want, but water," Peter had said. He 
now had enough, at least to begin with. 

Meanwhile he had sent fifty young Russians 
of the best families to England, Holland, and 
Venice to learn the arts and sciences of the West, 
especially shipbuilding and fortifications. Later 
he had gone himself for the same purpose, to 



38 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

study on the spot the civilization whose supe- 
riority he recognized and intended to impose 
upon his own country, if that were possible. 
This was a famous voyage. Traveling under the 
strictest incognito, as " Peter Mikailovitch," he 
donned laborer's clothes and worked for months 
in the shipyards of Holland and England. He 
was interested in everything. He visited mills 
and factories of every kind, asking innumerable 
questions: "What is this for? How does that 
work? " He made a sheet of paper with his own 
hands. During his hours of recreation he visited 
museums, theaters, hospitals, galleries. He saw 
printing presses in operation, attended lectures 
on anatomy, studied surgery a little, and even 
acquired some proficiency in the humble and use- 
ful art of pulling teeth. He bought collections 
of laws, and models of all sorts of machines, and 
engaged many officers, mechanics, printers, 
architects, sailors, and workmen of every kind, 
to go to Russia to engage in the task of impart- 
ing instruction to a nation which, in Peter's 
opinion, needed it and should receive it, willy- 
nilly. 

Peter was called home suddenly by the news 
of a revolt among the imperial troops devoted 
to the old regime and apprehensive of the com- 
ing innovations. They were punished with every 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 39 

refinement of savage cruelty, their regiments dis- 
banded, and a veritable reign of terror preceded 
the introduction of the new system. 

Then the Czar began with energy his trans- 
formation of Russia, as he described it. The 
process continued all through his reign. It was 
not an elaborate, systematic plan, deliberately 
worked out beforehand, but first this reform, 
then that, was adopted and enforced, and in the 
end the sum-total of all these measures of detail 
touched the national life at nearly every point. 
Some of them concerned manners and customs, 
others economic matters, others matters purely 
political. Peter at once fell upon the long beards 
and Oriental costumes, which, in his opinion, 
symbolized the conservatism of Old Russia, 
which he was resolved to shatter. Arming him- 
self with a pair of shears, he himself clipped the 
liberal beards and mustaches of many of his 
nobles, and cut their long coats at the knee. 
They must set the style, and the style must be 
that of France and Germany. Having given this 
sensational exhibition of his imperial purpose, he 
then compromised somewhat, allowing men to 
wear their beards long, but only on condition of 
submitting to a graduated tax upon these 
ornaments. The approbation of the Emperor, 
the compulsion of fashion, combined with con- 



4 o THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

siderations of economy, rapidly wrought a sur- 
prising change in the appearance of the man- 
hood of Russia. Barbers and tailors were sta- 
tioned at the entrances of towns to facilitate 
the process by slashing the offending members 
until they conformed to European standards. 
Women were forbidden to wear the veil and 
were released from the captivity of the harem, 
or terem, as it was called in Russia. Peter 
had attended the " assemblies " of France and 
England and had seen men and women dancing 
and conversing together in public. He now or- 
dered the husbands and fathers of Russia to 
bring their wives and daughters to all social 
entertainments. The adjustments were awk- 
ward at first, the women frequently standing or 
sitting stiffly apart at one end of the room, the 
men smoking and drinking by themselves at the 
other. But finally society as understood in Eu- 
rope emerged from these temporary and amusing 
difficulties. Peter gave lessons in dancing to 
some of his nobles, having himself acquired that 
accomplishment while on his famous trip. They 
were expected, in turn, to pass the secret on to 
others. 

The organs of government, national and local, 
were remodeled by the adoption of forms and 
methods known to Sweden, Germany, and other 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 41 

countries, and the state became more efficient 
and at the same time more powerful. The army 
was enlarged, equipped, and trained mainly in 
imitation of Germany. A navy was created and 
the importance of the sea to the general life of 
the nation gradually dawned upon the popular 
intelligence. The economic development of the 
country was begun, factories were established, 
mines were opened, and canals were cut. The 
church was brought into closer subjection to the 
state. Measures were taken against vagabond- 
age and robbery, widely prevalent evils. Edu- 
cation of a practical sort was encouraged. The 
Julian calendar was introduced and is still in 
force, though the other nations of Europe have 
since adopted another and more accurate chro- 
nology. Peter even undertook to reform the 
language of Russia, striking out eight of the 
more cumbersome letters of the alphabet and 
simplifying the form of some of the others. 

All these changes encountered resistance, re- 
sistance born of indolence, of natural conserva- 
tism, of religious scruples — was it not impious 
for Holy Russia to abandon her native customs 
and to imitate the heretics of the West? But 
Peter went on smashing his way through as best 
he could, crushing opposition by fair means and 
by foul, for the quality of the means was a mat- 



42 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ter of indifference to him, if only they were suc- 
cessful. Here we have the spectacle of a man 
who, himself a semi-barbarian, was bent upon 
civilizing men more barbarous than he. 

As the ancient capital, Moscow, was the 
stronghold of stiff conservatism, was wedded 
to the old ideas and customs, Peter resolved 
to build a new capital on the Baltic. There, 
on islands and marshes at the mouth of a river 
which frequently overflowed, he built at fright- 
ful cost in human life and suffering the city of 
St. Petersburg. Everything had to be created 
literally from the ground up. Forests of piles 
had to be driven into the slime to the solid 
earth beneath to furnish the secure foundations. 
Tens of thousands of soldiers and peasants were 
drafted for the work. At first they had no 
implements, but were forced to dig with sticks 
and carry the rubbish away in their coats. 
No adequate provisions were made for them; 
they slept unprotected in the open air, their 
food was insufficient and they died by thou- 
sands, only to be replaced by other thousands. 
All through the reign the desperate, rough 
process went on. The will of the autocrat, rich in 
expedients, triumphed over all obstacles. Every 
great landowner was required to build in the city 
a residence of a certain size and style. No ship 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 43 

might enter without bringing a certain quantity 
of stone for building purposes. St. Petersburg 
was cut by numerous canals, as were the cities 
of Holland. The Czar required the nobles to 
possess boats. Some of them, not proficient in 
the handling of these novel craft, were drowned. 
Toward the close of his reign Peter transferred 
the government to this city which stood on the 
banks of the Neva, a monument to his imagina- 
tion, his energy, and his persistence, a city with 
no hampering traditions, with no past, but with 
only an untrammeled future, an appropriate ex- 
pression of the spirit of the New Russia which 
Peter was laboring to create. 

He was, indeed, a strange leader for a people 
which needed above all to shake itself free from 
what was raw and crude, he was himself so raw 
and crude. A man of violent passions, capable and 
guilty of orgies of dissipation, of acts of savage 
cruelty, hard and fiendish in his treatment even 
of those nearest to him, his sister, his wife, and 
his son, using willingly as instruments of prog- 
ress the atrocious knout and wheel and stake, 
Peter was neither a model ruler, nor a model man. 
Yet, with all these traits of primal barbarism in 
his nature, he had many redeeming points. Good- 
humored, frank, and companionable under ordi- 
nary circumstances, he was entirely natural, as 



44 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

loyal in his friendships as he was bitter in his 
enmities. Masterful, titanic, there was in him a 
wild vitality, an immense energy, and he was 
great in the singleness of his aim. He did not 
succeed in transforming Russia; that could not 
be accomplished in one generation or in two. 
But he left an army of two hundred thousand 
men, he connected Russia with the sea by the 
coast-line of the Baltic, thus opening a contact 
with countries that were more advanced, intel- 
lectually and socially, and he raised a standard 
and started a tradition. 

Then followed, upon his death, a series of me- 
diocre rulers, under whom it seemed likely that 
the ground gained might be lost. But under 
Elizabeth (1741-1762) Russia played an impor- 
tant part in the Seven Years' War, thus showing 
her altered position in Europe, and with the ad- 
vent of Catherine II (1762-1796) the process of 
Europeanizing Russia and of expanding her ter- 
ritories and magnifying her position in inter- 
national politics was resumed with vigor and 
carried out with success. 

Catherine was a German princess, the wife of 
the Czar Peter III, who, proving a worthless 
ruler, was deposed, after a reign of a few months, 
then done to death, probably with the connivance 
of his wife. Catherine became empress, and for 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 45 

thirty-four years ruled Russia with an iron hand. 
Fond of pleasure, fond of work, a woman of 
intellectual tastes, or at least pretensions, which 
she satisfied by intimate correspondence with 
Voltaire, Diderot, and other French philosophers 
of the day, being rewarded for her condescension 
and her favors by their enthusiastic praise of her 
as the " Semiramis of the North," Catherine 
passes as one of the enlightened despots of her 
century. Being of western birth, she naturally 
sympathized with the policy of introducing 
western civilization into Russia, and gave that 
policy her vigorous support. 

But her chief significance in history is her for- 
eign policy. Three countries, we have seen, 
stood between Russia and the countries of west- 
ern Europe, Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. Peter 
had conquered the first and secured the water 
route by the Baltic. Catherine devoted her en- 
tire reign to conquering the other two. The 
former she accomplished by infamous means and 
with rare completeness. By the end of her reign 
Poland had been utterly destroyed and Russia 
had pushed her boundaries far westward until 
they touched those of Prussia and Austria. 
Catherine was not able to dismember Turkey as 
Poland was dismembered, but she gained from 
her the Crimea and the northern shores of the 



46 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Black Sea from the Caucasus to the Dniester. 
She had even dreamed of driving the Turk en- 
tirely from Europe and of extending her own 
influence down to the Mediterranean by the 
establishment of a Byzantine empire that should 
be dependent upon Russia. But any dream of 
getting to Constantinople was a dream indeed, 
as the troubled history of a subsequent century 
was to show. Henceforth, however, Europe 
could count on one thing with certainty, namely, 
that Russia would be a factor to be considered 
in any rearrangement of the map of the Balkan 
peninsula, in any determination of the Eastern 
question. 

This rise of Russia, like the rise of Prussia, to 
a position of commanding importance, in Euro- 
pean politics, was the work of the eighteenth 
century. Both were characteristic products of 
that age. 

The more one examines in general the gov- 
ernments of Europe in the eighteenth century, 
and the policies which they followed or at- 
tempted to follow, the less is one impressed 
with either their wisdom or their morality. The 
control was everywhere in the hands of the 
few and was everywhere directed to the advan- 
tage of the few. The idea that it was the first 
duty of the state to assure, if possible, the 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 47 

welfare of the great majority of the people 
was not the idea recognized in actual prac- 
tice. The first duty of the state was to in- 
crease its dominions by hook or crook, and to 
provide for the satisfaction of the rulers and the 
privileged classes. One could find in all Europe 
hardly a trace of what we call democracy. Eu- 
rope was organized aristocratically, and for the 
benefit of aristocracies. This was true even in 
such a country as England, which had a parlia- 
ment and established liberties; even in republics, 
like Venice or Genoa or the cantons of Switzer- 
land. 

The condition of the vast mass of the people 
in every country was the thing least considered. 
It was everywhere deplorable, though varying, 
more or less, in different countries. The masses, 
who were peasants, were weighed down and 
hemmed in by laws and institutions and customs 
that took no account of their well-being. In one 
way or another they were outrageously taxed, so 
that but a small fraction of what they earned 
went for their own support. Throughout most 
of Europe they did not possess what we regard as 
the mere beginnings of personal liberty, for, ex- 
cept in England and France, serfdom, with all its 
paralyzing restrictions, was in force. No one 
dreamed that the people were entitled to educa- 



48 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

tion so that they might be better equipped for 
life. The great substructure of European so- 
ciety was an unhappy, unfree, unprotected, un- 
developed mass of human beings, to whom op- 
portunity for growth and improvement was 
closed on every side. 

If the governments of Europe did not seriously 
consider the interests of the most numerous and 
weakest class, on whose well-being depended ab- 
solutely the ultimate well-being of the nations, 
did they discharge their other obligations with 
any greater understanding or sense of justice? 
It cannot be said that they did. The distempers 
in every state were numerous and alarming. 
The writings of contemporaries abound in 
gloomy prophecies. There was a widespread 
feeling that revolutions, catastrophes, ruin were 
impending, that the body politic was nowhere in 
sound condition. Excessive expenditures for the 
maintenance of extravagant courts, for sump- 
tuous buildings, for favorites of every stripe and 
feather, excessive expenditures for armies and 
for wars, which were frequent, resulted in in- 
creasing disorder in the finances of the various 
nations. States resorted more and more to loans, 
with the result that the income had to go for the 
payment of the interest. Deficits were chronic, 
and no country except England had a budget, or 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 49 

public and official statement of expenditures and 
receipts. Taxes were increasing and were de- 
testably distributed. Everywhere in Europe the 
richer a man was the less he paid proportionately. 
As new taxes were imposed, exemptions, com- 
plete or partial, went with them, and the exemp- 
tions were for the nobility and, in part, for the 
middle classes, where such existed. Crushing 
therefore was the burden of the lower orders. 
It was truly a vicious circle. 

These evils were so apparent that now and 
then they prompted the governing authorities to 
attempt reform. Several rulers in various coun- 
tries made earnest efforts to improve conditions. 
These were the " benevolent despots " of the 
eighteenth century who tried reform from above 
before the French tried it from below. On the 
whole they had no great or permanent success, 
and the need of thoroughgoing changes remained 
to trouble the future. 

Not only were the governments of Europe 
generally inefficient in all that concerned the full, 
symmetrical development of the economic, in- 
tellectual, and moral resources of the people, not 
only were they generally repressive and oppres- 
sive, allowing little scope to the principle of lib- 
erty, but they were, in their relations to each 
other, unprincipled, unscrupulous. The state 



5 o THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

was conceived as force, not at all as a moral 
being, subject to moral obligations and re- 
straints. The glory of rulers consisted in extend- 
ing the boundaries of their states, regardless of 
the rights of other peoples, regardless even of 
the rights of other rulers. The code that gov- 
erned their relations with each other was primi- 
tive indeed. Any means were legitimate, success 
was the only standard of right or wrong. " He 
who gains nothing, loses," wrote Catherine of 
Russia, one of the " enlightened " despots. The 
dominant idea in all government circles was that 
the greatness of the state was in proportion to 
its territorial extent, not in proportion to the 
freedom, the prosperity, the education of its 
people. The prevalence of this idea brought it 
about that every nation sought to be ready to 
take advantage of any weakness or distress that 
might appear in the situation of its neighbors. 
Armies must be constantly at hand and diplo- 
macy must be ready for any scurvy trick or in- 
famous crime that might promise hope of gain. 
It followed that treaties were to be broken when- 
ever there was any advantage in breaking them. 
" It is a mistake to break your word without 
reason," said Frederick II, " for thus you gain 
the reputation of being light and fickle." To 
keep faith with each other was no duty of rulers. 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 51 

There was consequently no certainty in inter- 
national agreements. 

This indifference to solemn promises was noth- 
ing new. The eighteenth century was full of 
flagrant violations of most explicit international 
agreements. There was no honor among na- 
tions. No state had any rights which any other 
state was bound to respect. These monarchs, 
" enlightened " and " benevolent " or not, as the 
case might be, all agreed that they ruled by di- 
vine right, by the will of God. Yet this decidedly 
imposing origin of their authority gave them 
no sense of security in their relations with each 
other, nor did it give to their reigns any ex- 
ceptional purity or unworldly character. The 
maxims of statecraft which they followed were 
of the earth earthy. While bent upon increasing 
their own power they did not neglect the study 
of the art of undermining each other's power, 
however divinely buttressed in theory it might 
be. Monarchs were dethroned, states were 
extinguished, boundaries were changed and 
changed again, as the result of aggressive wars, 
during the eighteenth century. Moreover the 
wars of that time were famous for the exactions 
of the victors and for the scandalous fortunes 
made by some of the commanders. It was not 
the French Revolutionists nor was it Napoleon 



52 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

who introduced these customs into Europe. 
They could not, had they tried, have lowered the 
tone of war or statecraft in Europe. At the 
worst they might only imitate their predecessors. 
The Old Regime in Europe was to be brought 
tumbling down in unutterable confusion as a re- 
sult of the storm which was brewing in France 
and which we are now to study. But that regime 
had been undermined, the props that supported 
it had been destroyed, by its own official bene- 
ficiaries and defenders. The Old Regime was 
disloyal to the very principles on which it rested, 
respect for the established order, for what was 
old and traditional, for what had come down 
from the past, regard for legality, for engage- 
ments, loyalty to those in authority. How little 
regard the monarchs of Europe themselves had 
for principles which they were accustomed to 
pronounce sacred, for principles in which alone 
lay their own safety, was shown by the part 
they played in the great events of the eight- 
eenth century already alluded to, the war of 
the Austrian Succession, and the Partition of 
Poland. By the first the ruler of Austria, 
Maria Theresa, was robbed of the large and 
valuable province of Silesia by Prussia, aided 
by France, both of which states had recently 
signed a peculiarly solemn treaty called the 



THE OLD REGIME IN EUROPE 53 

Pragmatic Sanction, by which her rights had 
been explicitly and emphatically recognized. 
Frederick II, however, wanted the province, took 
it, and kept it. This case shows how lightly 
monarchs regarded legal obligations, when they 
conflicted with their ambitions. 

The other case, the Partition of Poland, was 
the most iniquitous act of the century. Poland 
was in geographical extent the largest state in 
Europe, next to Russia. Its history ran far back. 
But its government was utterly weak. There- 
fore in 1772 Prussia, Austria, and Russia at- 
tacked it for no cause save their own cupidity, 
and tore great fragments away, annexing them 
to their own territories. Twenty years later they 
completed the process in two additional parti- 
tions, in 1793 and 1795, thus entirely annihilat- 
ing an ancient state. This shows how much re- 
gard the monarchs of Europe had for established 
institutions, for established authorities. 

Two things only counted in Old Europe — 
force and will, the will of the sovereign. But 
force and will may be used quite as easily for 
revolution, for the overthrow of what is old and 
sacred, as for its preservation. There need be 
no surprise at anything that we may find Napo- 
leon doing. He had a sufficient pattern and 
exemplar in Frederick the Great and in Catherine 



54 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

of Russia, only recently deceased when his 
meteoric career began. 

The eighteenth century attained its legitimate 
climax in its closing decade, a very memorable 
period in the history of the world. The Old 
Regime in Europe was rudely shattered by the 
overthrow of the Old Regime in France, which 
country, by its astonishing actions, was to domi- 
nate the next quarter of a century. 




□ i err 
bvR 



Lung East i-i of 



CHAPTER I 

THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 

THE French Revolution brought with it a new- 
conception of the state, new principles of politics 
and of society, a new outlook upon life, a new 
faith which seized the imagination of multitudes, 
inspiring them with intense enthusiasm, arous- 
ing boundless hopes, and precipitating a long and 
passionate struggle with all those who feared or 
hated innovation, who were satisfied with things 
as they were, who found their own conditions of 
life comfortable and did not wish to be disturbed. 
Soon France and Europe were divided into two 
camps, the reformers and the conservatives, 
those believing in radical changes along many 
lines and those who believed in preserving what 
was old and tried, either because they profited 
by it or because they felt that men were happier 
and more prosperous in living under conditions 
and with institutions to which they were accus- 
tomed than under those that might be ideally 
more perfect but would at any rate be strange 
and novel and uncertain. 

In order to understand the French Revolution 

55 



56 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

it is necessary to examine the conditions and in- 
stitutions of France out of which it grew; in 
other words, the Old Regime. Only thus can 
we get our sense of perspective, our standard of 
values and of criticism. The Revolution accom- 
plished a sweeping transformation in the life of 
France. Putting it in a single phrase it accom- 
plished the transition from the feudal system of 
the preceding centuries to the democratic system 
of the modern world. The entire structure of 
the French state and of French society was re- 
modeled and planted on new and far-reaching 
principles. 

The essence of the feudal system was class 
divisions and acknowledged privileges for all 
classes above the lowest. The essence of the new 
system is the removal of class distinctions, the 
abolition of privileges, the introduction of the 
principle of the equality of men, wherever pos- 
sible. 

What strikes one most in contemplating the 
Old Regime is the prevalence and the oppressive- 
ness of the privileges that various classes en- 
joyed. Society was simply honeycombed with 
them. They affected life constantly and at every 
point. It is not an easy society to describe in 
a few words, for the variations were almost end- 
less. But, broadly speaking, and leaving details 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 57 

aside, French society was graded from top to 
bottom, and each grade differed, in legal rights, 
in opportunities for enjoyment and development, 
in power. 

The system culminated in the monarch, the 
lofty and glittering head of the state, the embodi- 
ment of the might and the majesty of the nation. 
The king claimed to rule by the will of God, that 
is, by divine right, not at all by the consent of 
the people. He was responsible to no one but 
God. Consequently in the actual conduct of his 
office he was subject to no control. He was an 
absolute monarch. He could do as he chose. It 
was for the nation to obey. The will of the king 
and that alone was, in theory, the only thing that 
counted. It determined what the law should be 
that should govern twenty-five million French- 
men in their daily lives. " This thing is 
legal because I wish it," said Louis XVI, thus 
stating in a single phrase the nature of the mon- 
archy, the theory, and the practice also, if the 
monarch happened to be a strong man. The 
king made the laws, he levied the taxes, he spent 
them as he saw fit, he declared wars, made peace, 
contracted alliances according to his own inclina- 
tion. There was in theory no restriction upon 
his power, and all his subjects lay in the hollow 
of his hand. He could seize their property; he 



58 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

could imprison them by a mere order, a lettre de 
cachet, without trial, and for such a period as he 
desired; he could control, if not their thoughts, 
at least the expression of them, for his censor- 
ship of the press, whether employed in the publi- 
cation of books or newspapers, could muzzle 
them absolutely. 

So commanding a figure required a broad and 
ample stage for the part he was to play, a rich and 
spacious background. Never was a being more 
sumptuously housed. While Paris was the capi- 
tal of France, the king resided twelve miles away 
amid the splendors of Versailles. There he lived 
and moved and had his being in a palace that 
was the envy of every other king in Christen- 
dom, a monumental pile, with its hundreds of 
rooms, its chapel, theater, dining halls, salons, 
and endless suites of apartments for its distin- 
guished occupants, the royal family, its hundreds 
of servants and its guests. This mammoth resi- 
dence had been built a century before at an ex- 
pense of about a hundred million dollars in terms 
of our money today, an imposing setting for a 
most brilliant and numerous court, lending itself, 
with its miles of corridors, of walks through end- 
less formal gardens studded with statues, foun- 
tains, and artificial lakes, to all the pomp and 
pageantry of power. For the court which so 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 59 

dazzled Europe was composed of 18,000 people, 
perhaps 16,000 of whom were attached to the 
personal service of the king and his family, 2,000 
being courtiers, the favored guests of the house, 
nobles who were engaged in a perpetual round of 
pleasures and who were also busily feathering 
their own nests by soliciting, of course in polished 
and subtle ways, the favors that streamed from a 
lavish throne. Luxury was everywhere the pre- 
vailing note. Well may the occupants of the pal- 
ace have considered themselves, in spirit and in 
truth, the darlings of the gods, for earth had not 
anything to show more costly. The king, the 
queen, the royal children, the king's brothers and 
sisters and aunts all had their separate establish- 
ments under the spacious roof. The queen alone 
had 500 servants. The royal stables contained 
nearly 1,900 horses and more than 200 carriages, 
and the annual cost of this service alone was the 
equivalent of $4,000,000. The king's own table 
cost more than a million and a half. As gaiety 
was unconfined, so necessarily was the expendi- 
ture that kept it going, for every one in this 
household secured what, in the parlance of our 
vulgar democracy, is called a handsome " rake- 
off." Thus ladies-in-waiting secured about 
$30,000 each by the privilege they enjoyed 
of selling the candles that had once been 



60 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

lighted but not used up. Queen Marie Antoinette 
had four pairs of shoes a week, which constituted 
a profitable business for somebody. In 1789 the 
total cost of all this riot of extravagance 
amounted to not far from $20,000,000. No won- 
der that men spoke of the court as the veritable 
nation's grave. 

Not only were the King's household expenses 
pitched to this exalted scale, but, in addition, he 
gave money or appointments or pensions freely, 
as to the manner born, to those who gained his 
approbation and his favor. It has been estimated 
that in the fifteen years between 1774, when 
Louis XVI came to the throne, and 1789, when 
the whirlwind began, the King thus presented to 
favorites the equivalent of more than a hundred 
million dollars of our money. For those who 
basked in such sunshine it was unquestionably 
a golden age. 

Such was the dazzling apex of a state edifice 
that was rickety in the extreme. For the govern- 
ment of France was ill-constructed and the times 
were decidedly out of joint. That government 
was not a miracle of design, but of the lack 
of it. Complicated, ill-adjusted, the various 
branches dimly defined or overlapping, it was 
thoroughly unscientific and inefficient. The king 
was assisted by five councils which framed the 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 61 

laws, issued the orders, conducted the business 
of the state, domestic and foreign, at the capital. 
Then for purposes of local government France 
was split up into divisions, but, unfortunately, 
not into a single, simple set. There were forty 
" governments," so called, thirty-two of which 
corresponded closely to the old provinces of 
France, the outcome of her feudal history. But 
those forty " governments " belied their name. 
They did little governing, but they furnished 
many lucrative offices for the higher nobility who 
were appointed " governors " and who resided 
generally in Versailles, contributing their part 
to the magnificent ceremonial of that showy pa- 
rade ground. 

The real, prosaic work was done in the thirty- 
six "generalities," as another set 'of divisions 
was called. Over each of these was an intendant 
who was generally of the middle or bourgeois 
class, accustomed to work. These intendants 
were appointed by the king to carry on the royal 
government, each in his own district. They 
generally did not originate much, but they car- 
ried out the orders that came from the capital 
and made their reports to it. Their power was 
practically unrestricted. Upon them depended 
in large measure the happiness or the misery of 
the provinces. Judging from the fact that most 



62 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

of them were very unpopular, it must be admit- 
ted that this, the real working part of the na- 
tional government, did not contribute to the wel- 
fare of the people. The intendants were rather 
the docile tools of the misgovernment which 
issued from the five councils which were the five 
fingers of the king. As the head is, so are the 
members, and the officials under the intendants 
for the smaller local areas enjoyed the disesteem 
evoked by the oppressive or unjust policies of 
their superiors. 

Speaking broadly, local self-government did 
not exist in France, but the local, like the na- 
tional, government was directed and determined 
in Versailles. Were a bridge to be repaired over 
some little stream hundreds of miles from Paris, 
were a new roof required for a village church, 
the matter was regulated from Paris, after ex- 
asperating delay. It was the reign of the red 
tape in every sense of the word. The people 
stood like dumb, driven cattle before this mon- 
strous system. The only danger lay in the 
chance that they might not always remain 
dumb. Here obviously was no school for popular 
political education — a fact which explains many 
of the mistakes and failures of the people when, 
in the Revolution, they themselves undertook to 
rule, the monarchy having failed egregiously to 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 63 

discharge its functions either efficiently or benefi- 
cently. 

Let no one suppose that because France was a 
highly centralized monarchy, culminating in the 
person of the king, that therefore the French 
government was a real unity. Nothing could be 
further from the truth. To study in detail the 
various aspects of the royal government, its divi- 
sions and subdivisions, its standards, its agents, 
its methods of procedure, is to enter a lane where 
the mind quickly becomes hopelessly bewildered, 
so great was the diversity in the machinery em- 
ployed, so varied were the terms in use. Uni- 
formity was nowhere to be seen. There was 
unity in the person of the king, necessarily, and 
there only. Everywhere else disunity, diversity, 
variety, without rhyme or reason. It would take 
a volume or many volumes to make this clear — 
even then the reader would be driven to despair 
in attempting to form a true mental picture of 
the situation. The institutions of France were 
a hodge-podge — chaos erected into a system, 
with no loss of the chaotic, and with no system. 
Nowadays the same laws, the same taxes, the 
same weights and measures prevail throughout 
the length and breadth of the land. But in 1789 
no such simplicity or equality prevailed. Weights 
and measures had different names and different 



64 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

values as one moved from province to province, 
sometimes as one moved from village to village. 
In some provinces taxes were, not determined, 
but at least distributed, by certain people of the 
province. In other cases this distribution was 
effected directly by the agents of the king, that 
is, by the central government. In some parts of 
France the civil laws, that is, the laws that regu- 
lated the relations of individuals with each other, 
not with the state, were of Roman origin or char- 
acter. There the written law prevailed. In other 
sections, however, mainly in the north, one 
changed laws, Voltaire said, as one changed post- 
horses. In such sections the laws were not writ- 
ten but were customary, that is, feudal in origin 
and in spirit. There were indeed 285 different 
codes of customary laws in force, that is 285 dif- 
ferent ways of regulating legally the personal 
relations of men with men, within the confines 
of France. 

Again the same diversity in another sphere. 
Thirteen of the provinces of central France en- 
joyed free trade, that is, merchandise could move 
freely from one end of that area to the other 
without restriction. But the other nineteen 
provinces were separated from each other, just 
as nations are, by tariff boundaries, and when 
goods passed from one such province to another, 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 6.5 

they passed through custom-houses and duties 
were paid on them, as on goods that come from 
Europe to the United States. 

All these diversities in laws, all these tariff 
boundaries, are easily explained. They were 
historical survivals, troublesome and irritating 
reminders of the Middle Ages. As the kings of 
France had during the ages annexed this prov- 
ince and then that, they had, more or less, 
allowed the local customs and institutions to 
remain undisturbed. Hence this amazing patch- 
work which baffles description. 

One consequence of all this was the persistence 
in France of that feeling which in American his- 
tory is known as the states-rights feeling. While 
all admitted that they were Frenchmen, provin- 
cial feeling was strong and frequently assertive. 
Men thought of themselves as Bretons, as Nor- 
mans, were attached to the things that differen- 
tiated them, were inflexible or stubborn oppo- 
nents of all attempts at amalgamation. Before 
France could be considered strongly united, fu- 
sion on a grand scale had to be accomplished. 
This was to be one of the memorable and dura- 
ble achievements of the Revolution. 

The financial condition of this extravagant 
and inefficient state was deplorable and danger- 
ous. Almost half of the national income was de- 



66 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

voted to the payment of interest on the national 
debt. Expenditures were always larger than re- 
ceipts, with the result that there was an annual 
deficit which had to be met by contracting a new 
loan, thus enlarging the debt and the interest 
charges. It appeared to be the principle of state 
finance that expenditures should not be deter- 
mined by income but income should be deter- 
mined by expenditure. The debt therefore con- 
stantly increased, and to meet the chronic deficit 
the government had recourse to well-known 
methods which only aggravated the evil — the 
sale of offices, new loans. During twelve years 
of the reign of Louis XVI, from 1776 to 1788, 
the debt increased nearly $600,000,000. People 
became unwilling to loan to the state, and it was 
practically impossible to increase the taxes. The 
national finances were in a highly critical condi- 
tion. Bankruptcy impended, and bankruptcy 
can only be avoided in two ways, either by in- 
creasing receipts or by reducing expenditures, or 
both. Attempts were made in the one direction 
and in the other, but were ineffectual. 

The receipts, of course, came from the taxes, 
and the taxes were already very burdensome, at 
least for those who paid them. They were of 
two kinds, the direct and the indirect. The 
direct taxes were those on real estate, on 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 67 

personal property, and on income. From 
some of these the nobles and the clergy 
were entirely exempt, and they therefore fell 
all the more heavily upon the class that re- 
mained, the third estate. From others the nobles, 
though not legally exempted, were in practice 
largely freed, because the authorities did not 
assess noble property nearly as high as they 
did the property of commoners. Tax-assessors 
stood in awe of the great. Thus the royal 
princes, who were subject to the income tax 
and who ought to have paid nearly two and 
a half million francs, as a matter of fact paid 
less than two hundred thousand. Again, a 
marquis who ought to have paid a property 
tax of 2,500 francs paid 400 and a bourgeois 
in the same province who ought to have paid 
70 in reality paid 760. Such crass favoritism, 
which always worked in favor of the nobles, 
never in favor of members of the third estate, 
naturally served only deeply to embitter the 
latter class. Those who were the wealthiest 
and therefore the best able to support the state 
were the very ones who paid the least, thus con- 
forming to the principle that to those that have 
shall be given and from those that have not shall 
be taken away even that which they have. It 
has been estimated that the state took from the 



68 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

middle classes, and from the workingmen and 
peasants, half their annual earnings in the form 
of these direct taxes. 

There was another branch of the system of 
taxation which was oppressive and offensive for 
other reasons. There were certain indirect taxes 
which were collected, not by state officials but 
by private individuals or companies, the farmers 
of taxes, as they were called, who paid a lump 
sum to the state and then themselves collected 
the taxes, seeking of course to extract as much 
as possible from the people. Not only has this 
system of tax-collecting always proved most 
hateful, both in ancient and modern times, as the 
tax-farmers have always, in order to make as 
much as possible, applied the screws with pitiless 
severity, thus generating a maximum of odium 
and hatred; but in this particular case several of 
the indirect taxes would have been unjust and 
oppressive, even if collected with leniency, a 
thing never heard of. There was, for instance, 
the salt tax, or gabelle, which came home, in stark 
odiousness, to every one. The trade in salt was 
not open to any one who might wish to engage 
in it, but was a monopoly of a company that 
bought the privilege from the state, and that 
company was most astoundingly favored by the 
law. For every person above seven years of 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 69 

age was required to buy at least seven pounds 
of salt annually whether he wished it or not. 
Even the utterly poor, who had not money 
enough to buy bread, were severely punished if 
they refused or neglected to buy the stated 
amount of salt. Moreover the tax-collectors had 
the right to search all houses from top to bottom 
to see that there was no evasion. Illicit trade 
in this necessary commodity was incessantly 
tracked down and severely punished. On the 
very eve of the Revolution it was officially esti- 
mated that 20,000 persons were annually im- 
prisoned and over 500 annually condemned to 
death, or to service in the galleys, which was 
hardly preferable, for engaging in the illegal 
trade in salt. Moreover by an extra refinement 
in the art of oppression the seven pounds that all 
must buy could be used only for cooking or on 
the table. If one desired to salt down fish or 
meats for preservation, one must not use this 
particular salt for that purpose, but must buy an 
additional amount. 

There was another equally intolerable tax, the 
excise on wine. The making of wine was a great 
national industry which had existed for centu- 
ries, but if ever there was a system calculated to 
depress it, it was the one in vogue in France. 
Wine was taxed all along the line from the pro- 



70 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ducer to the consumer. Taxed at the moment 
of manufacture, taxed at the moment of sale by 
the producer, it was also taxed repeatedly in 
transportation, — thirty-five or forty times, for 
instance, between the south of France and Paris, 
so that the combined taxes amounted in the end 
to nearly as much as the cost of the original pro- 
duction. A trade exposed to such constant and 
heavy impositions could not greatly flourish. 

Again the taxes both on salt and on wine were 
not uniform, but varied from region to region, 
so that the sense of unjust treatment was kept 
alive every day in the ordinary course of busi- 
ness, and so that smuggling was in many cases 
extremely profitable. This in turn led to savage 
punishments, which only augmented the univer- 
sal discontent and entered like iron into the souls 
of men. In the system of taxation, as in the 
political structure, we find everywhere inequality 
of treatment, privileges, arbitrary and tyrannical 
regulations, coupled with uncertainty from year 
to year, for the regulations were not infrequently 
changed. No wonder that men, even nobles, 
criticised this fiscal system as shockingly unjust 
and scandalously oppressive. 

The social organization of France, also, was 
far from satisfactory. On even the most cursory 
view many notorious abuses, many intolerable 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 71 

grievances, many irritating or harmful malad- 
justments stood forth, condemned by reason or 
the interest of large sections of the population. 
Forms outworn, and institutions from which the 
life had departed, but whence issued a benumb- 
ing influence, hampered development in many 
directions. French society was frankly based 
upon the principle of inequality. There were 
three classes or orders, the clergy, the nobility, 
and the third estate. Not only were the two 
former classes privileged, that is, placed upon 
a better footing than the last, but it is curious 
to observe how the pervasive principle of 
unequal rights broke up even the formal unity 
of each of these classes. There was inequal- 
ity of classes and there was also inequality 
between sections of the same class. The two 
privileged orders were favored in many ways, 
such as complete or partial exemption from 
taxes, or the right themselves to tax — the clergy 
through its right to tithes, the nobility through 
its right to exact feudal dues. Even some of the 
members of the third estate enjoyed privileges 
denied the rest. There were classes within 
classes. Of the 25,000,000 of Frenchmen the 
clergy numbered about 130,000, the nobility 
140,000, while possibly about as many bourgeois 
as these two combined enjoyed privileges that 



72 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

separated them from the mass of their class. 
Thus the privileged as a whole numbered less 
than 600,000, while the unprivileged numbered 
well over 24,000,000. One man in forty there- 
fore belonged to the favored minority whose lot 
was differentiated from that of their fellowmen 
by artificial advantages and distinctions. 

The clergy of the Roman Catholic Church 
formed the first order in the state. It was rich 
and powerful. It owned probably a fifth of 
the land of France. This land yielded a large 
revenue, and, in addition, the clergy exacted 
tithes on all the agricultural products of the 
realm. This was in reality a form of national 
taxation, with this difference from the other 
forms, that the proceeds went, not to the nation, 
but to the church. The church had still an- 
other source of income, the dues which it ex- 
acted as feudal landlord from those to whom 
it stood in that relation. The total income of 
this corporation was approximately $100,000,- 
000 of our money. Out of this it was the 
duty of the church to maintain religious edifices 
and services, to support many hospitals and 
schools, to relieve personal distress by charity, 
for there was no such thing in France as 
organized poor relief by the state or munici- 
pality. Thus the church was a state within 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 73 

the state, performing several functions which 
in most modern societies are performed by the 
secular authority. This rich corporation was 
relieved from taxation. Although from time to 
tijrne it paid certain lump sums to the national 
treasury, these were far smaller than they would 
have been had the church been taxed on its prop- 
erty and on its income in the same proportion as 
were the commoners. 

An income so large, had it been wisely and 
justly expended, might have aroused no criticism, 
for many of the services performed by this organ- 
ization were essential to the well-being of France. 
But here as elsewhere in the institutions of the 
country we find gross favoritism and wanton 
extravagance, which shocked the moral sense of 
the nation and aroused its indignation, because 
they belied so completely pretensions to a pecu- 
liar sanctity on which the church based its 
claims to its privileged position. For the or- 
ganization did not treat its own staff with any 
sense of fair play. Much the larger part of 
the income went to the higher clergy, that is, 
to the 134 bishops and archbishops, and to a 
small number of abbots, canons, and other dig- 
nitaries — in all probably not more than 5,000 
or 6,000 ecclesiastics. These highly lucrative 
positions were monopolized by the younger 



74 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

sons of the nobility, who were eager to accept 
the salaries but not disposed to perform the 
duties. Many of them resided at court and 
lived the gay and worldly life, with scarcely any- 
thing, save some slight peculiarity of dress, to 
indicate their ecclesiastical character. The 
morals of many were scandalous and their intel- 
lectual ability was frequently mediocre. They 
did not consider themselves men set apart for a 
high and noble calling, they did not take their 
duties seriously — of course there were honorable 
exceptions, yet they were exceptions — but their 
aims were distinctly finite and they conducted 
themselves as typical men of the world, attentive 
to the problem of self-advancement, devoted to 
all the pleasures, dissipations, and intrigues of 
Versailles. Some held several offices at once, dis- 
charging the obligations of none, and enjoying 
princely revenues. The Archbishop of Strass- 
burg had an income of $300,000 a year and held 
high court in a splendid palace, entertaining 200 
guests at a time. Even the saucepans of his 
kitchens were of silver. A hundred and eighty 
horses were in his stables, awaiting the pleasure 
of the guests. 

A few of the bishops received small incomes, 
but the average among them was over $50,000 
a year. They were in the main absentees, resid- 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 75 

ing, not in their dioceses, but in Versailles, where 
further plums were to be picked up by the lucky, 
and where at any rate life was gay. Some of the 
bishoprics had even become the hereditary pos- 
sessions of certain families, passing from uncle 
to nephew, as in the secular sphere many offices 
passed from father to son. 

On the other hand, the lower clergy, the thou- 
sands of parish priests, who did the real work 
of spiritual consolation and instruction, who la- 
bored faithfully in the vineyard, were wretchedly 
requited. They were sons of the third estate, 
while their proud and prosperous superiors were 
sons of the nobility, and they were treated as 
plebeians. With wretched incomes of a few hun- 
dred francs, they had difficulty in keeping body 
and soul together. No wonder they were dis- 
contented and indignant, exclaiming that their 
lot " made the very stones and beams of their 
miserable dwellings cry aloud." No wonder they 
were bitter against their superiors, who neg- 
lected and exploited them with equal indiffer- 
ence. The privileged order of the clergy is thus 
seen to be divided into two classes, widely dis- 
similar in position, in origin, and in outlook upon 
life. The parish priests came from the people, 
experienced the hardships and sufferings of the 
people, saw the injustice of the existing system, 



76 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

and sympathized with plans for its reform. The 
clergy was divided into two classes. The tri- 
umph of the popular cause in the Revolution was 
powerfully aided by the lower clergy, who threw 
in their lot with the third estate at critical mo- 
ments and against their clerical superiors, who 
rallied to the support of the absolute monarchy 
which had been so indulgent and so lavish to 
them. A house divided against itself, however, 
cannot permanently stand. 

Somewhat similar was the situation of the 
second order, the nobility. As in the case of the 
clergy, there was here also great variety of con- 
dition among the members of this order, although 
all were privileged. There were several sub- 
divisions, clearly enough marked. There were 
two main classes, the nobility of the sword and 
the nobility of the robe, that is, the old military 
nobility of feudal origin and the new judicial 
nobility, which secured its rank from the judicial 
offices its members held. The nobility of the 
sword consisted of the nobles of the court and 
of the nobles of the provinces. The former were 
few in number, perhaps a thousand, but they 
shone with peculiar brilliancy, for they were the 
ones who lived in Versailles, danced attendance 
upon the king, vied with each other in an eager 
competition for appointments in the army and 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 77 

navy and diplomatic service, for pensions and 
largesses from the royal bounty. These they 
needed, as they lived in a luxurious splendor that 
taxed their incomes and overtaxed them. Re- 
siding at court, they allowed their estates to be 
administered by bailiffs or stewards, who exacted 
all that they could get from the peasantry who 
cultivated them. Everybody was jealous of 
the nobles of this class, for they were the favored 
few, who practically monopolized all the pleasant 
places in the sun. 

The contrast was striking between them and 
the hundred thousand provincial nobles who for 
various reasons did not live at court, were not 
known to the king, received no favors, and who 
yet were conscious that in purity of blood, in 
honorableness of descent and tradition, they 
were the equals or superiors of those who 
crowded about the monarch's person. Many of 
them had small incomes, some pitifully small. 
They could cut no figure in the world of society, 
they had few chances to increase their prosperity, 
which, in fact, tended steadily to decrease. Their 
sons were trained for the army, the only noble 
profession, but could never hope to rise very high 
because all the major appointments went to the 
assiduous suitors of the clique at court. They 
resided among the peasants and in some cases 



78 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

were hardly distinguishable from them, except 
that they insisted upon maintaining the tradi- 
tion of their class, their badge of superiority, a 
life of leisure. To work was to lose caste. 
This obliged many of them to insist rigorously 
upon the payment of the various feudal dues 
owed them by the peasantry, some of which 
were burdensome, most of which were irritat- 
ing. In some parts of France, however, as in 
the Vendee and in Brittany, they were sympa- 
thetic and helpful in their relations with the 
peasants and were in turn treated with respect 
by them. 

The nobility as a whole enjoyed one privilege 
that was a serious and unnecessary injury to 
the peasants, making harder the conditions of 
their lives, always hard enough, namely the ex- 
clusive right of hunting, considered the chief 
noble sport. This meant in actual practice that 
the peasants might not disturb the game, al- 
though the game was destroying their crops. 
This was an unmitigated abuse, universally exe- 
crated by them. 

The odium that came to be attached in men's 
minds to the nobility was chiefly felt only for the 
selfish and greedy minority. The provincial no- 
bility, like the lower clergy, were themselves dis- 
contented with the existing order, for abundant 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 79 

reasons. They might not wish a sweeping trans- 
formation of society, but they were disposed to 
favor political reforms that would at least give 
all within the order an approximately equal 
chance. They were devoted to the king, but 
they experienced in their own persons the evils 
of an arbitrary and capricious government 
which was highly partial in its favors. 

There was yet another section of the nobility 
whose status and whose outlook were different 
still. Many offices in France could be bought. 
They and their perquisites became the property 
of those who purchased them and could transmit 
them to their children, and one of the perquisites 
that such offices carried was a patent of nobility. 
This was the created nobility, the nobility of the 
robe, so called because its most conspicuous 
members were the judges, or members of the 
higher tribunals or parlements. These judges 
appeared, in one aspect, as liberals, in that as 
lawyers they opposed certain unpopular innova- 
tions attempted by the king. But in reality as 
soon as their own privileges were threatened 
they became the stiffest of defenders of many of 
the most odious abuses of the Old Regime. In 
the opening days of the Revolution the Third 
Estate found no more bitter opponents than these 
ennobled judges. 



80 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Such were the two privileged orders. The rest 
of the population, comprising the vast majority 
of the people, was called the third estate. 
Differing from the others in that it was 
unprivileged, it resembled them in that it illus- 
trated the principle of inequality, as did they. 
There were the widest extremes in social and eco- 
nomic conditions. Every one who was not a noble 
nor a clergyman was a member of the third 
estate, the richest banker, the most illustrious 
man of letters, the poorest peasant, the beggar 
in the streets. Not at all homogeneous, the three 
chief divisions of this immense mass were the 
bourgeoisie, the artisans, and the peasants. 

The bourgeoisie, or upper middle class, com- 
prised all those who were not manual laborers. 
Thus lawyers, physicians, teachers, literary men 
were bourgeois: also merchants, bankers, manu- 
facturers. Despite great national reverses, the 
bourgeoisie had grown richer during the past 
century as commerce had greatly increased. 
This economic growth had benefited the bour- 
geoisie almost exclusively, and many large for- 
tunes had been built up and the general level of 
material welfare had been distinctly raised. 
These were the practical business men who 
loaned money to the state and who were fre- 
quently appointed to offices where business abil- 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 81 

ity was required. Intelligent, energetic, educated, 
and well-to-do, this class resented most keenly 
the existing system. For they were made to feel 
in numerous galling ways their social inferiority, 
and, conscious that they were quite as well edu- 
cated, quite as well mannered as the nobles, they 
returned the disdain of the latter with envy and 
hatred. Having loaned immense sums to the 
state, they were increasingly apprehensive, as 
they saw it verging rapidly toward bankruptcy, 
because their interests were greatly imperiled. 
They therefore favored a political reorganiza- 
tion which should enable them to participate in 
the government, to control its expenditures, to 
assure its solvency, that thus they might be cer- 
tain of their interest and principal, that thus 
abuses which impeded or injured business might 
be redressed, and that the precariousness of 
their position might be remedied. 

They wished also a social revolution. Well 
educated, saturated with the literature of the 
period, which they read with avidity, their minds 
fermented with the ideas of Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Montesquieu, and the economists. Personally, 
man for man, they were as cultivated as the 
nobles. They wished social equality, they wished 
the laws to recognize what they felt the facts 
proved, that the bourgeois was the equal of the 



82 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

noble. They chafed under pretensions which 
they felt unjustified by any real superiority. 
Their mood was brilliantly expressed by a 
pamphlet written by one of their members, the 
Abbe Sieyes, which circulated enormously on the 
eve of the Revolution. " What is the Third 
Estate?" asked Sieyes. "Everything. What 
has it been in politics until now? Nothing. 
What does it desire? To become something." 

Belonging to this estate but beneath the bour- 
geoisie were the artisans — perhaps two million 
and a half, living in the towns and cities. They 
were a comparatively small class because the 
industrial life of France was not yet highly de- 
veloped. They were generally organized in 
guilds which had their rules and privileges that 
gave rise to bickerings galore and that were gen- 
erally condemned as preventing the free and 
full expansion of industry and as artificially re- 
stricting the right to work. 

The other large division of the third estate 
was the peasantry. This was by far the largest 
section. Indeed it was the nation. France was 
an agricultural country, more than nine-tenths 
of the population were peasants, more than 
20,000,000. About a million of them were serfs, 
the rest were free men, yet their lot was an 
unhappy one. The burdens of society fell with 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 83 

crushing weight upon them. They paid fifty- 
five per cent of what they were able to earn to 
the state, according to the sober estimate of 
Turgot. They paid tithes to the clergy and nu- 
merous and vexatious feudal dues to the nobles. 
The peasant paid tolls to the seigneur for the use 
of the roads and bridges. When he sold his land 
he paid a fee to the former seigneur. He was com- 
pelled to use the seigneur's winepress in mak- 
ing his wine, the seigneur's mill, the seigneur's 
oven, always paying for the service. The loss of 
money was one aspect of the business, the loss of 
time another. In some cases, for instance, the 
mill was four or five hours distant, and a dozen 
or more rivers and rivulets had to be crossed. 
In summer, even if the water was too low to turn 
the wheel, nevertheless the peasant was obliged 
to bring his grain to be ground, must wait per- 
haps three days or must pay a fee for permission 
to have the grain ground elsewhere. Adding 
what he paid to the king, the church, and the 
seigneur, and the salt and excise duties, the total 
was often not far from four-fifths of his earnings. 
With the remaining one-fifth he had to support 
himself and family. 

The inevitable consequence was that he lived 
on the verge of disaster. Bad weather at a criti- 
cal moment supervening, he faced dire want, 



84 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

even starvation. It happened that the harvest 
was bad in 1788 and that the following winter 
was cruelly severe. According to a foreign am- 
bassador water froze almost in front of the 
fireplace. It need occasion no surprise that ow- 
ing to such conditions hundreds of thousands of 
men became beggars or brigands, driven to 
frenzy by hunger. It has been estimated that in 
Paris alone, with a population of 650,000, there 
were nearly 120,000 paupers. No wonder there 
were abundant recruits for riots and deeds of 
violence. The 20,000,000 peasants, who knew 
nothing of statecraft, who were ignorant of 
the destructive and subversive theories of Vol- 
taire and Rousseau, were daily and hourly im- 
pressed with the imperative necessity of reforms 
by the hard circumstances of their lives. They 
knew that the feudal dues would have to be abol- 
ished, that the excessive exactions of the state 
would have to be reduced before their lives could 
become tolerable. Their reasons for desiring 
change were different from those of the other 
classes, but it is evident that they were more than 
sufficient. 

The combined demand for reform increased as 
time went on and swelled in volume and in in- 
tensity. The voice of the people spoke with no 
uncertain sound. 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 85 

Such was the situation. On the eve of the 
Revolution Frenchmen enjoyed no equality of 
status or opportunity, but privileges of the most 
varied kinds divided them from each other. 

They also enjoyed no liberty. Religious lib- 
erty was lacking. Since the revocation of the 
Edict of Nantes in 1685 Protestantism had been 
outlawed. It was a crime punishable with hard 
labor to practise that religion. Under Louis 
XVI the persecution of Protestants was in fact 
suspended, but it might be resumed at any mo- 
ment. Protestant preaching was forbidden and 
consequently could occur only in secret or in 
lonely places. Jews were considered foreigners 
and as such were tolerated, but their position 
was humiliating. Catholics were required by law 
to observe the requirements and usages of their 
religion, communion, fast days, Lent. The 
church was absolutely opposed to toleration and 
because of this incurred the animosity of Vol- 
taire. 

There was no liberty of thought or, at least, 
of the expression of it. Every book, every news- 
paper article must be submitted to the censor for 
approval before publication, and no printer might 
print without permission. Even when pub- 
lished in conformity with these conditions books 
might be seized and burned by the police, edi- 



86 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

tions destroyed when possible, and publishers, 
authors, readers might be prosecuted and fined 
or imprisoned. Let no one think that the mere 
fact that Rousseau, Voltaire, and the other au- 
thors of the day were able to get their thoughts 
before the public proves that liberty really ex- 
isted in practice, even if not in theory. Voltaire 
was imprisoned several times for what he wrote 
and was virtually exiled during long years of 
his life. The censorship was applied capri- 
ciously, but it was applied sufficiently often and 
prosecutions were sufficiently numerous, to jus- 
tify the statement that liberty was lacking in this 
sphere of life. 

There was no individual liberty. The authori- 
ties might arrest any one whom they wished 
and keep him in prison as long as they chose 
without assigning reasons and without giving 
the victim any chance to prove his innocence. 
There was no such thing as a Habeas Corpus 
law. There was a large number of state prisons, 
the most famous being the Bastille, and many of 
their occupants were there by reason of the 
lettres de cachet, or orders for arbitrary arrest, 
one of the most odious and hated features of the 
Old Regime. Ministers and their subordinate 
officials used these letters freely. Nobles easily 
obtained them, sometimes the place for the name 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 87 

being left blank for them to fill in. Sometimes, 
even, they were sold. Thus there was abundant 
opportunity to use them to pay off merely per- 
sonal grudges. Malesherbes once said to Louis 
XVI, " No citizen of your realm is sure of not 
seeing his liberty sacrificed to private spite, the 
spirit of revenge: for no one is so great as to be 
safe from the hatred of a minister, so little as to 
be unworthy of that of a clerk." Lettres de 
cachet were also used as a measure of family dis- 
cipline, to buttress the authority of the head of 
the family, which was quite as absolute as it is 
in the Orient. A father could have his wife im- 
prisoned or his children, even though they were 
adults. Mirabeau had this experience even when 
he was already widely known as a writer on pub- 
lic affairs. 

Nor was there political liberty. The French 
did not have the right to hold public meetings or 
to form associations or societies. And of course, 
as we have seen, they did not elect any assem- 
blies to control the royal government. Liberties 
which had been in vogue in England for centu- 
ries, which were the priceless heritage of the 
English race on both sides of the Atlantic, were 
unknown in France. 

In view of all these facts it is not strange that 
Liberty and Equality became the battle cry of the 



88 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Revolution, embodying the deepest aspirations 
of the nation. 

The French Revolution has been frequently 
ascribed to the influence of the " philosophers " 
or writers of the eighteenth century. This is 
putting the cart before the horse, not the usual 
or efficient way of insuring progress. The mani- 
fold ills from which the nation suffered only too 
palpably were the primary cause of the demand 
for a cure. 

Nevertheless it was a fact of great importance 
that all the conditions described above, and many 
others, were criticised through the century by a 
group of brilliant writers, whose exposition and 
denunciation gave vocal expression on a vast 
scale to the discontent, the indignation, and the 
longing of the age. Literature was a lusty and 
passionate champion of reform, and through it 
a flood of new ideas swept over France. Many 
of these ideas were of foreign origin, German, 
American, above all English; many were of na- 
tive growth. Literature was political, and never 
was there such a raking criticism, from every 
angle, of prevalent ideas. It was skeptical and 
expressed the greatest contempt for the tradi- 
tional — that is, for the very basis on which 
France uneasily rested. It was analytical, and 
ideas and institutions and methods were sub- 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 

jected to the most minute and exhaustiv 
amination. No cranny of sequestered abuse 
folly was left unexplored by these eager an*, 
inquisitive and irreverent minds, on whom the 
past hung lightly. Literature was optimistic, 
and never did a nation witness so luxuriant 
or tropical a growth of Utopias and dreams. 
Rarely has any body of writing been so charged 
and surcharged with freshness and boldness and 
reckless confidence. Appealing to reason, ap- 
pealing to the emotions, it ran up and down the 
gamut of human nature, playing with ease and 
fervor upon the minds and hearts of men, in every 
tone, with every accent. It was a literature of 
criticism, of denunciation, of ingenious or futile 
suggestions for a fairer future. Sparkling, 
vehement, satirical, scientific in form, it breathed 
revolt, detestation, but it breathed also an 
abounding faith in the infinite perfectibility of 
man and his institutions. It was destructive, 
as has often been said. It was constructive, 
too, a characteristic which has not so often 
been noted. These books, which issued in 
great profusion from the facile pens and teem- 
ing brains of Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, 
Diderot, Quesnay, and many others, stirred the 
intellectual world to its depths. They acceler- 
ated the circulation of multifarious ideas on poli- 



THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

, religion, society, business. They constituted 
reat historic acts. They crystallized in brilliant 
and sometimes blinding formulas and theorems 
whole philosophies of* the state and of society. 
In such compact and manageable form they made 
the tour of France and began the tour of Europe. 

The volume of this inflammable literature was 
large, its impetus tremendous. It exhaled the 
love of liberty, the craving for justice. Liberal 
ideas penetrated more and more deeply into the 
public mind. A vast fermentation, an incessant 
and fearless discussion of existing evils and their 
remedies prepared the way for coming events 
which were to prove of momentous character. 

For three generations the fire of criticism and 
satire rained upon the foundations of the French 
monarchy. The campaign was opened by Mon- 
tesquieu, a member of the nobility of the robe, a 
lawyer of eminence, a judge of the Parlement of 
Bordeaux. His great work, the product of 
twenty years of labor, was his Spirit of Laws, 
published in 1748. It had an immediate and im- 
mense success. Twenty-two editions issued from 
the press in eighteen months. It was a study in 
political philosophy, an analysis of the various 
forms of government known to men, a cold and 
balanced judgment of their various peculiarities, 
merits, and defects. Tearing aside the veil of 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 91 

mystery which men had thrown about their in- 
stitutions, disregarding contemptuously the 
claim of a divine origin, of a sacrosanct and in- 
violable quality inherent in their very nature, 
Montesquieu examined the various types with 
the same detachment and objectivity which a 
botanist shows in the study of his specimens. 
Two or three leading ideas emerged from the 
process. One was that the English government 
was on the whole the best, since it guaranteed 
personal liberty to all citizens. It was a mon- 
archy which was limited in power, and controlled 
by an assembly which represented the people of 
England — in other words what, in the language 
of modern political science, is called a constitu- 
tional monarchy. Montesquieu also emphasized 
the necessity in any well-regulated state of sep- 
arating carefully the three powers of govern- 
ment, the legislative, the executive, and the ju- 
dicial. In the French monarchy all were blended 
and fused in the single person of the king, and 
were subject to no earthly control — and, as a 
matter of fact, to no divine control that was per- 
ceptible. These conceptions of a constitutional 
as preferable to an absolute monarchy, and of 
the necessity of providing for a separation of the 
three powers, have dominated all the constitu- 
tions France has had since 1789 and have exerted 



92 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

an influence far beyond the boundaries of that 
country. Propounded by a studious judge, in 
language that was both grave and elegant, Mon- 
tesquieu's masterpiece was a storehouse of wis- 
dom, destined to be provocative of much thought, 
discussion, and action, both in France and else- 
where. 

Very different, but even more memorable, was 
the work of Voltaire, one of the master minds of 
European history, whose name has become the 
name of an era. We speak of the age of Voltaire 
as we speak of the age of Luther and of Erasmus. 
Voltaire stands for the emancipation of the in- 
tellect. His significance to his times is shown in 
the title men gave him — King Voltaire. The 
world has not often seen a freer or more intrepid 
spirit. Supremely gifted for a life of letters, 
Voltaire proved himself an accomplished poet, 
historian, dramatist, even scientist, for he was 
not a specialist, but versatility was his forte. 
Well known at the age of twenty-three, he died 
at the age of eighty-four in a veritable delirium 
of applause, for his exit from the world was an 
amazing apotheosis. World-renowned he melted 
into world history. 

He had not trod the primrose path of dalliance 
but had been a warrior all his life for multi- 
farious and generally honorable causes. With 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 93 

many weaknesses of character, of which exces- 
sive vanity was one, he was a pillar of cloud by 
day and of fire by night for all who enlisted in 
the fight for the liberation of mankind. He had 
personally experienced the oppression of the Old 
Regime and he hated it with a deep and abiding 
hatred. He had several times been thrown into 
prison by the odious arbitrary lettres de cachet 
because he had incurred the enmity of the great. 
A large part of his life had been spent in exile 
because he was not safe in France. By his pro- 
digious intellectual activity he had amassed a 
large fortune and had become one of the powers 
of Europe. Show him a case of arbitrary injus- 
tice, a case of religious persecution hounding an 
innocent man to an awful death — and there were 
such cases — and you would see him taking the 
field, aflame with wrath against the authors of 
the monstrous deed. It was literally true in the 
age of Voltaire that the pen was far mightier 
than the sword. His style has been superlatively 
praised and cannot be praised too highly. Clear, 
pointed, supple, trenchant, it was a Damascus 
blade. He was never tiresome, he was al- 
ways interesting, and he was generally instruc- 
tive. The buoyancy of his spirit was shown 
in everything he wrote. A master of biting 
satire and of pulverizing invective, he singled 



94 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

out particularly for his attention the hypocrisies 
and cruelties and bigotries of his age and he 
raked them with a rapid and devastating fire. 
This brought him into conflict with the state and 
the church. He denounced the abuses and in- 
iquities of the laws and the judicial system, of 
arbitrary imprisonment, of torture. Voltaire 
was not a careful and sober student, like Mon- 
tesquieu. In an age which had no journalism 
he was the most brilliant and mordant of jour- 
nalists, writing as he listed, on the events or 
problems of his day. The variety and piquancy 
of his writings were astonishing. 

Voltaire was not primarily a political thinker. 
He attacked individual abuses in the state and 
he undermined the respect for authority, but he 
evidently was satisfied with monarchy as an in- 
stitution. His ideal of government was a benev- 
olent despotism. He was not a democrat. He 
would rather be ruled by one lion than by a hun- 
dred rats, was the way in which he expressed his 
preference. 

The church was his bete noire, as he considered 
it the gloomy fastness of moldering supersti- 
tions, the enemy of freedom of thought, the per- 
secutor of innocent men who differed from it, as 
the seat of intolerance, as the supporter of all 
kinds of narrow and bigoted prejudices. Vol- 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 95 

taire was not an atheist. He believed in God, 
but he did not believe in the Christian or in the 
Hebrew God, and he hated the Roman Catholic 
Church and all its works and dealt it many re- 
doubtable blows. In eighteenth-century France 
the church, as we have seen, presented plenty of 
vulnerable sides for his fiery shafts. Voltaire's 
work was not constructive but destructive. His 
religious faith was vague at best and not very 
vital. He scorned all formal creeds. 

Very different in tone and tendency was the 
work of another author, Jean Jacques Rousseau. 
In Voltaire we have the dry, white light of reason 
thrown upon the dark places of the world. In 
Rousseau we have reason, or rather logic, suf- 
fused and powerfully refracted with emotion. If 
the former was primarily engaged in the attempt 
to destroy, the latter was constructive, imagina- 
tive, prophetic. Rousseau was the creator of an 
entire political system, he was the confident the- 
orist of a new organization of society. Montes- 
quieu and Voltaire desired political reforms in 
the interest of individual liberty, desired the end 
of tyranny. But Rousseau swept far beyond 
them, wishing a total reorganization of society, 
because no amount of patching and renovating 
could make the present system tolerable, because 
nothing less would render liberty possible. He 



90 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

wrote a magic prose, rich, sonorous, full of mel- 
ancholy, full of color, of musical cadences, of 
solemn and pensive eloquence. The past had no 
power over him; he lacked completely the his- 
torical sense. The past, indeed, he despised. It 
was to him the enemy par excellence, the cause 
of all the multiplied ills from which humanity was 
suffering- and must free itself. Angry with the 
world as it was — his own life had been hard — he, 
the son of a Genevan watchmaker, had wandered 
here and there practising different trades, valet, 
music-teacher, tutor — he had known misery and 
had no personal reason for thinking well of the 
world and its boasted civilization. In his first 
work he propounded his fundamental thesis that 
man, naturally good and just and happy, had 
been corrupted and degraded by the very thing 
he called civilization. Therefore sweep civiliza- 
tion aside, and on the ground freed from its arti- 
ficial and baneful conventions and institutions 
erect the idyllic state. 

Rousseau's principal work was his Social Con- 
tract, one of the most famous and in its results 
one of the most influential books ever written. 
Opening with the startling statement that " man 
was born free and is everywhere in chains," he 
proceeded to outline, by pure abstract reasoning, 
and with a lofty disregard of all that history 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 97 

had to teach and all that psychology revealed of 
the nature of the human mind, a purely ideal 
state, which was in complete contrast to the one 
in which he lived. Society rests only upon an 
agreement of the persons who compose it. The 
people are sovereign, not any individual, nor any 
class. All men are free and equal. The purpose 
of any government should be to preserve the 
rights of each. Rousseau did not at all agree 
with Montesquieu, whose praise of the English 
form of government as insuring personal liberty 
he considered fallacious. " The English think 
themselves free," he said, " but they are mis- 
taken, for they are free only at the moment in 
which they elect the members of Parliament." As 
soon as these are chosen, the people are slaves, 
they are nothing, since the members of Parlia- 
ment are rulers, not the people. Only when the 
next election comes round will they be free again, 
and then only for another moment. Rousseau 
repudiated the representative system of govern- 
ment and demanded that the people make the 
laws themselves directly. Government must be 
government by majorities. The majority may 
make mistakes, nevertheless it is always right, — 
a dark saying. Rousseau's state made no pro- 
vision for safeguarding any rights of the minor- 
ity which the majority might wish to infringe. 



98 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

The harmful feature of his system was that 
it rendered possible a tyranny by a majority 
over a minority quite as complete and odious and 
unrestrained as any tyranny of a king could be. 
But two of his ideas stood out in high relief — 
the sovereignty of the people and the political 
equality of all citizens, two democratic principles 
which were utterly subversive of the states of 
Europe as then constituted. These principles 
powerfully influenced the course of the Revolu- 
tion and have been preached with fervor and 
denounced with passion by rival camps ever 
since. They have made notable progress in the 
world since Rousseau gave them thrilling utter- 
ance, but they have still much ground to traverse 
before they gain the field, before the reign of 
democracy everywhere prevails. 

There were many other writers who, by at- 
tacking this abuse and that, contributed power- 
fully to the discrediting, the sapping of the Old 
Regime. A conspicuous group of them busied 
themselves with economic studies and theories, 
enunciating principles which, if applied, would 
revolutionize the industrial and commercial life 
of the nation by sweeping away the numerous 
and formidable restrictions which hampered it 
and which permeated it with favoritism and 
privilege, and by introducing the maximum of 



THE OLD REGIME IN FRANCE 99 

liberty in commerce, in industry, in agriculture, 
just as the writers whom we have described 
enunciated principles which would revolutionize 
France politically and socially. 

All this seed fell upon fruitful soil. Remark- 
able was to be the harvest, as we shall shortly 
see. 

The Revolution was not caused by the philoso- 
phers, but by the conditions and evils of the na- 
tional life and by the mistakes of the govern- 
ment. Nevertheless these writers were a factor 
in the Revolution, for they educated a group of 
leaders, instilled into them certain decisive doc- 
trines, furnished them with phrases, formulas, 
and arguments, gave a certain tone and cast to 
their minds, imparted to them certain powerful 
illusions, encouraged an excessive hopefulness 
which was characteristic of the movement. They 
did not cause the Revolution, but they exposed 
the causes brilliantly, focussed attention upon 
them, compelled discussion, and aroused passion. 



CHAPTER II 

BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 

UNDER Louis XVI the financial situation of the 
country became more and more serious, until it 
could no longer be ignored. The cost of the par- 
ticipation in the American Revolution, added to 
the enormous debt inherited from the reigns of 
Louis XIV and Louis XV and to the excessive 
and unregulated expenditures of the state and 
the wastefulness of the court, completed the de- 
rangement of the national finances and fore- 
shadowed bankruptcy. In the end this crisis 
forced the monarch to make an appeal to the 
people by summoning their representatives. 

But before taking so grave a step, the conse- 
quences of which were incalculable, the govern- 
ment tried various expedients less drastic, which, 
however, for various reasons, failed. Louis XVI 
was the unhappy monarch under whom these 
long accumulating ills culminated. The last of 
the rulers of the Old Regime, his reign covered 
the years from 1774 to 1792. It falls into three 
periods, a brief one of attempted reform (1774- 
1776) and then a relapse for the next twelve 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 101 

years into the traditional methods of the Bour- 
bon monarchy, after that the hurricane. 

During his youth no one thought that Louis 
would ever be monarch, so many other princes 
stood between him and the throne that his suc- 
cession was only a remote contingency. But ow- 
ing to an unprecedented number of deaths in the 
direct line this contingency became reality. 
Louis mounted the throne, from which eighteen 
years later, by a strange concourse of events, he 
was hurled. He had never been molded for the 
high and dangerous office. He was but twenty 
years old and the Queen, Marie Antoinette, but 
nineteen when they heard of the death of Louis 
XV, and instinctively both expressed the same 
thought, " How unhappy are we. We are too 
young to rule." The new king was entirely un- 
trained in the arts of government. He was good, 
well-intentioned, he had a high standard of mo- 
rality and duty, a genuine desire to serve his peo- 
ple. But his mind lacked all distinction, his edu- 
cation had been poor, his processes of thought 
were hesitating, slow, uncertain. Awkward, 
timid, without elegancies or graces of mind or 
body, no king could have been less to the manner 
born, none could have seemed more out of place 
in the brilliant, polished, and heartless court of 
which he was the center. This he felt himself, 



io2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

as others felt it, and he often regretted, even be- 
fore the Revolution, that he could not abdicate 
and pass into a private station which would have 
been far more to his taste. He was an excellent 
horseman, he was excessively fond of hunting, 
he practised with delight the craft of locksmith. 
He was ready to listen to the advice of wiser 
men, but, and this was his fatal defect, he was of 
feeble will. He had none of the masterful quali- 
ties necessary for leadership. He was quite un- 
able to see where danger lay and where support 
was to be found. He was not unintelligent, but 
his intelligence was unequal to his task. He had 
no clear conception of either France or Europe. 
He was a poor judge of men, yet was greatly in- 
fluenced by them. He gave way now to this in- 
fluence, which might be good, now to that, which 
might be bad. He was, by nature, like other 
princes of his time, a reforming monarch, but his 
impulses in this direction were intermittent. 
Necker said on one occasion, " You may lend a 
man your ideas, you cannot lend him your 
strength of will." " Imagine," said another, 
" trying to keep a dozen oiled ivory balls touch- 
ing. I think you couldn't do it." So it was with 
the King's ideas. At the beginning of his reign 
Louis XVI was subject to the influence of Tur- 
got, one of the wisest of statesmen. Later he 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 103 

was subject to the influence of the Queen — 
to his own great misfortune and also to that of 
France. 

The influence of women was always great in 
France under the Bourbon monarchy, and Marie 
Antoinette was no exception to the rule. Fur- 
thermore that influence was frequently dis- 
astrous, and here again in the case of the last 
queen of the Old Regime there was no exception. 
If the King proved inferior to his position, the 
Queen proved no less inferior to hers. She was 
the daughter of the great Empress Maria 
Theresa of Austria, and she had been married to 
Louis XVI in the hope that thus an alliance 
would be cemented between the two states which 
had so long been enemies. But, as many French- 
men disliked everything about this alliance, she 
was unpopular and exposed to much malevolent 
criticism from the moment she set foot in France. 
She was beautiful, gracious, and vivacious. She 
possessed in large measure some of the very 
qualities the King so conspicuously lacked. She 
had a strong will, power of rapid decision, a 
spirit of initiative, daring. But she was lacking 
in wisdom, in breadth of judgment; she did not 
understand the temperament of the French peo- 
ple nor the spirit of the times. Born to the pur- 
ple, her outlook upon life did not transcend that 



io 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

of the small and highly privileged class to which 
she belonged. 

She had grown up in Vienna, one of the gayest 
capitals of Europe. Her education was woefully 
defective. When she came to France to become 
the wife of Louis XVI, she hardly knew how to 
write. She had had tutors in everything, but 
they had availed her little. She was wilful and 
proud, unthinking and extravagant, intolerant 
of disagreeable facts, frivolous, impatient of all 
restraint, fond of pleasure and of those who 
ministered unto it. She committed many indis- 
cretions both in her conduct and in the kind of 
people she chose to have about her. Because of 
these she was grossly calumniated and mis- 
judged. 

Marie Antoinette was the center of a group of 
rapacious people who benefited by existing 
abuses, who were opposed to all reform. Quite 
unconsciously she helped to aggravate the finan- 
cial situation and thus to hasten catastrophe. 

At the beginning of his reign Louis intrusted 
the management of finances to a man of rare 
ability and courage, Turgot. Turgot had been in- 
tendant of one of the poorest provinces of France. 
By applying there the principles of the most 
advanced economists, which may be summed up 
as demanding the utmost liberty for industry 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 105 

and trade, the abolition of all artificial restric- 
tions and all minute and vexatious governmental 
regulations, he had made his province pros- 
perous. He now had to face the problem of the 
large annual deficit. The continuance of annual 
deficits could mean nothing else than ultimate 
bankruptcy. Turgot announced his program to 
the King in the words, " No bankruptcy, no in- 
crease of taxation, no more borrowing." He 
hoped to extricate the national finances by two 
processes, by effecting economies in expendi- 
tures, and by developing public wealth so that 
the receipts would be larger. The latter object 
would be achieved by introducing the regime of 
liberty into agriculture, industry, and commerce. 
Turgot was easily able to save many millions 
by suppressing useless expenditures, but in so 
doing he offended all who enjoyed those sine- 
cures, and they flew to arms. {/The trade in food- 
stuffs was hopelessly and dangerously hampered 
by all sorts of artificial and pernicious legislation 
and interference by the state. All this he swept 
aside, introducing free trade in grain. A power- 
ful class of speculators was thus offended. He 
abolished the trade guilds, which restricted pro- 
duction by limiting the number of workers in 
each line, and by guarding jealously the narrow, 
inelastic monopolies they had established. Their 



106 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

abolition was desirable, but all the masters of 
the guilds and corporations became his bitter 
enemies. Turgot abolished an odious tax, the 
royal corvee, which required the peasants to work 
without pay on the public roads. Instead, he pro- 
vided that all such work should be paid for and 
that a tax to that end should be levied upon all 
landowners, whether belonging to the privileged 
or the unprivileged classes. The former were 
resolved that this should not be, this odious 
equality of all before the tax-collector. Thus -all 
those who battened and fattened off the old sys- 
tem combined in merciless opposition to Turgot 
and, reinforced by the parlements particularly, 
and by Marie Antoinette, they brought great 
pressure upon the King to dismiss the obnoxious 
minister. Louis yielded to the vehement impor- 
tunities of the Queen and dismissed the ablest 
supporter the throne had. In this both mon- 
archs were grievously at fault, the King for his 
lack of will, the Queen for her wilfulness. " M. 
Turgot and I are the only persons who love the 
people," said Louis XVI, but he did not prove 
his love by his acts. A few days earlier Turgot 
had written him, " Never forget, your Majesty, 
that it was weakness which brought Charles I to 
the block." 

This incident threw a flood of light upon the 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 107 

nature of the Old Regime. All reformers were 
given warning by the fall of Turgot. No changes 
that should affect the privileged classes! As the 
national finances could be made sound only by 
reforms which should affect those classes, there 
was no way out. Reform was blocked. Necker, 
a Genevan banker, succeeded Turgot. He was a 
man who had risen by his own efforts from pov- 
erty to great wealth. He, too, encountered op- 
position the instant he proposed economies. He 
took a step which infuriated the members of the 
court. He published a financial report, showing 
the income and the expenditures of the state. 
This had never been done before, secrecy having 
hitherto prevailed in such matters. The court 
was indignant that such high mysteries should 
be revealed to the masses, particularly as the 
report showed just how much went annually in 
pensions to the courtiers, as free gifts for which 
they rendered no services whatever. For such 
unconscionable audacity Necker was over- 
thrown, the King weakly yielding once more to 
pressure. 

This time the court took no chances, but se- 
cured a minister quite according to the heart's 
desire, in Calonne. No minister of finance could 
be more agreeable. Calonne's purpose was to 
please, and please he did, for a while. The wand 



108 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

of Prospero was not more felicitous in its en- 
chantments. The members of the court had only 
to make their wishes known to have them grati- 
fied. 

Calonne, a man of charm, of wit, of graceful 
address, had also a philosophy of the gentle art of 
spending which was highly appreciated by those 
about him. "A man who wishes to borrow 
must appear to be rich, and to appear rich he 
must dazzle by spending freely." Money flowed 
like water during these halcyon times. In three 
years, in a time of profound peace, Calonne bor- 
rowed nearly $300,000,000. 

It seemed too good to be true, and it was, by 
far. The evil days drew nigh for an accounting. 
It was found in August, 1786, that the treasury 
was empty and that there were no more fools 
willing to loan to the state. It was a rude awak- 
ening from a blissful dream. But Calonne now 
showed, what he had not shown before, some 
sense. He proposed a general tax which should 
fall upon the nobles as well as upon commoners. 
It was therefore his turn to meet the same op- 
position from the privileged classes which Tur- 
got and Necker had met. He, too, was balked, 
and resigned. 

His successor, Lomenie de Brienne, encoun- 
tered a similar fate. As there was nothing to do 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 109 

but to propose new taxes, he proposed them. 
The Parlement of Paris immediately protested 
and demanded the convocation of the States- 
General, asserting the far-reaching principle 
that taxes can only be imposed by those who are 
to pay them. The King attempted to overawe 
the parlement, which, in turn, defied the King. 
All this, however, was no way to fill an empty 
treasury. Finally the government yielded and 
summoned the States-General to meet in Ver- 
sailles on May 1, 1789. A new chapter, of incal- 
culable possibilities, was opened in the history 
of France. Necker was recalled to head the min- 
istry, and preparations for the coming meeting 
were made. 

The States-General, or assembly representing 
the three estates of the realm, the clergy, the no- 
bility, and the commoners, was an old institution 
in France, but one that had never developed as 
had the parliament of England. The last meeting, 
indeed, had been held 175 years before. The insti- 
tution might have been considered dead. Now, 
in a great national crisis, it was revived, in the 
hope that it might pull the state out of the deplor- 
able situation into which the Bourbon monarchy 
had plunged it. But the States-General was a 
thoroughly feudal institution and France was 
tired of feudalism. Its organization no longer 



no THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

conformed to the wishes or needs of the nation. 
Previously each one of the three estates had had 
an equal number of delegates, and the delegates 
of each estate had met separately. It was a 
three-chambered body, with two of the chambers 
consisting entirely of the privileged classes. 
There was objection to this now, since, with two 
against one, it left the nation exactly where it 
had been, in the power of the privileged classes. 
They could veto anything that the third estate 
alone wanted; they could impose anything they 
chose upon the third estate, by their vote of two 
to one. In other words, if organized as hitherto, 
they could prevent all reform which in any way 
affected themselves, and yet such reform was an 
absolute necessity. Consulted on this problem 
the Parlement of Paris pronounced in favor of 
the customary organization; in other words, it- 
self a privileged body, it stood for privilege. The 
parlement immediately became as unpopular as 
it had previously been popular, when opposing 
the monarch. 

Necker, now showing one of his chief charac- 
teristics which was to make him impossible as a 
leader in the new era, half settled the question 
and left it half unsettled. He, like the King, 
lacked the power of decision. He was a banker, 
not a statesman. It was announced that the 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION in 

third estate should have as many members as 
the two other orders combined. Whether the 
three bodies should still meet and vote separately 
was not decided, but was left undetermined. 
But of what avail would be the double member- 
ship of the third estate — representing more than 
nine-tenths of the population — unless all three 
met together, unless the vote was by individuals, 
not by chambers; by head, as the phrase ran, and 
not by order? In dodging this question Necker 
was merely showing his own incapacity for 
strong leadership and was laying up abundant 
trouble for the immediate future. 

The States-General met on May 5, 1789. 
There were about 1,200 members, of whom 
over 600 were members of the third estate. In 
reality, however, that class of the population had 
a much larger representation, as, of the 300 rep- 
resentatives elected by the clergy, over 200 were 
parish priests or monks, all commoners by origin 
and, to a considerable extent, in sympathy. Each 
of the three orders had elected its own members. 
At the same time the voters, and the vote was 
nearly universal, were asked to draw up a formal 
statement of their grievances and of the reforms 
they favored. Fifty or sixty thousand of these 
cahiers have come down to us and present a vivid 
and instructive criticism of the Old Regime, and 



ii2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

a statement of the wishes of each order. On cer- 
tain points there was practical unanimity on the 
part of clergy, nobles, and commoners. All 
ascribed the ills from which the country suffered 
to arbitrary, uncontrolled government, all talked 
of the necessity of confining the government 
within just limits by establishing a constitution 
which should define the rights of the king and 
of the people, and which should henceforth be 
binding upon all. Such a constitution must guar- 
antee individual liberty, the right to think and 
speak and write, — henceforth no lettres de cachet 
nor censorship. In the future the States-General 
should meet regularly at stated times, and 
should share the lawmaking power and alone 
should vote the taxes, and taxes should 
henceforth be paid by all. The clergy and no- 
bility almost unanimously agreed in their cahiers 
to relinquish their exemptions, for which they 
had fought so resolutely only two years before. 
On the other hand, the third estate was willing 
to see the continuance of the nobility with its 
rights and honors. The third estate demanded 
the suppression of feudal dues. There was in 
their cahiers no hint of a desire for a violent revo- 
lution. They all expressed a deep affection for 
the King, gratitude for his summoning of the 
States-General, faith that the worst was over, 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 113 

that now, in a union of all hearts, a way would 
easily be discovered out of the unhappy plight 
in which the nation found itself.^* 

An immense wave of hopefulness swept over 
the land. This optimism was based on the fact 
that the King, when consenting to call the States- 
General, had at the same time announced his ac- 
ceptance of several important reforms, such as 
the periodical meeting of the States-General, its 
control of the national finances, and guarantees 
for the freedom of the individual. But the King's 
chief characteristic, as we have seen, was his 
feebleness of will, his vacillation. And from the 
day the deputies arrived in Versailles to the day 
of his violent overthrow this was a fatal factor 
in the history of the times. In his speech open- 
ing the States-General on May 5 the King said 
not a word about the thought that was in every 
one's mind, the making of a constitution. He 
merely announced that it had been called to- 
gether to bring order into the distracted finances 
of the country. Necker's speech was no more 
promising. The government, moreover, said 
nothing about whether the estates should vote by 
order or by head. The crux of the whole matter 
lay there, for on the manner of organization and 
procedure depended entirely the outcome. The 
government did not come forward with any pro- 



ii 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

gram, even in details. It shirked its responsi- 
bility and lost its opportunity. 

A needless but very serious crisis was the re- 
sult. The public was disappointed and apprehen- 
sive. Evidently the recent liberalism of the 
King had evaporated or he was under a pressure 
which he had not strength to withstand. A con- 
flict between the orders began on May 6 which 
lasted until the end of June and which ended in 
embittering relations which at the outset had 
seemed likely to be cordial. Should the voting 
be by order or by member, should the assembly 
consist of three chambers or of one? The diffi- 
culty arose in the need of verifying the creden- 
tials of the members. The nobles proceeded to 
verify as a separate chamber, by a vote of 188 to 
47; the clergy did the same, but by a smaller ma- 
jority, 133 to 114. But the third estate refused 
to verify until it should be decided that the three 
orders were to meet together in one indivisible 
assembly. This was a matter of life or death 
with it, or at least of power or impotence. Both 
sides stood firm, the government allowed things 
to drift, angry passions began to develop. 
Until organized the States-General could do no 
business, and no organization could be effected 
until this crucial question was settled. Week 
after week went by and the dangerous deadlock 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 115 

continued. Verification in common would mean 
the abandonment of the class system, voting by 
member and not by order, and the consequent 
preponderance of the third estate, which consid- 
ered that it had the right to preponderate as rep- 
resenting over nine-tenths of the population. 
Fruitless attempts to win the two upper orders 
by inviting them to join the third estate were 
repeatedly made. Finally the third estate an- 
nounced that on June 1 1 it would begin verifica- 
tion and the other orders were invited for the last 
time. Then the parish priests began to come 
over, sympathizing with the commoners rather 
than with the privileged class of their own order. 
Finally on June 17 the third estate took the mo- 
mentous step of declaring itself the National As- 
sembly, a distinctly revolutionary proceeding. 

The King now, under pressure from the court, 
made a decision, highly unwise in itself and fool- 
ishly executed. When, on June 20, the members 
of the third estate went to their usual meeting- 
place they found the entrance blocked by soldiers. 
They were told that there was to be a special 
royal session later and that the hall was closed 
in order that necessary arrangements might be 
made for it, a pretext as miserable as it was vain. 
What did this action mean? No one knew, but 
every one was apprehensive that it meant that 



n6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

the Assembly itself, in which such earnest hopes 
had centered, was to be brought to an untimely 
end and the country plunged into greater misery 
than ever by the failure of the great experiment. 
For a moment the members were dismayed and 
utterly distracted. Then, as by a common im- 
pulse, they rushed to a neighboring building in a 
side street, which served as a tennis court. There 
a memorable session occurred, in the large, un- 
finished hall. Lifting their president, the distin- 
guished astronomer, Bailly, to a table, the mem- 
bers surged about him, ready, it seemed, for ex- 
treme measures. There they took the famous 
Tennis Court Oath. All the deputies present, 
with one single exception, voted " never to sep- 
arate, and to reassemble wherever circumstances 
shall require, until the constitution of the king- 
dom shall be established." 

On the 23rd occurred the royal session on 
which the privileged classes counted. The King 
pronounced the recent acts of the third estate 
illegal and unconstitutional, and declared that 
the three orders should meet separately and 
verify their credentials. He rose and left the 
hall, while outside the bugles sounded around 
his coach. The nobility, triumphant, withdrew 
from the hall; the clergy also. But in the center 
of the great chamber the third estate remained, 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 117 

in gloomy silence. This was one of the solemn, 
critical moments of history. Suddenly the master 
of ceremonies advanced, resplendent in his offi- 
cial costume. " You have heard the King's or- 
ders," he said. " His Majesty requests the depu- 
ties of the third estate to withdraw." Behind 
the grand master, at the door, soldiers were seen. 
Were they there to clear the hall? The King 
had given his orders. To leave the hall meant 
abandonment of all that the third estate stood 
for; to remain meant disobedience to the express 
commands of the King and probably severe pun- 
ishment. 

The occasion brought forth its man. Mira- 
beau, a noble whom his fellow nobles had refused 
to elect to the States-General and who had then 
been chosen by the third estate, now arose and 
advanced impetuously and imperiously toward 
the master of ceremonies, de Breze, and with 
thunderous voice exclaimed, ^Go tell your mas- 
ter that we are here by the will of the people 
and that we shall not leave except at the point 
of the bayonet." / Then on motion of Mirabeau 
it was voted that all persons who should lay vio- 
lent hands on any members of the National As- 
sembly would be " infamous and traitors to the 
nation and guilty of capital crime." De Breze 
reported the defiant eloquence to the King. All 



n8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

eyes were fixed upon the latter. Not knowing 
what to do he made a motion indicating weari- 
ness, then said: " They wish to remain, do they? 
Well, let them." 

Two days later a majority of the clergy and a 
minority of the nobility came over to the Assem- 
bly. On June 27 the King commanded the no- 
bility and clergy to sit with the third estate in a 
single assembly. Thus the question was finally 
settled, which should have been settled before the 
first meeting in May. The National Assembly 
was now complete. It immediately appointed a 
committee on the constitution. The National 
Assembly, accomplished by this fusion of the 
three estates, adopted the title Constituent As- 
sembly because of the character of the work it 
had to do. 

No sooner was this crisis over than another 
began to develop. A second attempt was made 
by the King, again inspired by the court, to sup- 
press the Assembly or effectively to intimidate 
it, to regain the ground that had been lost. Con- 
siderable bodies of soldiers began to appear near 
Versailles and Paris. They were chiefly the 
foreign mercenaries, or the troops from frontier 
stations, supposedly less responsive to the popu- 
lar emotions. On July 11 Necker and his col- 
leagues, favorable to reform, were suddenly dis- 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 119 

missed and Necker was ordered to leave the 
country immediately. What could all this mean 
but that reaction and repression were coming 
and that things were to be put back where they 
had been? The Assembly was in great danger, 
yet it possessed no physical force. What could 
it do if troops were sent against it? 

The violent intervention of the city of Paris 
saved the day and gave the protection which the 
nation's representatives lacked, assuring their 
continuance. The storming of the Bastille was an 
incident which seized instantly the imagination 
of the world, and which was disfigured and trans- 
figured by a mass of legends that sprang up on the 
very morrow of the event. The Bastille was a 
fortress commanding the eastern section of Paris. 
It was used as a state prison and had had many 
distinguished occupants, among others Voltaire 
and Mirabeau, thrown into it by lettres de cachet. 
It was an odious symbol of arbitrary govern- 
ment and it was also a strong fortress which 
these newly arriving troops might use. There 
was a large discontented and miserable class in 
Paris; also a lively band of radical or liberal men 
who were in favor of reform and were alarmed 
and indignant at every rumor that the Assembly 
on which such hopes were pinned was in danger. 
Paris was on the side of the Assembly, and when 



120 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

the news of the dismissal of Necker arrived it 
took fire. Rumors of the most alarming charac- 
ter spread rapidly. Popular meetings were ad- 
dressed by impromptu and impassioned orators. 
The people began to pillage the shops where 
arms were to be found. Finally they attacked 
the Bastille and after a confused and bloody 
battle of several hours the fortress was in their 
hands. They had lost about 200 men, killed or 
wounded. The crowd savagely murdered the 
commander of the fortress and several of the 
Swiss Guard. Though characterized by these 
and other acts of barbarism, nevertheless the 
seizure of the Bastille was everywhere regarded 
in France and abroad as the triumph of liberty. 
Enthusiasm was widespread. The Fourteenth 
of July was declared the national holiday and a 
new flag, the tricolor, the red, white, and blue, 
was adopted in place of the old white banner of 
the Bourbons, studded with the fleur-de-lis. 
At the same time, quite spontaneously, Paris 
gave itself a new form of municipal government, 
superseding the old royal form, and organized 
a new military force, the National Guard, which 
was destined to become famous. Three days 
later Louis XVI came to the capital and formally 
ratified these changes. 

Meanwhile similar changes were made all over 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 121 

France. Municipal governments on an elective 
basis and national guards were created every- 
where in imitation of Paris. The movement ex- 
tended to rural France. There the peasants, im- 
patient that the Assembly had let two months 
go by without suppressing the feudal dues, took 
things into their own hands. They turned upon 
their oppressors and made a violent " war upon 
the chateaux," destroying the records of feudal 
dues if they could find them or if the owners gave 
them up; if not, frequently burning the chateaux 
themselves in order to burn the odious docu- 
ments. Day after day in the closing week of 
July, 1789, the destructive and incendiary process 
went on amid inevitable excesses and disorders. 
In this method feudalism was abolished — not 
legally but practically. It remained to be seen 
what the effect of this victory of the people would 
be upon the National Assembly. 

Its effect was immediate and sensational. On 
the 4th of August a committee on the state of 
the nation made a report, describing the inci- 
dents which were occurring throughout the 
length and breadth of the land, chateaux burn- 
ing, unpopular tax-collectors assaulted, millers 
hanged, lawlessness triumphant. It was night 
before the stupefying report was finished. Sud- 
denly at eight o'clock in the evening, as the ses- 



122 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

sion was about to close, a nobleman, the Viscount 
of Noailles, rushed to the platform. The only- 
reason, he said, why the people had devastated 
the chateaux was the heavy burden of the 
seignorial dues, odious reminders of feudalism. 
These must be swept away. He so moved and 
instantly another noble, the Duke d'Aiguillon, 
next to the King the greatest feudal lord in 
France, seconded the motion. A frenzy of gen- 
erosity seized the Assembly. Noble vied with 
noble in the enthusiasm of renunciation. The 
Bishop of Nancy renounced the privileges of his 
order. Parish priests renounced their fees. 
Judges discarded their distinctions. Rights of 
chase, rights of tithes went by the board. Rep- 
resentatives of the cities and provinces gave up 
their privileges, Brittany, Burgundy, Lorraine, 
Languedoc. A veritable delirium of joy swept 
in wave after wave over the Assembly. All night 
long the excitement continued amid tears, em- 
braces, rapturous applause, a very ecstasy of pa- 
triotic abandonment, and by eight in the morn- 
ing thirty decrees, more or less, had been passed 
and the most extraordinary social revolution that 
any nation has known had been voted. The feudal 
dues were dead. Tithes were abandoned; the 
guilds, with their narrow restrictions, were swept 
away; no longer were offices to be purchasable, 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 123 

but henceforth all Frenchmen were to be equally 
eligible to all public positions; justice was to be 
free; provinces and individuals were all to be on 
the same plane. Distinctions of class were abol- 
ished. The principle of equality was henceforth 
to be the basis of the state. 

Years later participants in this memorable ses- 
sion, in which a social revolution was accom- 
plished, or at least promised, spoke of it with ex- 
citement and enthusiasm. The astonishing ses- 
sion was closed with a Te Deum in the chapel of 
the royal palace, at the suggestion of the Arch- 
bishop of Paris, and Louis XVI, who had had no 
more to do with all this than you or I, was offi- 
cially proclaimed by the Assembly the " Restorer 
of French Liberty." 

Thus was the dead weight of an oppressive, 
unjust past lifted from the nation's shoulders. 
Grievances, centuries old, vanished into the 
night. That it needed time to work out all these 
tumultuous and rapturous resolutions into clear 
and just laws was a fact ignored by the people, 
who regarded them as real legislation, not as a 
program merely sketched, to be filled in slowly 
in detail. Hence when men awoke to the fact 
that not everything was what it seemed, that 
before the actual application of all these changes 
many adjustments must or should be made, there 



i2 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

was some friction, some disappointment, some 
impatience. The clouds speedily gathered again. 
Because a number of nobles and bishops had in 
an outburst of generosity relinquished all their 
privileges, it was not at all certain that their ac- 
tion would be ratified by even the majority of 
their orders and it was indeed likely that the con- 
trary would prove true. The contagion might 
not extend beyond the walls of the Assembly 
hall. And many even of those who had shared 
the fine enthusiasm of that stirring session might 
feel differently on the morrow. This proved to 
be the case, and soon two parties appeared, 
sharply differentiated, the upholders of the revo- 
lution thus far accomplished and those who 
wished to undo it and to recover their lost ad- 
vantages. The latter were called counter-revolu- 
tionaries. From this time on they were a factor, 
frequently highly significant, in the history of 
modern France. Although after the Fourteenth 
of July the more stiff-necked and angry of the 
courtiers, led by the Count of Artois, brother of 
the King, had left the country and had begun 
that "emigration" which was to do much to em- 
broil France with Europe, yet many courtiers 
still remained and, with the powerful aid of Marie 
Antoinette, played upon the feeble monarch. 
The Queen, victim of slanders and insults, was 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 125 

temperamentally and intellectually incapable of 
understanding or sympathizing with the reform 
movement. She stiffened under the attacks, her 
pride was fired, and she did what she could to 
turn back the tide, with results highly disastrous 
to herself and to the monarchy. Another feature 
of the situation was the subterranean intriguing, 
none the less real because difficult accurately to 
describe, of certain individuals who thought they 
had much to gain by troubling the waters, such 
as the Duke of Orleans, cousin of the King, im- 
mensely wealthy and equally unscrupulous, who 
nourished the scurvy ambition of overthrowing 
Louis XVI and of putting the House of Orleans 
in place of the House of Bourbon. All through 
the Revolution we find such elements of personal 
ambition or malevolence, anxious to profit by 
fomenting the general unrest. At every stage in 
this strange, eventful history we observe the 
mixture of the mean with the generous, the in- 
sincere with the candid, the hypocritical and the 
oblique with the honest and the patriotic. It 
was a web woven of mingled yarn. 

Such were some of the possible seeds of future 
trouble. In addition, increasing the general 
sense of anxiety and insecurity, was the fact that 
two months went by and yet the King did not 
ratify or accept the decrees of August 4, which, 



126 THE FRENCH-REVOLUTION 

without his acceptance, lacked legal force. Cer- 
tain articles of the constitution had been already- 
drafted, and these, too, had not yet received the 
royal sanction. Was the King plotting some- 
thing, or were the plotters about him getting con- 
trol of him once more? The people lived in an 
atmosphere of suspicion; also thousands and 
thousands of them were on the point of starva- 
tion, and the terror of famine reinforced the ter- 
ror of suspicion. 

Out of this wretched condition of discontent 
and alarm was born another of the- famous inci- 
dents of the Revolution. Early in October ru- 
mors reached Paris that at a banquet offered at 
Versailles to some of the crack regiments that 
had been summoned there the tricolor had been 
stamped upon, that threats had been made 
against the Assembly, and that the Queen, by her 
presence, had sanctioned these outrages. 

On October 5 several thousand women of the 
people, set in motion in some obscure way, 
started to march to Versailles, drawing cannon 
with them. It was said they were going to de- 
mand the reduction of the price of bread and at 
the same time to see that those who had insulted 
the national flag should be punished. They were 
followed by thousands of men, out of work, and 
by many doubtful characters. Lafayette, hastily 



BEGINNINGS OF THE REVOLUTION 127 

gathering some of the guards, started after them. 
That evening the motley and sinister crowd 
reached Versailles and bivouacked in the streets 
and in the vast court of the royal palace. All 
night long obscure preparations as for a battle 
went on. On the morning of the 6th the crowd 
forced the gates, killed several of the guards, and 
invaded the palace, even reaching the entrance 
to the Queen's apartments. The Queen fled to 
the apartments of the King for safety. The King 
finally appeared on a balcony, surrounded by 
members of his family, addressed the crowd, and 
promised them food. The outcome of this ex- 
traordinary and humiliating day was that the 
King was persuaded to leave the proud palace of 
Versailles and go to Paris to live, in the midst of 
his so-called subjects. At two o'clock the grim 
procession began. The entire royal family, eight 
persons, packed into a single carriage, started 
for Paris, drawn at a walk, surrounded by the 
women, and by bandits who carried on pikes the 
heads of the guards who had been killed at the 
entrance to the palace. "We are bringing back 
the baker, and the baker's wife, and the baker's 
son!" shouted the women. At eleven o'clock 
that night Louis XVI was in the Tuileries. 

Ten days later the Assembly followed. The 
King and the Assembly were now under the daily 



128 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

supervision of the people of Paris. In reality they 
were prisoners. Versailles was definitely aban- 
doned. From this moment dates the great influ- 
ence of the capital. A single city was henceforth 
always in position to dominate the Assembly. 
The people could easily bring their pressure to 
bear, for they were admitted to the thousand or 
more seats in the gallery of the Assembly's hall 
of meeting and they considered that they had the 
freedom of the place, hissing unpopular speak- 
ers, vociferating their wishes. Those who could 
not get in congregated outside, arguing violently 
the measures that were being discussed within. 
Now and then some one would announce to them 
from the windows how matters were proceeding 
in the hall. Shouts of approval or disapproval 
thus reached the members from the vehement 
audience outside. 



CHAPTER III 

THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 

THE States-General which met in May, 1789, 
had in June adopted the name National As- 
sembly. This body is also known as the Con- 
stituent Assembly, as its chief work was the 
making of a constitution. It had begun work 
upon the constitution while still in Versailles, 
and the first fruit of its labors was the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, a state- 
ment of the rights which belong to men because 
they are human beings, which are not the 
gift of any government. The declaration was 
drawn up in imitation of American usage. La- 
fayette, a hero of the American Revolution, as 
now a prominent figure in the French, brought 
forward a draft of a declaration just before the 
storming of the Bastille. He urged two chief 
reasons for its adoption: first, it would present 
the people with a clear conception of the elements 
of liberty which, once understanding, they would 
insist upon possessing; and, secondly, it would 
be an invaluable guide for the Assembly in its 
work of elaborating the constitution. All propo- 

129 



130 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

sitions could be tested by comparison with its 
carefully defined principles. It would be a guar- 
antee against mistakes or errors by the Assembly 
itself. Another orator paid a tribute to America, 
explaining why " the noble idea of this declara- 
tion, conceived in another hemisphere" ought to 
be transplanted to France. Opponents of such 
a statement declared it useless and harmful be- 
cause bound to distract the members from impor- 
tant labors, as tending to waste time on doubtful 
generalizations, as leading to hair-splitting and 
endless debate, when the Assembly's attention 
ought to be focussed on the pressing problems of 
legislation and administration. The Assembly 
took the side of Lafayette and, after intermittent 
discussion, composed the notable document in 
August, 1789. As a result of the events of Octo- 
ber 5, described above, the King accepted it. 
The declaration, which has been called "the 
most remarkable fact in the history of the growth 
of democratic and republican ideas" in France, 
as "the gospel of modern times," was not the 
work of any single mind, nor of any committee 
or group of leaders. Its collaborators were very 
numerous. The political discussions of the 
eighteenth century furnished many of the ideas 
and even some of the phrases. English and 
American example counted for much. The ne- 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 131 

cessities of the national situation were factors of 
importance. 

The National Assembly has often been severely 
criticised for devoting time, in a period of crisis, 
to a declaration which the critics in the same 
breath pronounce a tissue of abstractions, of 
doubtful philosophical theories, topics for ever- 
lasting discussion. "A tourney of metaphysical 
speculations" is what one writer calls it. But a 
study of the situation shows that the idea of a 
declaration and the idea of a constitution were 
indissolubly connected. The one was essential 
to the other in a country which had no historic 
principles of freedom. French liberty could not 
from the nature of the case, like English liberty, 
slowly broaden down from precedent to prece- 
dent. It must begin abruptly and with a distinct 
formulation. After the enunciation of the prin- 
ciples would naturally come their conversion into 
fact. 

The Declaration of the Rights of Man laid 
down the principles of modern governments. 
The men who drew up that document believed 
these principles to be universally true and every- 
where applicable. They did not establish rights 
— they merely declared them. Frenchmen well 
knew that they were composing a purely dogmatic 
text. But that such a text was extremely useful 



132 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

they believed. And the reason why they believed 
this was that they had a profound faith in the 
power of truth, of reason. This was, as Michelet 
pointed out long ago, the essential originality of 
the Constituent Assembly, this "singular faith 
in the power of ideas," this firm belief that "once 
formed and formulated in law the truth was in- 
vincible." These political dogmas seemed to the 
members of the Assembly so true that they 
thought they had only to proclaim them to insure 
their efficiency in the actual conduct of govern- 
ments. These men believed that they were in- 
augurating a new phase in the history of hu- 
manity, that, by solemnly formulating the creed 
of the future, they were rendering an inestimable 
service, not to France alone but to the world. 
Though America had set an example, it was felt 
that France could "perfect" it for the other 
hemisphere and that the new declaration might 
perhaps have the advantage over the other of 
making "a loftier appeal to reason and of cloth- 
ing her in a purer language." 

The seventeen articles of this creed asserted 
that men are free and equal, that the people are 
sovereign, that law is an expression of the popu- 
lar will, and that in the making of it the people 
may participate, either directly, or indirectly 
through their representatives, and that all offi- 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 133 

cials possess only that authority which has been 
definitely given them by law. All those liberties 
of the person, of free speech, free assembly, jus- 
tice administered by one's peers, which had been 
worked out in England and America were as- 
serted. These principles were the opposite of 
those of the Old Regime. If incorporated in laws 
and institutions they meant the permanent aboli- 
tion of that system. 

As a matter of fact the expectation that the Dec- 
laration would constitute a new evangel for the 
world has not proved so great an exaggeration 
as the optimism of its authors and the pessimism 
of its critics would prompt one to think. When 
men wish anywhere to recall the rights of man 
it is this French document that they have in 
mind. The Declaration long ago passed beyond 
the frontiers of France. It has been studied, 
copied, or denounced nearly everywhere. It has 
been an indisputable factor in the political and 
social evolution of modern Europe. During the 
past century, whenever a nation has aspired to 
liberty, it has sought its principles in the Dec- 
laration. "It has found there," says a recent 
writer, "five or six formulas as trenchant as 
mathematical propositions, true as the truth it- 
self, intoxicating as a vision of the absolute." 

The Declaration was, of course, only an ideal, 



134 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

a goal toward which society should aim, not a 
fulfilment. It was a list of principles, not the 
realization of those principles. It was a declara- 
tion of rights, not a guarantee of rights. The 
problem of how to guarantee what was so suc- 
cinctly declared has filled more than a century 
of French history, and is still incompletely 
solved. We shall now see how far the Assem- 
bly which drafted this Declaration was willing 
or able to go in applying its principles in the con- 
stitution, of which it was the preamble. 

The constitution was only slowly elaborated. 
Some of its more fundamental articles were 
adopted in 1789. But numerous laws were passed 
in 1790 and 1791, which were really parts of the 
constitution. Thus it grew piece by piece. 
Finally all this legislation was revised, retouched, 
and codified into a single document, which was 
accepted by the King in 1791. Though some- 
times called the Constitution of 1789, it is more 
generally and more correctly known as the Con- 
stitution of 1791. It was the first written consti- 
tution France had ever had. Framed under very 
different conditions from those under which the 
constitution of the United States had been 
framed only a short time before, it resembled 
the work of the Philadelphia Convention in that 
it was conspicuously the product of the spirit of 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 135 

compromise. With the exception of the vigor- 
ous assertions of the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, the document was marked by as great 
a moderation as was consistent with the thor- 
oughgoing changes that were demanded by the 
overwhelming public opinion, as represented in 
the cahiers. It is permeated through and through 
with two principles, the sovereignty of the peo- 
ple, all governmental powers issuing from their 
consent and will, and the separation of the 
powers sharply from each other, of the execu- 
tive, the legislative, and the judicial branches, a 
division greatly emphasized by Montesquieu as 
the sole method of insuring liberty. 

The form of government was to be monarchi- 
cal. This was in conformity with the wishes 
of the people as expressed in the cahiers, and 
with the feelings of the Constituent Assem- 
bly. But whereas formerly the king was an 
absolute, henceforth he was to be a limited, a 
constitutional ruler. Indicative of the pro- 
found difference between these two concep- 
tions, his former title, King of France and of 
Navarre, now gave way to that of King of the 
French. Whereas formerly he had taken what 
he chose out of the national treasury for his per- 
sonal use, now he was to receive a salary or civil 
list of the definite amount — and no more — of 



136 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

25,000,000 francs. He was to appoint the minis- 
ters or heads of the cabinet departments, but he 
was forbidden to select members of the legisla- 
ture for such positions. The English system 
of parliamentary government was deliberately 
avoided because it was believed to be vicious in 
that ministers could bribe or influence the mem- 
bers of Parliament to do their will, which might 
not at all be the will of the people. Ministers 
were not even to be permitted to come be- 
fore the legislature to defend or explain their 
policies. 

A departure from the principle of the separa- 
tion of powers, in general so closely followed, 
was shown in the granting of the veto power to 
the king. The king, who had hitherto made the 
laws, was now deprived of the lawmaking power, 
but he could prevent the immediate enforcement 
of an act passed by the legislature. There was 
much discussion over this subject in the Assem- 
bly. Some were opposed to any kind of a veto; 
others wanted one that should be absolute and 
final. The Assembly compromised and granted 
the king a suspensive veto, that is, he might pre- 
vent the application of a law voted by two suc- 
cessive legislatures, that is, for a possible period 
of four years. If the third legislature should 
indicate its approval of the law in question, then 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 137 

it was to be put into operation whether the king 
assented or not. 

The king was to retain the conduct of foreign 
affairs in his own hands. He was to appoint and 
receive ambassadors; was to be the head of the 
navy and army and was to appoint to higher 
offices. The Assembly at first thought of leaving 
him the right to make peace and war, then, fear- 
ing that he might drag the nation into a war for 
personal or dynastic and not national purposes, 
it decided that he might propose peace or war, 
but that the legislature should decide upon it. 

The legislative power was given by the Con- 
stitution of 1791 to a single assembly of 745 mem- 
bers, to be elected for a term of two years. Sev- 
eral of the deputies desired a legislature of two 
chambers, and cited the example of England and 
America. But the second chamber in England 
was the House of Lords, and the French, who 
had abolished the nobility, had no desire to estab- 
lish an hereditary chamber. Moreover the Eng- 
lish system was based on the principle of inequal- 
ity. The French were founding their new sys- 
tem upon the principle of equality. Even among 
the nobles themselves there was opposition to a 
second chamber — the provincial nobility fearing 
that only the court nobles would be members of 
it. On the other hand, the Senate of the United 



1 38 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

States was a concession to the states-rights feel- 
ing, a feeling which the French wished to de- 
stroy by abolishing the provinces and the local 
provincial patriotism, by thoroughly unifying 
France. Thus the plan of dividing the legisla- 
ture into two chambers was deliberately rejected, 
for what seemed good and sufficient reasons. 

How was this legislature to be chosen? Here 
we find a decided departure from the spirit and 
the letter of the Declaration, which had asserted 
that all men are equal in rights. Did not this 
mean universal suffrage? Such at least was not 
the opinion of the Constituent Assembly, which 
now made a distinction between citizens, declaring 
some active, some passive. To be considered an 
active citizen one must be at least twenty-five 
years of age and must pay annually in direct 
taxes the equivalent of three days' wages. This 
excluded the poor from this class, and the num- 
ber was large. It has been estimated that there 
were somewhat over 4,000,000 active citizens and 
about 3,000,000 passive. 

The active citizens alone had the right to vote. 
But even they did not vote directly for the mem- 
bers of the legislature. They chose electors at 
the ratio of one for every 100 active citizens. 
These electors must meet a much higher prop- 
erty qualification, the equivalent of from 150 to 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 139 

200 days' wages in direct taxes. As a matter of 
fact this resulted in rendering eligible as electors 
only about 43,000 individuals. These electors 
chose the members of the legislature, the depu- 
ties. They also chose the judges under the new 
system. Thus the Constituent Assembly, so 
zealous in abolishing old privileges, was, in de- 
fiance of its own principles, establishing new 
ones. Political rights in the new state were made 
the monopoly of those who possessed a certain 
amount of property. There was no property 
qualification required for deputies. Any active 
citizen was eligible, but as the deputies were 
elected by the propertied men, they would in all 
probability choose only propertied men — the 
electors would choose from their own class. 

The judicial power was completely revolution- 
ized. Hitherto judges had bought their posi- 
tions, which carried with them titles and privi- 
leges and which they might pass on to their sons. 
Henceforth all judges, of whatever rank in the 
hierarchy, were to be elected by the electors de- 
scribed above. Their terms were to range from 
two to four years. The jury, something hitherto 
absolutely unknown to modern France, was now 
introduced for criminal cases. Hitherto the 
judge had decided all cases. 

For purposes of administration and local gov- 



i 4 o THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ernment a new system was established. The old 
thirty-two provinces were abolished and France 
was divided into eighty-three departments of 
nearly uniform size. The departments were 
divided into arrondissements, these into cantons, 
and these into municipalities or communes. 
These are terms which have ever since been in 
vogue. 

France, from being a highly centralized state, 
became one highly decentralized. Whereas for- 
merly the central government was represented in 
each province by its own agents or office-holders, 
the intendants and their subordinates, in the de- 
partments of the future the central government 
was to have no representatives. The electors 
were to choose the local departmental officials. 
It would be the business of these officials to carry 
out the decrees of the central government — but 
what if they should disobey? The central gov- 
ernment would have no control over them, as it 
would not appoint them and could neither re- 
move nor discipline them. 

The Constitution of 1791 represented an im- 
provement in French government; yet it did not 
work well and did not last long. As a first ex- 
periment in the art of self-government it had its 
value, but it revealed inexperience and poor judg- 
ment in several points which prepared trouble 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 141 

for the future. The executive and the legisla- 
ture were so sharply separated that communica- 
tion between them was difficult and suspicion 
was consequently easily fostered. The king 
might not select his ministers from the legisla- 
ture, he might not, in case of a difference of 
opinion with the legislature, dissolve the latter, 
as the English king could do, thus allowing the 
voters to decide between them. The king's veto 
was not a weapon strong enough to protect him 
from the attacks of the Assembly, yet it was 
enough to irritate the Assembly, if used. The 
distinction between active and passive citizens 
was in plain and flagrant defiance of the Declara- 
tion of the Rights of Man, and inevitably created 
a discontented class. The administrative decen- 
tralization was so complete that the efficiency of 
the national government was gone. France was 
split up into eighty-three fragments, and the co- 
ordination of all these units, their direction 
toward great national ends in response to the 
will of the nation as a whole, was rendered ex- 
tremely difficult, and in certain crises impossible. 
The work of reform carried out by the Constit- 
uent Assembly was on an enormous scale, im- 
mensely more extensive than that of our Federal 
Convention. We search history in vain for any 
companion piece. It is unique. Its destructive 



i 4 2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

work proved durable and most important. Much 
of its constructive work, however, proved very 
fragile. Mirabeau expressed his opinion in say- 
ing that "The disorganization of the kingdom 
could not be better worked out." 

There were other dangerous features of the 
situation which inspired alarm and seemed to 
keep open and to embitter the relations of vari- 
ous classes and to foster opportunities for the 
discontented and the ambitious. The legislation 
concerning the church proved highly divisive in 
its effects. It began with the confiscation of its 
property; it was continued in the attempt pro- 
foundly to alter its organization. 

The States-General had been summoned to 
provide for the finances of the country. As the 
problem grew daily more pressing, as various at- 
tempts to meet it proved futile, as bankruptcy 
was imminent, the Assembly finally decided to 
sell for the state the vast properties of the church. 
The argument was that the church was not the 
owner but was merely the administrator, enjoy- 
ing only the use of the vast wealth which had 
been bestowed upon it by the faithful, but be- 
stowed for public, national purposes, namely, the 
maintenance of houses of worship, schools, hos- 
pitals ; and that if the state would otherwise pro- 
vide for the carrying out of the intentions of these 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 143 

numerous benefactors, it might apply the prop- 
erty, which was the property of the nation, not of 
the church as a corporation, to whatever uses it 
might see fit. Acting on this theory a decree was 
passed by the Assembly declaring these lands 
national. They constituted perhaps a fourth or 
a fifth of the territory of France and represented 
immense wealth, amply sufficient, it was be- 
lieved, to set the public finances right. 

But such property could only be used if 
converted into money and that would be a 
slow process, running through years. The 
expedient was devised of issuing paper money, 
as the government needed it, against this 
property as security. This paper money bore 
the name of assignats. Persons receiving such 
assignats could not demand gold for them, as in 
the case of our paper money, but could use them 
in buying these lands. There was value there- 
fore behind these paper emissions. The dan- 
ger in the use of paper money, however, always 
is the inclination, so easy to yield to, to issue far 
more paper than the value of the property behind 
it. This proved a temptation that the revolu- 
tionary assemblies did not have strength of mind 
or will to resist. At first the assignats were issued 
in limited quantities as the state needed the 
money, and the public willingly accepted them. 



144 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

But later larger and larger emissions were made, 
far out of proportion to the value of the national 
domains. This meant the rapid depreciation of 
the paper. People would not accept it at its face 
value, as they had at first been willing to do. The 
value of the church property was estimated in 
1789 as 4,000,000,000 francs. Between 1789 and 
1796 over 45,000,000,000 of assignats were issued. 
In 1789 an assignat of 100 francs was accepted 
for 100 francs in coin. But by 1791 it had 
sunk from par to 82, and by 1796 to less than a 
franc. This was neither an honest nor an effec- 
tive solution of the perplexing financial problem. 
It was evasion, it was in its essence repudiation. 
The Constituent Assembly did nothing toward 
solving the problem that had occasioned its meet- 
ing. It left the national finances in a worse welter 
than it had found them in. 

Another piece of legislation concerning the 
church, much more serious in its effects upon the 
cause of reform, was the Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy. By act of the Assembly the number 
of dioceses was reduced from 134 to 83, one for 
each department. The bishops and priests were 
henceforth to be elected by the same persons 
who elected the departmental officials. Once 
elected, the bishops were to announce the fact 
to the Pope, who was not to have the right to ap- 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 145 

prove or disapprove but merely to confirm. He 
was then to recognize them. If he refused, the 
ordinary courts could be invoked. The clergy 
were to receive salaries from the state, were, in 
other words, to become state officials. The in- 
come of most of the bishops would be greatly 
reduced, that of the parish priests considerably 
increased. 

This law was not acceptable to sincere Catho- 
lics as it altered by act of politicians an organiza- 
tion that had hitherto been controlled absolutely 
from within. Bishops and priests were to be 
elected like other officials — that is, Protestants, 
Jews, free-thinkers might participate in choos- 
ing the religious functionaries of the Catholic 
Church. Judges, who might be infidels, might 
yet play a decisive part. The Pope was prac- 
tically ignored. His nominal headship was not 
questioned. His real power was largely de- 
stroyed. He would be informed of what was 
happening; his approval would not be necessary. 

The Assembly voted that all clergymen must 
take an oath to support this Civil Constitution 
of the Clergy. Only four of the 134 bishops con- 
sented to do so. Perhaps a third of the parish 
priests consented. Those who consented were 
called the juring, those who refused, the non- 
juring or refractory clergy. In due time elections 



i 4 6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

were held as provided by the law and those 
elected were called the constitutional clergy. 
France witnessed the spectacle of two bodies of 
priests, one non-juring, chosen in the old way, 
the other elected by the voters indirectly. The 
scandal was great and the danger appalling, for 
religious discord was introduced into every city 
and hamlet. Faith supported the one body, the 
state supported the other — and the state em- 
barked upon a long, gloomy, and unsuccessful 
struggle to impose its will in a sphere where it 
did not belong. 

Most fatal were the consequences. One was 
that it made the position of Louis XVI, a sin- 
cere Catholic, far more difficult and exposed 
him to the charge of being an enemy of the 
Revolution, if he hesitated in his support of meas- 
ures which he could not and did not approve. 
Another was that it provoked in various sections, 
notably in Vendee, the most passionate civil war 
France had ever known. Multitudes of the lower 
clergy, who had favored and greatly helped the 
Revolution so far, now turned against it for con- 
science' sake. We cannot trace in detail this 
lamentable chapter of history. Suffice it to say 
that the Constituent Assembly made no greater 
or more pernicious mistake. The church had, as 
, the issue proved, immense spiritual influence over 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 147 

the peasants, the vast bulk of the population. 
Henceforth there was a divided allegiance — alle- 
giance to the state, allegiance to the church. Men 
had to make an agonizing choice. The small 
counter-revolutionary party of the nobles, hith- 
erto a staff of officers without an army, was now 
reinforced by thousands and millions of recruits, 
prepared to face any sacrifices. And worldly 
intriguers could draw on this fund of piety for pur- 
poses that were anything but pious. The heat 
generated by politics is sufficient. There was 
no need of increasing the temperature by adding 
the heat of religious controversy. French Revo- 
lution or eternal damnation, such was the hard 
choice placed before the devout. 

"I would rather be King of Metz than remain 
King of France in such a position," said Louis 
XVI, as he signed the decree requiring an oath 
to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy, "but this 
will end soon." The meaning of which remark 
was that the King was now through with his 
scruples, that he was resolved to call the mon- 
archs of Europe to his aid, that he was deter- 
mined to escape from this coil of untoward events 
that was binding him tighter and tighter, threat- 
ening soon to strangle him completely. The 
idea of a royal flight was not new. Marie An- 
toinette had thought of it long before. Mira- 



i 4 8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

beau had counseled it under certain conditions 
which, however, were no longer possible. The 
nobles who had fled from France, some of them 
after the fall of the Bastille, more of them after 
the war upon the chateaux, hung upon the 
fringes of the kingdom, in Belgium, in Piedmont, 
and particularly in the petty German states that 
lined the fabled banks of the Rhine, eager to have 
the King come to them, eager to embroil Europe 
with France, that thus they might return to Paris 
with the armies that would surely be easily vic- 
torious, and set back the clock to where it stood 
in 1789, incidentally celebrating that happy oc- 
currence by miscellaneous punishment of all the 
notable revolutionists, so that henceforth imag- 
inative spirits would hesitate before again laying 
impious hands upon the Lord's anointed, upon 
kings by divine right, upon nobles reposing upon 
rights no less sacred, upon the holy clergy. The 
Count of Artois, the proud and empty-headed 
brother of the King, one of the first to emigrate, 
had said: " Weshall return within three months." 
As a matter of fact he was to return only after 
twenty-three years, a considerable miscalcula- 
tion, pardonable no doubt in that extraordinary 
age in which every one miscalculated. 

Louis XVI, wounded in his conscience, now 
planned to escape from Paris, to go to the eastern 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 149 

part of France, where there were French troops 
on which he thought he could rely. Then, sur- 
rounded by faithful adherents, he could reassume 
the kingly role and come back to Paris, master 
of the situation. 

Disguised as a valet the King, accompanied by 
the Queen, disguised as a Russian lady, escaped 
from the Tuileries in the night of June 20, 1791, 
in a clumsy coach. All the next day they rolled 
over the white highways of Champagne under a 
terrible sun, reaching at about midnight the little 
village of Varennes, not far from the frontier. 
There they were recognized and arrested. The 
National Assembly sent three commissioners to 
bring them back. The return was for these two 
descendants of long lines of kings a veritable 
ascent of Calvary. Outrages, insults, jokes, ig- 
nominies of every kind were hurled at them by 
the crowds that thronged about them in the vil- 
lages through which they passed — a journey with- 
out rest, uninterrupted, under the annihilating 
heat, the suffocating dust of June. Reaching Paris 
they were no longer overwhelmed with insults, 
but were received in glacial silence by enormous 
throngs who stood with hats on, as the royal 
coach passed by. The King was impassive, but 
" our poor Queen," so wrote a friend, " bowed her 
head almost to her knees." Rows of national 



150 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

guards stood, arms grounded, as at funerals. At 
seven o'clock that night they were in the Tui- 
leries once more. Marie Antoinette had in these 
few days of horror grown twenty years older. 
Her hair had turned quite white, "like the hair 
of a woman of seventy." 

The consequences of this woeful misadventure 
were extremely grave. Louis XVI had shown 
his real feelings. The fidelity of his people to 
him was not entirely destroyed but was irremedi- 
ably shaken. They no longer believed in the 
sincerity of his utterances, his oaths to support 
the constitution. The Queen was visited with 
contumely, being regarded as the arch-conspira- 
tor. The throne was undermined. A republican 
party appeared. Before this no one had consid- 
ered a republic possible in so large a country as 
France. Republics were for small states like 
those of ancient Greece or medieval Italy. Even 
the most violent revolutionists, Robespierre, 
Danton, Marat, were, up to this time, monarch- 
ists. Now, however, France had a little object- 
lesson. During the absence of the King, the 
government of the Assembly continued to work 
normally. In the period following, during which 
Louis XVI was suspended from the exercise of 
his powers, government went on without damage 
to the state. A king was evidently not indispen- 



THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 151 

sable. It has been correctly stated that the flight 
to Varennes created the republican party in 
France, a party that has had an eventful history 
since then, and has finally, after many vicissi- 
tudes, established its regime. 

But this republican party was very small. The 
very idea of a republic frightened the Constitu- 
ent Assembly, even after the revelation of the 
faithlessness of the King. Consequently, in a 
revulsion of feeling, the Assembly, after a little, 
restored Louis XVI to his position, finished the 
constitution, accepted his oath to support it, and 
on September 30, 1791, this memorable body de- 
clared its mission fulfilled and its career at an 
end. 

The National Assembly before adjournment 
committed a final and unnecessary mistake. In 
a mood of fatal disinterestedness it voted that 
none of its members should be eligible to the next 
legislature or to the ministry. Thus the experi- 
ence of the past two years was thrown away and 
the new constitution was intrusted to hands en- 
tirely different from those that had fashioned it. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 

The constitution was now to be put into force. 
France was to make the experiment of a con- 
stitutional monarchy in place of the old abso- 
lute monarchy, gone forever. In accordance 
with the provisions of the document a legis- 
lature was now chosen. Its first session was 
held October i, 1791. Elected for a two-year 
term, it served for less than a single year. Ex- 
pected to inaugurate an era of prosperity and 
happiness by applying the new principles of gov- 
ernment in a time of peace, to consolidate the 
monarchy on its new basis, it was destined to a 
stormy life and to witness the fall of the mon- 
archy in irreparable ruin. A few days before it 
met Paris, adept, as always, in the art of observ- 
ing fittingly great national occasions, had cele- 
brated "the end of the Revolution." The old 
regime was buried. The new one was now to be 
installed. 

But the Revolution had not ended. Instead, 
it shortly entered upon a far more criti- 
cal stage. The reasons for this unhappy turn 
152 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 153 

were grave and numerous. They were inherent 
in the situation, both in France and in Europe. 
Would the King frankly accept his new position, 
with no mental reservations, with no secret de- 
terminations, honestly, entirely? If so, and if he 
would by his conduct convince his people of his 
loyalty to his word, of his intention to rule as a 
constitutional monarch, to abide by the reforms 
thus far accomplished, with no thought of up- 
setting the new system, then there was an ex- 
cellent chance that the future would be one of 
peaceful development, for France was thoroughly 
monarchical in tradition, in feeling, and in con- 
viction. The Legislative Assembly was as mon- 
archical in its sentiments as the Constituent 
had been. But if the King's conduct should 
arouse the suspicion that he was intriguing to 
restore the Old Regime, that his oaths were in- 
sincere, then the people would turn against him 
and the experiment of a constitutional monarchy 
would be hazarded. France had no desire to be 
a republic, but it had also a fixed and resolute 
aversion to the Old Regime. 

Inevitably, since the flight to Varennes, sus- 
picion of Louis XVI was widespread. The sus- 
picion was not dissipated by wise conduct on his 
part, but was increased in the following months 
to such a pitch that the revolutionary fever had 



154 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

no chance to subside but necessarily mounted 
steadily. The King's views were inevitably col- 
ored by his hereditary pretensions. Moreover, 
as we have seen, the religious question had been 
injected into the Revolution in so acute a form 
that his conscience as a Catholic was outraged. 
It was this that strained to the breaking point 
the relations of the Legislative Assembly and 
Louis XVI. The Civil Constitution of the Clergy 
gave rise to a bitter and distressing civil war. In 
the great province of Vendee several thousand 
peasants, led by the refractory or non-juring 
priests, rose against the elected, constitutional 
priests and drove them out of the pulpits and 
churches. When national guards were sent 
among them to enforce the law they flew to arms 
against them and civil war began. 

The Assembly forthwith passed a decree 
against the refractory priests, which only 
made a bad matter worse. They were re- 
quired to take the oath to the Civil Constitution 
within a week. If they refused they would be 
considered " suspicious " characters, their pen- 
sions would be suppressed, and they would be 
subject to the watchful and hostile surveillance 
of the government. Louis XVI vetoed this de- 
cree, legitimately using the power given him by 
the constitution. This veto, accompanied by 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 155 

others, offended public opinion, and weakened 
the King's hold upon France. It would have 
been better for Louis had he never been given 
the veto power, since every exercise of it placed 
him in opposition to the Assembly and inflamed 
party passions. 

The other decrees which he vetoed concerned 
the royal princes and the nobles who had emi- 
grated from France, either because they no longer 
felt safe there, or because they thought that 
by going to foreign countries they might induce 
their rulers to intervene in French affairs and re- 
store the Old Regime. This was wanton playing 
with fire. For the effect on France might be the 
very opposite of that intended. It might so 
heighten and exasperate popular feeling that the 
monarchy would be in greater danger than if 
left alone. This emigration, mostly of the privi- 
leged classes, had begun on the morrow of the 
storming of the Bastille. The Count d'Artois, 
younger brother of Louis XVI, had left France 
on July 15, 1789. The emigration became impor- 
tant in 1790, after the decree abolishing all titles 
of nobility, a decree that deeply wounded the 
pride of the nobles, and it was accelerated in 
1791, after the flight to Varennes and the suspen- 
sion of the King. It was later augmented by 
great numbers of non-juring priests and of bour- 



156 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

geois, who put their fidelity to the Catholic 
Church above their patriotism. 

It has been estimated that during the Revo- 
lution a hundred and fifty thousand people 
left France in this way. Many of them went 
to the little German states on the eastern 
frontier. There they formed an army of per- 
haps 20,000 men. The Count of Provence, elder 
brother of Louis XVI, was the titular leader 
and claimed that he was the regent of France 
on the ground that Louis XVI was virtually a 
prisoner. The emigres ceaselessly intrigued in the 
German and European courts, trying to insti- 
gate their rulers to invade France, particularly 
the rulers of Austria and Prussia, important mili- 
tary states, urging that the fate of one monarch 
was a matter that concerned all monarchs, for 
sentimental reasons and for practical, since, if the 
impious revolution triumphed in France, there 
would come the turn of the other kings for sim- 
ilar treatment at the hands of rebellious subjects. 
In 1 791 the emigres succeeded in inducing the rul- 
ers of Austria and Prussia to issue the Declara- 
tion of Pillnitz announcing that the cause of 
Louis XVI was the cause of all the monarchs 
of Europe. This declaration was made condi- 
tional upon the cooperation of all the countries 
and, therefore, it was largely bluster and had no 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 157 

direct importance. It was not sufficient to bring 
on war. But it angered France and increased 
suspicion of the King. The Legislative Assem- 
bly passed two decrees, one declaring that the 
Count of Provence would be deprived of his 
eventual rights to the throne if he did not return 
to France within two months, the other declaring 
that the property of the emigres would be con- 
fiscated and that they themselves would be 
treated as enemies, as guilty of treasonable con- 
spiracy, if their armaments were not dispersed 
by January 1, 1792; also stating that the French 
princes and public officials who had emigrated 
should be likewise regarded as conspiring against 
the state and would be exposed to the penalty 
of death, if they did not return by the same date. 
Louis XVI vetoed these decrees. He did, how- 
ever, order his two brothers to return to France. 
They refused to obey out of " tenderness " for the 
King. The Count of Provence, who had a gift 
for misplaced irony and impertinence, saw fit to 
exercise it in his reply to the Assembly's sum- 
mons. If this was not precisely pouring oil upon 
troubled waters, it was precisely adding fuel to 
a mounting conflagration, perhaps a natural 
mode of action for those who are dancing on vol- 
canoes. Prudent people prefer to do their danc- 
ing elsewhere. 



i 5 8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

More serious were the war clouds that were 
rapidly gathering. At the beginning of the Rev- 
olution nothing seemed less likely than a con- 
flict between France and Europe. France was 
pacifically inclined, and there were no outstand- 
ing subjects of dispute. Moreover the rulers of 
the other countries were not at all anxious to 
intervene. They were quite willing to have 
France occupied exclusively with domestic prob- 
lems, as thus the field would be left open for their 
intrigues. They were meditating the final par- 
tition of Poland and wished to be left alone while 
they committed that crowning iniquity. But 
gradually they came to see the menace to them- 
selves in the new principles proclaimed by the 
French, principles of the sovereignty of the 
people and of the equality of all citizens. Their 
own subjects, particularly the peasants and the 
middle classes, were alarmingly enthusiastic over 
the achievements of the French. If such prin- 
ciples should inspire the same deeds as in France, 
the absolute monarchy of Louis XVI would not 
be the only one to suffer a shock. 

Just as the sovereigns were being somewhat 
aroused from this complacent indifference in 
regard to their neighbor's principles, a change 
was going on in France itself, where certain 
parties were beginning to proclaim their duty to 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 159 

share their happiness with other peoples, in other 
words, to conduct a propaganda for their ideas 
outside of France. They were talking of the 
necessity of warring against tyrants, and of liber- 
ating peoples still enslaved. 

Thus on both sides the temper was becoming 
warlike. When such a mood prevails it is never 
difficult for willing minds to find sufficient pre- 
texts for an appeal to arms. Moreover each side 
had a definite and positive grievance. France, 
as we have seen, viewed with displeasure and con- 
cern the formation of the royalist armies on her 
eastern borders, with the connivance, or at least 
the consent, of the German princes. On the 
other hand, the German Empire had a direct 
grievance against France. When Alsace became 
French in the seventeenth century, a number of 
German princes possessed lands there and were, 
in fact, feudal lords. They still remained princes 
of the German Empire and their territorial rights 
were guaranteed by the treaties. Only they were 
at the same time vassals of the King of France, 
doing homage to him and collecting feudal dues, 
as previously. When the French abolished feu- 
dal dues, as we have seen, August 4, 1789, they 
insisted that these decrees applied to Alsace as 
well as to the rest of France. The German 
princes protested and asserted that the decrees 



160 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

were in violation of the treaties of Westphalia. 
The German Diet espoused their cause. The 
Constituent Assembly insisted upon maintaining 
its laws, in large measure, but offered to modify 
them. The Diet refused, demanding the revo- 
cation of the obnoxious laws and the restoration 
of the feudal dues in Alsace. The controversy 
was full of danger for the reason that there were 
many people, both in France and in the other 
countries, who were anxious for war and who 
would use any means they could to bring it about. 
The gale was gathering that was to sweep over 
Europe in memorable devastation for nearly a 
quarter of a century. 

The Legislative Assembly was composed of in- 
experienced men, because of the self-denying or- 
dinance passed in the closing hours of the Con- 
stituent Assembly. Yet this Assembly was vested 
by the new constitution with powers vastly over- 
shadowing those left with the King. Yet it was 
suspicious of the latter, as it had no control over 
the ministry and as it was the executive that 
directed the relations with foreign countries. 

There were, moreover, certain new forces in 
domestic politics of which the world was to hear 
much in the coming months. Certain political 
clubs began to loom up threateningly as possible 
rivals even of the Assembly. The two most con- 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 161 

spicuous were the Jacobin and the Cordelier 
clubs. These had originated at the very begin- 
ning of the Revolution, but it was under the 
Legislative Assembly and its successor that they 
showed their power. 

The Jacobin Club was destined to the greater 
notoriety. It was composed of members of the 
Assembly and of outsiders, citizens of Paris. 
As a political club the members held constant 
sessions and debated with great zeal and freedom 
the questions that were before the Assembly. Its 
most influential leader at this time was Robes- 
pierre, a radical democrat but at the same time a 
convinced monarchist, a vigorous opponent of the 
small republican party which had appeared mo- 
mentarily at the time of the epoch-making flight 
to Varennes. The Jacobin Club grew steadily 
more radical as the Revolution progressed and 
as its more conservative members dropped out 
or were eliminated. It also rapidly extended its 
influence over all France. Jacobin clubs were 
founded in over 2,000 cities and villages. 
Affiliated with the mother club in Paris, they 
formed a vast network, virtually receiving orders 
from Paris, developing great talent for concerted 
action. The discipline that held this volun- 
tary organization together was remarkable and 
rendered it capable of great and decisive action. 



162 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

It became a sort of state within the state, and 
moreover, within a state which was as decentral- 
ized and ineffective as it was itself highly cen- 
tralized and rapid and thorough in its action. 
The Jacobin Club gradually became a rival of 
the Assembly itself and at times exerted a pre- 
ponderant influence upon it, yet the Assembly 
was the legally constituted government of all 
France. 

The Cordelier Club was still more radical. Its 
membership was derived from a lower social 
scale. It was more democratic. Moreover, since 
the flight to Varennes it was the hotbed of repub- 
licanism. Its chief influence was with the work- 
ing classes of Paris, men who were enthusiastic 
supporters of the Revolution, anxious to have it 
carried further, easily inflamed against any one 
who was accused as an enemy, open or secret, of 
the Revolution. These men were crude and rude 
but tremendously energetic. They were the stuff 
of which mobs could be made, and they had in 
Danton, a lawyer, with a power of downright and 
epigrammatic speech, an able, astute, and ruth- 
less leader. The Cordelier Club, unlike the Jaco- 
bin, was limited to Paris; it had no branches 
throughout the departments. Like the Jacobins 
the Cordeliers contracted the habit of bringing 
physical pressure to bear upon the government, 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 163 

of seeking to impose their will upon that of the 
representatives of the nation, the King and the 
Assembly. 

Here, then, were redoubtable machines for in- 
fluencing the public. They would support the 
Assembly as long as its conduct met their wishes, 
but they were self-confident and self-willed 
enough to oppose it and to try to dominate it on 
occasion. Both were enthusiastic believers in 
the Revolution; both were lynx-eyed and keen- 
scented for any hostility to the Revolution, will- 
ing to go to any lengths to uncover and to crush 
those who should try to undo the reforms thus 
far accomplished. Both were suspicious of the 
King. 

They had inflammable material enough to 
work upon in the masses of the great capital of 
France. And these masses were, as the months 
went by, becoming steadily more excitable and 
exalted in temper. They worshiped liberty 
frantically and they expressed their worship in 
picturesque and sinister ways. They considered 
themselves, called themselves the true "patriots," 
and, like all fanatics, they were highly jealous and 
suspicious of their more moderate fellow-citizens. 
The new wine, which was decidedly heady, was 
fermenting dangerously in their brains. They 
displayed the revolutionary colors, the tricolor 



164 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

cockade, everywhere and on all occasions. They 
adopted and wore the bonnet rouge or red cap, 
which resembled the Phrygian cap of antiquity, 
the cap worn by the slaves after their eman- 
cipation. This was now, as it had been then, the 
symbol of liberty. 

This is the period, too, when we hear of the 
planting of liberty poles or trees everywhere 
amid popular acclamation and with festivities 
calculated to intensify the new-born democratic 
devotion. Even in dress the new era had its 
radical innovations and symbolism. The sans- 
culottes now set the style. They were the men 
who abandoned the old-style short breeches, the 
culottes, and adopted the long trousers hitherto 
worn only by workingmen and therefore a badge 
of social inferiority. 

Such, then, was the new quality in the atmos- 
phere, such were the new players who were 
grouped around the margins of the scene. Their 
influence was felt all through its year of fevered 
history by the Legislative Assembly, the lawful 
government of France. These men were all 
aglow with the great news announced in the Dec- 
laration of the Rights of Man, that the people 
are sovereign here below and that no divinity 
doth hedge about a King — that was sheer clap- 
trap which had imposed on mankind quite long 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 165 

enough. Now that France was delivered from 
this sorry hallucination, now that the darkness 
was dispelled, let the new principles be fearlessly 
applied! 

The reaction of all this upon the Legislative 
Assembly was pronounced. One of the first ac- 
tions of that Assembly was to abolish the terms, 
"Sire" and "Your Majesty," used in addressing 
the King. Another evidence that the new doc- 
trine of the sovereignty of the people was not 
merely a rosy, yet unsubstantial, figment of the 
imagination, but was a definite principle intended 
to be applied to daily politics, was the fact that 
when dissatisfied with the Assembly, the people 
crowded into its hall more frequently, express- 
ing their disapproval, voicing in unambiguous 
manner their desires, and the Assembly, which 
believed in the doctrine too, did not dare resent 
its application, did not dare assert its inviolabil- 
ity, as the representative of France, of law and 
order. 

The signs of the times, then, were certainly 
not propitious for those who would undo the 
work of the Revolution, who would restore the 
King and the nobles to the position they had once 
occupied and had now lost. The pack would be 
upon them if they tried. The struggle would be 
with a rude and vigorous democracy in which 



166 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

reverence for the old had died, which was reck- 
less of traditions, and was ready to suffer, and 
more ready to inflict suffering, if attempts were 
made to thwart it. Anything that looked like 
treachery would mean a popular explosion. Yet 
this moment, so inopportune, was being used by 
the King and Queen in secret but suspected 
machinations with foreign rulers, with a view 
to securing their aid in the attempt to recover 
the ground lost by the monarchy; was being used 
by the emigrant nobles in Coblenz and Worms 
for counter-revolutionary intrigues and for war- 
like preparations. Their only safe policy was a 
candid and unmistakable recognition of the new 
regime, but this was precisely what they were in- 
tellectually and temperamentally incapable of ap- 
preciating. They were playing with fire. This 
was all the more risky as many of their enemies 
were equally willing to play with the same dan- 
gerous element. 

There was in the Legislative Assembly a group 
of men called the Girondists, because many of 
their leaders, Vergniaud, Isnard, Buzot and 
others, came from that section of France known 
as Gironde, in the region of Bordeaux. The 
Girondists have enjoyed a poetic immortality 
ever since imaginative histories of the Revolu- 
tion issued from the pensive pen of the poet La- 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 167 

martine, who portrayed them as pure and high- 
minded patriots caught in the swirl of a wicked 
world. The description was inaccurate. They 
were not disinterested martyrs in the cause of 
good government. They were a group of poli- 
ticians whose discretion was not as conspicuous 
as their ambition. They paid for that vaulting 
emotion the price which it frequently exacts. 
They knew how to make their tragic exit from 
life bravely and heroically. They did not know, 
what is more difficult, how to make their lives 
wise and profitable to the world. They were a 
group of eloquent young men, led by a romantic 
young woman. For the real head of this group 
that had its hour upon the stage and then was 
heard no more in the deafening clamor of the later 
Revolution, was Madame Roland, their bright 
particular star. Theirs was a bookish outlook 
upon the world. They fed upon Plutarch, and 
boundless was their admiration for the ancient 
Greeks and Romans. They were republicans be- 
cause those glorious figures of the earlier time 
had been republicans; also because they imag- 
ined that, in a republic, they would themselves 
find a better chance to shine and to irradiate the 
world. Dazzled by these prototypes, they burned 
with the spirit of emulation. The reader must 
keep steadily in mind that the Girondists and the 



168 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Jacobins were entirely distinct groups. They 
were, indeed, destined later to be deadly rivals 
and enemies. 

Such were the personages who played their 
dissimilar parts in the hot drama of the times. 
The stage was set. The background was the 
whole fabric of the European state system, now 
shaking unawares. The action began with the 
declaration of war by France against Francis II, 
ruler of Austria, and nephew of Marie An- 
toinette, a declaration which opened a war which 
was to be European and world-wide, which was 
to last twenty-three long years, was to deform 
and twist the Revolution out of all resemblance 
to its early promise, was, as by-products, to give 
France a republic, a Reign of Terror, a Napole- 
onic epic, a Bourbon overthrow and restoration, 
and was to end only with the catastrophic inci- 
dent of Waterloo. 

That war was precipitated by the French, who 
sent an ultimatum to the Emperor concerning 
the emigres. Francis replied by demanding the 
restoration to the German princes in Alsace of 
their feudal rights and, in addition, the repression 
in France "of anything that might alarm other 
states." War was declared on April 20, 1792. 
It was desired by all the parties of the Legis- 
lative Assembly. Only seven members voted 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 169 

against it. The supporters of the King wanted 
it, believing that it would enable him to recover 
power once more by rendering him popular as the 
leader in a victorious campaign and by putting 
at his disposal a strong military force. Giron- 
dists and Jacobins wanted it for precisely the op- 
posite reason, as likely to prove that Louis was 
secretly a traitor, in intimate relations with the 
enemies of France. This once established, the 
monarchy could be swept aside and a republic 
installed. Only Robespierre and a few others op- 
posed it on the ground that war always plays into 
the hands of the rich and powerful, that the peo- 
ple, on the other hand, the poor, always pay for 
it and lose rather than gain, that war is never in 
the interest of a democracy. They were, how- 
ever, voices crying in the wilderness. There 
was a widespread feeling that the war was an 
inevitable clash between democracy, represented 
by France under the new dispensation, and 
autocracy, represented by the House of Haps- 
burg, a conflict of two eras, the past and the fu- 
ture. The national exaltation was such that the 
people welcomed the opportunity to spread 
abroad, beyond the borders of France, the revo- 
lutionary ideas of liberty and equality which they 
had so recently acquired and which they so highly 
prized. The war had some of the character- 



170 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

istics of a religious war, the same mental exalta- 
tion, the same dogmatic belief in the universal 
applicability of its doctrines, the same sense of 
duty to preach them everywhere; by force, if 
necessary. 

This war was a startling and momentous turn- 
ing-point in the history of the Revolution. It 
had consequences, some of which were fore- 
seen, most of which were not. It reacted pro- 
foundly upon the French and before it was over 
it compromised their own domestic liberty and 
generated a military despotism of greater effi- 
ciency than could be matched in the century-old 
history of the House of Bourbon. 

First and foremost among the effects of the 
war was this : it swept the illustrious French mon- 
archy clean away and put the monarchs to death. 
The war began disastrously. Instead of easily 
conquering Belgium, which belonged to Francis 
II, as they had confidently expected to, the French 
suffered severe reverses. One reason was that 
their army had been badly disorganized by the 
wholesale resignation or emigration of its offi- 
cers, all noblemen. Another was the highly trea- 
sonable act of Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, 
who informed the Austrians of the French plan 
of campaign. This treason of their sovereigns 
was not known to the French, but it was sus- 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 171 

pected, and it was none the less efficacious. At 
the same time that French armies were being 
driven back, civil war, growing out of the re- 
ligious dissensions, was threatening in France. 
The Assembly, facing these troubles, indignantly 
passed two decrees, one ordering the deporta- 
tion to penal colonies of all refractory or non- 
juring priests, the other providing for an army 
of 20,000 men for the protection of Paris. 

Louis XVI vetoed both measures. Then 
the storm broke. The Jacobins inspired and or- 
ganized a great popular demonstration against 
the King, the object being to force him to sign 
the decrees. Out from the crowded working- 
men's quarters emerged, on June 20, 1792, several 
thousand men, wearing the bonnet rouge, armed 
with pikes, and carrying standards with the 
Rights of Man printed on them. They went to 
the hall of the Assembly and were permitted to 
march through it, submitting a petition in which 
the pointed statement was made that the will 
of 25,000,000 people could not be balked by the 
will of one man. After leaving the hall the crowd 
went to the Tuileries, forced open the gates, and 
penetrated to the King's own apartments. The 
King for three hours stood before them, in the 
recess of a window, protected by some of the 
deputies. The crowd shouted, "Sign the de- 



172 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

crees!" "Down with the priests!" One of the 
ringleaders of the demonstration, a butcher 
called Legendre, gained a notoriety that has suf- 
ficed to preserve his name from oblivion to this 
day, by shouting at the King, "Sir, you are a 
traitor, you have always deceived us, you are de- 
ceiving us still. Beware, the cup is full." Louis 
XVI refused to make any promises. His will, for 
once, did not waver. But he received a bonnet 
rouge and donned it and drank a glass of wine 
presented him by one of the crowd. The crowd 
finally withdrew, having committed no violence, 
but having subjected the King of France to bit- 
ter humiliation. 

Immediately a wave of indignation at this af- 
front and scandal swept over France and it 
seemed likely that, after all, it might redound to 
the advantage of Louis, increasing his popular- 
ity by the sympathy it evoked. But shortly other 
events supervened and his position became more 
precarious than ever. Prussia joined Austria in 
the war and the Duke of Brunswick, commander 
of the coalition armies, as he crossed the fron- 
tiers of France, issued a manifesto which aroused 
the people to a fever pitch of wrath. This mani- 
festo had really been written by an emigre and 
it was redolent of the concentrated rancor of his 
class. The manifesto ordered the French to re- 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 173 

store Louis XVI to complete liberty of action. 
It went further and virtually commanded them 
to obey the orders of the monarchs of Austria 
and Prussia. It announced that any national 
guards who should resist the advance of the 
allies would be punished as rebels and it wound 
up with the terrific threat that if the least vio- 
lence or outrage should be offered to their Majes- 
ties, the King, the Queen, and the royal family, if 
their preservation and their liberty should not 
be immediately provided for, they, the allied 
monarchs, would " exact an exemplary and ever- 
memorable vengeance," namely, the complete 
destruction of the city of Paris. 

Such a threat could have but one reply from a 
self-respecting people. It nerved them to in- 
credible exertions to resent and repay the insult. 
Patriotic anger swept everything before it. 

The first to suffer was the person whom the 
manifesto had singled out for special care, Louis 
XVI, now suspected more than ever of being the 
accomplice of these invaders who were breath- 
ing fire and destruction upon the French for the 
insolence of managing their own affairs as they 
saw fit. On August 10, 1792, another, and this 
time more formidable, insurrection occurred in 
Paris. At nine in the morning the crowd at- 
tacked the Tuileries. At ten the King and the 



174 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

royal family left the palace and sought safety in 
the Assembly. There they were kept in a little 
room, just behind the president's chair and there 
they remained for more than thirty hours. While 
the Assembly was debating, a furious combat 
was raging between the troops stationed to guard 
the Tuileries and the mob. Louis XVI, hearing 
the first shots, sent word to the guards to cease 
fire, but the officer who carried the command did 
not deliver it as long as he thought there was a 
chance of victory. The Swiss Guards were the 
heroes and the victims of that dreadful day. 
They defended the palace until their ammunition 
gave out and then, receiving the order to retire, 
they fell back slowly, but were soon overwhelmed 
by their assailants and 800 of them were shot 
down. The vengeance of the mob was frenzied. 
They themselves had lost hundreds of men. No 
quarter was given. More than 5,000 people 
were killed that day. The Tuileries was sacked 
and gutted. A sallow-complexioned young ar- 
tillery officer, out of service, named Napoleon 
Bonaparte, was a spectator of this scene, from 
which he learned a few lessons which were later 
of value to him. 

The deeds of August 10 were the work of the 
Revolutionary Commune of Paris. The former 
municipal government had been illegally over- 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 175 

thrown by the Jacobins, who had then organized 
a new government which they entirely controlled. 
The Jacobins, the masters of Paris, had carefully 
prepared the insurrection of August 10 for the 
definite purpose of overthrowing Louis XVI. 
The menaces of the Duke of Brunswick had 
merely been the pretext. Now began that sys- 
tematic dominance of Paris in the affairs 
of France which was to be brief but 
terrible. At the end of the insurrection 
the Commune forced the Legislative Assembly 
to do its wishes. Under this imperious and en- 
tirely illegal dictation the Assembly voted that 
the King should be provisionally suspended. This 
necessitated the making of a new constitution, 
as the Constitution of 1791 was monarchical. The 
present Assembly was a merely legislative body, 
not competent to alter the fundamental law. 
Therefore the Legislative Assembly, although 
its term was only half expired, decided to call 
a Convention to take up the matter of the con- 
stitution. Under orders from the Paris Com- 
mune it issued a decree to that effect and it 
made a further important decision. For elec- 
tions to the Convention it abolished the prop- 
erty suffrage, established by the Constitution of 
1791, and proclaimed universal suffrage. France, 
thus, on August 10, 1792, became a democracy. 



176 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

The executive of France was thus overthrown. 
During the interval before the meeting of the 
Convention a provisional executive council, with 
Danton at the head, wielded the executive power, 
influenced by the Commune. The Assembly had 
merely voted the suspension of Louis XVI. The 
Commune, in complete disregard of law and in 
defiance of the Assembly, imprisoned the King 
and Queen in the Temple, an old fortress in 
Paris. The Commune also arrested large num- 
bers of suspected persons. 

This Revolutionary Commune, or City Coun- 
cil of Paris, was henceforth one of the power- 
ful factors in the government of France. It, 
and not the Legislative Assembly, was the real 
ruler of the country between the suspension of 
the King on August 10 and the meeting of the 
Convention, September 20. It continued to be 
a factor, sometimes predominant, even under 
the Convention. For nearly two years, from 
August, 1792, until the overthrow of Robes- 
pierre on July 27, 1794, the Commune was one 
of the principal forces in politics. It signal- 
ized its advent by suppressing the freedom of 
the press, one of the precious conquests of the 
reform movement, by defying the committees 
of the Assembly when it chose, and by carrying 
through the infamous September Massacres, 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 177 

which left a monstrous and indelible stain upon 
the Revolution. The Commune was the repre- 
sentative of the lower classes and of the Jacobins. 
Its leaders were all extremely radical, and some 
were desperate characters who would stop at 
nothing to gain their ends. 

The September Massacres grew out of the feel- 
ing of panic which seized the population of Paris 
as it heard of the steady approach of the Prus- 
sians and Austrians under the Duke of Bruns- 
wick. Hundreds of persons, suspected or 
charged with being real accomplices of the in- 
vaders, were thrown into prison. Finally the 
news reached Paris that Verdun was besieged, 
the last fortress on the road to the capital. If 
that should fall, then the enemy would have but 
a few days' march to accomplish and Paris would 
be theirs. The Commune and the Assembly 
made heroic exertions to raise and forward 
troops to the exposed position. The Commune 
sounded the tocsin or general alarm from the bell 
towers, and unfurled a gigantic black flag from 
the City Hall bearing the inscription, " The 
Country is in Danger." The more violent mem- 
bers began to say that before the troops were 
sent to the front the traitors within the city 
ought to be put out of the way. " Shall we go 
to the front, leaving 3,000 prisoners behind us, 



178 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

who may escape and murder our wives and chil- 
dren? " they asked. The hideous spokesman and 
inciter of the foul and cowardly slaughter was 
Marat, one of the most bloodthirsty characters 
of the time. The result was that day after day 
from September 2 to September 6 the cold-blooded 
murder of non-juring priests, of persons sus- 
pected or accused of " aristocracy," went on, 
without trial, the innocent and the guilty, men 
and women. The butchery was systematically 
done by men hired and paid by certain members 
of the Commune. The Legislative Assembly was 
too terrified itself to attempt to stop the infamous 
business, nor could it have done so had it tried. 
Nearly 1,200 persons were thus savagely 
hacked to pieces by the colossal barbarism of 
those days. 

One consequence of these massacres was to dis- 
credit the cause of the Revolution. Another was 
to precipitate a sanguinary struggle between the 
Girondists, who wished to punish the " Septem- 
brists " and particularly their instigator, Marat, 
and the Jacobins, who either defended them or 
assumed an attitude of indifference, urging that 
France had more important work to do than to 
spend its time trying to avenge men who were 
after all " aristocrats." The struggles between 
these factions were to fill the early months of the 



THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 179 

Convention which met on September 20, 1792, 
the elections having taken place under the 
gloomy and terrifying impressions produced by 
the September Massacres. On the same day, 
September 20, the Prussians were stopped in 
their onward march at Valmy. They were to 
get no further. The immediate danger was over. 
The tension was relieved. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CONVENTION 

THE third Revolutionary assembly was the Na- 
tional Convention, which was in existence for 
three years, from September 20, 1792, to October 
26, 1795. Called to draft a new constitution, 
necessitated by the suspension of Louis XVI, its 
first act was the abolition of monarchy as an in- 
stitution. Before its final adjournment three 
years later it had drafted two different constitu- 
tions, one of which was never put in force, it 
had established a republic, it had organized a 
provisional government with which to face the 
appalling problems that confronted the country, 
it had maintained the integrity and independence 
of the country, threatened by complete dissolu- 
tion, and had decisively defeated a vast hostile 
coalition of European powers. In accomplish- 
ing this gigantic task it had, however, made a 
record for cruelty and tyranny that left the Re- 
public in deep discredit and made the Revolution 
odious to multitudes of men. 

On September 21, 1792, the Convention voted 
unanimously that "royalty is abolished in 



THE CONVENTION 181 

France." The following day it voted that all 
public documents should henceforth be dated 
from "the first year of the French Republic." 
Thus unostentatiously did the Republic make its 
appearance upon the scene "furtively interject- 
ing itself between the factions," as Robespierre 
expressed it. There was no solemn proclama- 
tion of the Republic, merely the indirect state- 
ment. As Aulard observes, the Convention had 
the air of saying to the nation, "There is no pos- 
sibility of doing otherwise." Later the Republic 
had its heroes, its victims, its martyrs, but it was 
created in the first instance simply because there 
was nothing else to do. France had no choice in 
the matter. It merely accepted an imperative 
situation. A committee was immediately ap- 
pointed to draw up a new constitution. Its work, 
however, was long postponed, for the Conven- 
tion was distracted by a frenzied quarrel that 
broke out immediately between two parties, the 
Girondists and Jacobins. The latter party was 
often called the Mountain, because of the raised 
seats its members occupied. It is not easy to de- 
fine the differences between these factions, which 
were involved in what was fundamentally a strug- 
gle for power. Both were entirely devoted to the 
Republic. Between the two factions there was a 
large group of members, who swung now this 



i82 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

way and now that, carrying victory or defeat as 
they shifted their votes. They were the center, 
the Plain or the Marsh, as they were called be- 
cause of the location of their seats in the con- 
vention hall. 

On one point, the part that the city of Paris 
should be permitted to play in the government, 
the difference of opinion was sharp. The Giron- 
dists represented the departments and insisted 
that Paris, which constituted only one of the de- 
partments of the eighty-three into which France 
was divided, should have only one eighty-third 
of influence. They would tolerate no dictatorship 
of the capital. On the other hand the Jacobins 
drew their strength from Paris. They consid- 
ered Paris the brain and the heart of the coun- 
try, a center of light to the more backward prov- 
inces; they believed that it was the proper and 
predestined leader of the nation, that it was in 
a better position than was the country at large 
to appreciate the significance of measures and 
events, that it was, as Danton said, "the chief 
sentinel of the nation." The Girondists were 
anxious to observe legal forms and processes; 
they disliked and distrusted the frequent appeals 
to brute force. The Jacobins, on the other hand, 
were not so scrupulous. They were rude, active, 
forceful, indifferent to law, if law stood in the 



THE CONVENTION 183 

way. They were realists and believed in the ap- 
plication of force wherever and whenever neces- 
sary. Indeed their great emphasis was always 
put upon the necessity of the state. That justi- 
fied everything. In other words anything was 
legitimate that might contribute to the safety 
or greatness of the Republic, whether legal or 
not. 

But the merely personal element was even 
more important in dividing and envenoming 
these groups. The Girondists hated the three 
leaders of the Jacobins, Robespierre, Marat, and 
Danton. Marat and Robespierre returned the 
hatred, which was thus easily fanned to fever 
heat. Danton, a man of coarse fiber but large 
mould, above the pettiness of jealousy and pique, 
thought chiefly and instinctively only of the 
cause, the interest of the country at the given 
moment. He had no scruples, but he had a keen 
sense for the practical and the useful. He was 
anxious to work with the Girondists, anxious to 
smooth over situations, to avoid extremes, to 
subordinate persons to measures, to ignore the 
spirit of faction and intrigue, to keep all repub- 
licans working together in the same harness for 
the welfare of France. His was the spirit of easy- 
going compromise. But he met in the Giron- 
dists a stern, unyielding opposition. They would 



i8 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

have nothing to do with him, they would not co- 
operate with him, and they finally ranged him 
among their enemies, to their own irreparable 
harm and to his. 

The contest between these two parties grew 
shriller and more vehement every day, ending in 
a life and death struggle. It began directly after 
the meeting of the Convention, in the discussion 
as to what should be done with Louis XVI, now 
that monarchy was abolished and the monarch 
a prisoner of state. 

The King had unquestionably been disloyal to 
the Revolution. He had given encouragement to 
the emigres and had entered into the hostile plans 
of the enemies of France. After the meeting of 
the Convention a secret iron box, fashioned by his 
own hand, had been discovered in the Tuileries 
containing documents which proved beyond 
question his treason. Ought he to have the full 
punishment of a traitor or had he been already 
sufficiently punished, by the repeated in- 
dignities to which he had been subjected, 
by imprisonment, and by the loss of his 
throne? Might not the Convention stay 
its hand, refrain from exacting the full 
measure of satisfaction from one so sorely visited 
and for whom so many excuses lay in the general 
goodness of his character and in the extraor- 



THE CONVENTION 185 

dinary perplexities of his position, perplexities 
which might have baffled a far wiser person, 
at a time when the men of clearest vision saw 
events as through a glass, darkly? But mercy 
was not in the hearts of men, particularly of the 
Jacobins, who considered Louis the chief culprit 
and unworthy of consideration. The Jacobins at 
first would not hear even of a trial. Robespierre 
demanded that the King be executed forthwith 
by a mere vote of the Convention, and Saint-Just, 
a satellite of Robespierre, recalled that " Caesar 
was despatched in the very presence of the Senate 
without other formality than twenty-two dagger 
strokes." But Louis was given a trial, a trial, 
however, before a packed jury, which had already 
shown its hatred of him, before men who were at 
the same time his accusers and his judges. The 
trial lasted over a month, Louis himself appear- 
ing at the bar, answering the thirty-three ques- 
tions that were put to him and which covered his 
conduct during the Revolution. His statements 
were considered unsatisfactory. Despite the 
eloquent defense of his lawyer the Convention 
voted on January 15, 1793, that " Louis Capet" 
was " guilty of conspiracy against the liberty of 
the nation and of a criminal attack upon the 
safety of the state." The vote was unanimous, a 
few abstaining from voting but not one voting 



186 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

in the negative. Many of the Girondists then 
urged that the sentence be submitted to the 
people for their final action. Robespierre com- 
bated this idea with vigor, evidently fearing that 
the people would not go the whole length. This 
proposition was voted down by 424 votes 
against 283. 

What should be the punishment? Voting on 
this question began at eight o'clock in the even- 
ing of January 16, 1793. During twenty-four 
hours the 721 deputies present mounted the plat- 
form one after the other, and announced their 
votes to the Convention. At eight o'clock on the 
evening of the 17th the vote was completed. The 
president announced the result. Number voting 
721; a majority 361. For death 387; against 
death, or for delay, 334. 

On Sunday, January 21st, the guillotine was 
raised in the square fronting the Tuileries. At 
ten o'clock Louis mounted the fatal steps with 
courage and composure. He was greater on the 
scaffold than he had been upon the throne. He 
endeavored to speak. "Gentlemen, I am inno- 
cent of that of which I am accused. May my 
blood assure the happiness of the French." His 
voice was drowned by a roll of drums. He died 
with all the serenity of a profoundly religious 
man. 



THE CONVENTION 187 

The immediate consequence of the execution 
was a formidable increase in the number of ene- 
mies France must conquer if she were to live, and 
an intensification of the passions involved. 
France was at war with Austria and Prussia. 
Now England, Russia, Spain, Holland, and the 
states of Germany and Italy entered the war 
against her, justifying themselves by the "mur- 
der of the King," although all had motives much 
more practical than this sentimental one. It 
was an excellent opportunity to gain territory 
from a country which was plainly in process of 
dissolution. Civil war, too, was added to the 
turmoil, as the peasants of the Vendee, 100,000 
strong, rose against the republic which was the 
murderer of the king and the persecutor of the 
church. Dumouriez, an able commander of one 
of the French armies, was plotting against the 
Convention and was shortly to go over to the 
enemy, a traitor to his country. 

The ground was giving way everywhere. The 
Convention stiffened for the fray, resolved to do 
or die, or both, if necessary. No government was 
ever more energetic or more dauntless. It voted 
to raise 300,000 troops immediately. It created 
a committee of General Security, a committee 
of Public Safety, a Revolutionary Tribunal, all 
parts of a machine that was intended to concen- 



188 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

trate the full force of the nation upon the prob- 
lem of national salvation and the annihilation of 
the Republic's enemies, whether foreign or do- 
mestic. 

But while it was doing all this the Convention 
was floundering in the bog of angry party poli- 
tics. Discussion was beginning its work of divid- 
ing the republicans, preparatory to consuming 
them. The first struggle was between the Gi- 
rondists and the Jacobins. The Girondists wished 
to punish the men who had been responsible for 
the September Massacres. They wished to pun- 
ish the Commune for numerous illegal acts. They 
hated Marat and were able to get a vote from the 
Convention sending him before the Revolution- 
ary Tribunal, expecting that this would be the 
end of him. Instead, he was acquitted and be- 
came the hero of the populace of Paris, more 
powerful than before and now wilder than ever 
in his denunciations. Sanguinary Marat, feline 
Robespierre, were resolved on the annihilation 
of the Girondists. Danton, thinking of France 
and loathing all this discord, when the nation was 
in danger, all this exaggeration of self, this con- 
temptible carnival of intrigue, thinking that 
Frenchmen had enemies enough to fight without 
tearing each other to pieces, tried to play the 
peacemaker. But he had the fate that peacemak- 



THE CONVENTION 189 

ers frequently have. He accomplished nothing 
for France and made enemies for himself. 

The Commune, which supported the Jacobins, 
and which idolized Marat and respected Robes- 
pierre, intervened in this struggle, using, to cut 
it short, its customary weapon, physical force. 
It organized an insurrection against the Giron- 
dists, a veritable army of 80,000 men with sixty 
cannon. Marat, himself a member of the Con- 
vention, climbed to the belfry of the City Hall 
and with his own hand sounded the tocsin. This 
was Marat's day. He, self-styled Friend of the 
People, was the leader of this movement from the 
beginning to the end of the fateful June 2, 1793. 
The Tuileries, where the Convention sat, was 
surrounded by the insurrectionary troops. The 
Convention was the prisoner of the Commune, 
the Government of France at the mercy of the 
Government of Paris. The Commune demanded 
the expulsion of the Girondist leaders from the 
Convention. The Convention protested indig- 
nantly against the conduct of the insurgents. Its 
members resolved to leave the hall in a body. 
They were received with mock deference by the 
insurgents. The demand of their president that 
the troops disperse was bluntly refused until the 
Girondists who had been denounced should be 
expelled. The Convention was obliged to return 



igo THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

to its hall conquered and degraded and to vote 
the arrest of twenty-nine Girondists. For the 
first time in the Revolution the assembly elected 
by the voters of France was mutilated. Violence 
had laid its hand upon the sovereignty of the 
people in the interest of the rule of a faction. The 
victory of the Commune was the victory of the 
Jacobins, who, by this treason to the nation, were 
masters of the Convention. 

But not yet masters of the country. Indeed 
this high-handed crime of June 2 aroused indigna- 
tion and resistance throughout a large section of 
France. Had the departments no rights which 
the Commune of Paris was bound to respect? 
The Girondists called the departments to arms 
against this tyrannical crew. They responded 
with alacrity, exasperated and alarmed. Four 
of the largest cities of France, Lyons, Marseilles, 
Bordeaux, and Caen, took up arms, and civil 
war, born of politics, added to the civil war born 
of religion in the Vendee, and to the ubiquitous 
foreign war, made confusion worse confounded. 
In all some sixty departments out of eighth-three 
participated in this movement, three-fourths of 
France. To meet this danger, to allay this 
strong distrust of Paris felt by the de- 
partments, to show them that they need 
not fear the dictatorship of the Commune, the 



THE CONVENTION 191 

Convention drafted in great haste the constitu- 
tion which it had been summoned to make, but 
which it had for months ignored in the heat 
of party politics. And the Constitution of 1793, 
the second in the history of the Revolution, 
guarded so carefully the rights of the depart- 
ments and the rights of the people that it made 
Parisian dictation impossible. 

The Constitution of 1793 established universal 
suffrage. It also carried decentralization farther 
than did the Constitution of 1791, which had car- 
ried it much too far. The Legislature was to be 
elected only for a year, and all laws were to be 
submitted to the people for ratification or rejec- 
tion before being put into force. This is the first 
appearance of the referendum. The executive 
was to consist of twenty-four members chosen 
by the legislature out of a list drawn up by the 
electors and consisting of one person from each 
department. 

This constitution worked like a charm in dis- 
sipating the distrust of the departments. Their 
rights could not be better safeguarded. Sub- 
mitted to the voters the constitution was over- 
whelmingly ratified, over 1,000,000 votes in its 
favor, less than 12,000 in opposition. But this 
is the only way in which this constitution ever 
worked. So thoroughly did it decentralize the 



i 9 2 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

state, so weak did it leave the central govern- 
ment, that even those who had accepted it cor- 
dially saw that it could not be applied imme- 
diately, with foreign armies streaming into 
France from every direction. What was needed 
for the crisis as every one saw, was a strong gov- 
ernment. Consequently by general agreement 
the constitution was immediately suspended, as 
soon as it was made. The suspension was to be 
merely provisional. As soon as the crisis should 
pass it should be put into operation. Meanwhile 
this precious document was put into a box in the 
center of the convention hall and was much in 
the way. 

To meet the crisis, to enable France to hew her 
way through the tangle of complexities and dan- 
gers that confronted her, a provisional govern- 
ment was created, a government as strong as 
the one provided by the constitution was weak, 
as efficient as that would have proved in- 
efficient. The new system was frankly based 
on force, and it inaugurated a Reign of Terror 
which has remained a hissing and a byword 
among the nations ever since. This provisional 
or revolutionary government was lodged in 
the Convention. The Convention was the sole 
nerve center whence shot forth to the farthest 
confines of the land the iron resolutions that beat 



THE CONVENTION 193 

down all opposition and fired all energies to a 
single end. The Convention was dictator, and it 
organized a government that was more absolute, 
more tyrannical, more centralized than the Bour- 
bon monarchy, in its palmiest days, had ever 
dreamed of being. Montesquieu's sacred doc- 
trine of the separation of powers, which the Con- 
stituent Assembly had found so excellent, was 
ignored. 

The machinery of this provisional government 
consisted of two important committees, ap- 
pointed by the Convention, the Committee of 
Public Safety, and the Committee of General 
Security; also of representatives on mission, of 
the Revolutionary Tribunal, and of the political 
clubs and committees of surveillance in the cities 
and villages throughout the country. 

The Committee of Public Safety consisted at 
first of nine, later of twelve members. Chosen 
by the Convention for a term of a month, they 
were, as a matter of fact, reelected month after 
month, changes only occurring when parties 
changed in the Assembly. Thus Danton, upon 
whose suggestion the original committee had 
been created, was not a member of the enlarged 
committee, reorganized after the expulsion of 
the Girondists. He was dropped because he cen- 
sured the acts of June 2, and his enemy Robes- 



194 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

pierre became the leading member. At first this 
committee was charged simply with the manage- 
ment of foreign affairs and of the army, but in 
the end it became practically omnipotent, direct- 
ing the state as no single despot had ever done, 
intervening in every department of the nation's af- 
fairs, even holding the Convention itself, of which 
in theory it was the creature, in stern and terri- 
fied subjection to itself. Installing itself in the 
palace of the Tuileries, in the former royal apart- 
ments, it developed a prodigious activity, fram- 
ing endless decrees, tossing thousands of men to 
the guillotine, sending thousands upon thousands 
against the enemies of France, guiding, animat- 
ing, tyrannizing ruthlessly a people which had 
taken such pains to declare itself free, only to find 
its fragile liberties, so resoundingly affirmed in 
the famous Declaration, ground to powder be- 
neath this iron heel. No men ever worked harder 
in discharging an enormous mass of business of 
every kind than did the members of the Commit- 
tee of Public Safety. Hour after hour, around 
a green table, they listened to reports, framed 
decrees, appointed officials. Sometimes over- 
come with weariness they threw themselves on 
mattresses spread upon the floor of their com- 
mittee room, snatched two or three hours of 
sleep, then roused themselves to the racking work 



THE CONVENTION 195 

again. Under them was the Committee of Gen- 
eral Security, whose business was really police 
duty, maintaining order throughout the country, 
throwing multitudes of suspected persons into 
prison, whence they emerged only to encounter 
another redoubtable organ of this government, 
the Revolutionary Tribunal. 

This Tribunal had been created at Danton's 
suggestion. It was an extraordinary criminal 
court, instituted for the purpose of trying 
traitors and conspirators rapidly. No appeal 
could be taken from its decisions. Its sentences 
were always sentences of death. Later, when 
Robespierre dominated the Committee of Public 
Safety, the number of judges was increased and 
they were divided into four sections, all holding 
sessions at the same time. Appointed by the 
Committee, the Revolutionary Tribunal servilely 
carried out its orders. It acted with a rapidity 
that made a cruel farce of justice. A man might 
be informed at ten o'clock that he was to appear 
before the Revolutionary Tribunal at eleven. By 
two o'clock he was sentenced, by four he was 
executed. 

The Committee of Public Safety had another 
organ — the representatives on mission. These 
were members of the Convention sent, two to 
each department, and two to each army, to see 



ig6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

that the will of the Convention was carried out. 
Their powers were practically unlimited. They 
could not themselves pronounce the sentence of 
death, but a word from them was sufficient to 
send to the Revolutionary Tribunal any one who 
incurred their suspicion or displeasure. 

There were other parts of this governmental 
machinery, wheels within wheels, revolution- 
ary clubs, affiliated with the Jacobin Club in 
Paris, revolutionary committees of surveillance. 
Through them the will of the great Committee 
of Public Safety penetrated to the tiniest ham- 
let, to the remotest corner of the land. The 
Republic was held tight in this closely-woven 
mesh. 

This machinery was created to meet a national 
need, of the most pressing character. The coun- 
try was in danger, in direst danger, of submer- 
sion under a flood of invasion; also in danger of 
disruption from within. The authors of this sys- 
tem were originally men who appreciated the 
critical situation, who grasped facts as they were, 
who were resolute to put down every foreign 
and domestic enemy, and who thrilled the people 
with their appeals to boundless, self-sacrificing 
patriotism. Had this machinery been used in the 
way and for the purpose intended, it is not likely 
that it would have enjoyed the dismal, repellent 



THE CONVENTION 197 

reputation with posterity which it has enjoyed. 
France would have willingly endured and sanc- 
tioned a direct and strong government, ruthlessly 
subordinating personal happiness and even per- 
sonal security to the needs of national welfare. 
No cause could be higher, and none makes a 
wider or surer appeal to men. But the system 
was not restricted to this end. It was applied 
to satisfy personal and party intrigues and ran- 
cors, it was used to further the ambitions of in- 
dividuals, it was crassly distorted and debased. 
The system did not spring full-blown from the 
mind of any man or any group. It grew piece by 
piece, now this item being added, now that. 
Those who fashioned it believed that only by ap- 
pealing to or arousing^ one of the emotions of 
men, fear, could the government get their com- 
plete and energetic support. The success of the 
Revolution could not be assured simply by love 
or admiration of its principles and its deeds — that 
was proved by events, the difficulties had only 
increased. There were too many persons who 
hated the Revolution. But even these had an 
emotion that could be touched, the sense of 
fear, horror, dread. That, too, is a powerful in- 
centive to action. " Let terror be the order of 
the day," such was the official philosophy of the 
creators of this government, and it has given 



198 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

their system its name. Punish disloyalty swiftly 
and pitilessly and you create loyalty, if not from 
love, at least from fear, which will prove a pass- 
able substitute. 

The Committee of Public Safety and the 
Convention lost no time in striking a fast 
pace. To meet the needs of the war a general 
call for troops was issued. Seven hundred and 
fifty thousand men were secured. " What we 
need is audacity, and more audacity, and audac- 
ity always " was a phrase epitomizing this 
aspect of history, a phrase thrown out by Dan- 
ton, a man who knew how to sound the bugle 
call, knew how to mint the passion of the 
hour in striking form and give it the impress 
of his dynamic personality. Carnot, one of the 
members of the Committee of Public Safety, 
performed herculean feats in getting this enor- 
mous mass of men equipped, disciplined, and offi- 
cered. A dozen armies were the result and they 
were hurled in every direction at the enemies of 
France. Representatives of the Convention ac- 
companied each general, demanding victory of 
him or letting him know that his head would 
fall if victory were not forthcoming. Some did 
fail, even under this terrific incentive, this literal 
choice between victory or death, and they went 
to the scaffold. It was an inhuman punishment 



THE CONVENTION 199 

but it had tremendous effects, inspiring desperate 
energy. The armies made superhuman efforts 
and were wonderfully successful. A group of 
fearless, reckless, and thoroughly competent 
commanders emerged rapidly from the ranks. 
We shall shortly observe the reaction of these 
triumphant campaigns upon the domestic politi- 
cal situation. 

While this terrific effort to hurl back the in- 
vaders of France was going on, the Committee 
of Public Safety was engaged in a lynx-eyed, 
comprehensive campaign at home against all do- 
mestic enemies or persons accused of being such. 
By the famous law of "suspects," every one in 
France was brought within its iron grip. This 
law was so loosely and vaguely worded, it indi- 
cated so many classes of individuals, that under 
its provisions practically any one in France could 
be arrested and sent before the Revolutionary 
Tribunal. All were guilty of treason, and pun- 
ishable with death, who "having done nothing 
against liberty have nevertheless done nothing 
for it." No guilty, and also no innocent, man 
could be sure of escaping so elastic a law, or, if 
arrested, could expect justice from a court which 
ignored the usual forms of law, which, ultimately, 
deprived prisoners of the right to counsel, and 
which condemned them in batches. Yet the Dec- 



aoo THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

laration of the Rights of Man, which had seemed 
a new evangel to an optimistic world, had stated 
that henceforth no one should be arrested or im- 
prisoned except in cases determined by law and 
according to the forms of law. 

A tree is judged by its fruits. Consider the 
results in this case. In every city, town, and 
hamlet of France arrests of suspected persons 
were made en masse, and judgment and execution 
were rendered in almost the same summary and 
comprehensive fashion. Only a few instances 
can be selected from this calendar of crime. The 
city of Lyons had sprung to the defense of the 
Girondists after their expulsion from the Conven- 
tion on June 2. It took four months and a half 
and a considerable army to put down the oppo- 
sition of this, the second city of France. When 
this was accomplished the Convention passed a 
fierce resolution: " The city of Lyons is to be de- 
stroyed. Every house which was inhabited by 
the rich shall be demolished. There will remain 
only the homes of the poor, of patriots, and build- 
ings especially employed for industries, and those 
edifices dedicated to humanity and to education." 
The name of this famous city was to be obliter- 
ated. It was henceforth to be known as the Lib- 
erated City (Commune affranchie). This savage 
sentence was not carried out, demolition on so 



THE CONVENTION 201 

large a scale not being easy. Only a few build- 
ings were blown to pieces. But over 3,500 per- 
sons were arrested and nearly half of them were 
executed. The authorities began by shoot- 
ing each one individually. The last were 
mowed down in batches by cannon or musketry 
fire. Similar scenes were enacted, though not 
on so extensive a scale, in Toulon and Marseilles. 
It was for the Vendee that the worst ferocities 
were reserved. The Vendee had been in rebellion 
against the Republic, and in the interest of coun- 
ter-revolution. The people had been angered by 
the laws against the priests. Moreover the people 
of that section refused to fight in the Republic's 
armies. It was entirely legitimate for the gov- 
ernment to crush this rebellion, and it did so after 
an indescribably cruel war, in which neither side 
gave quarter. Carrier, the representative on mis- 
sion sent out by the Convention, established a 
gruesome record for barbarity. He did not 
adopt the method followed by the Revolutionary 
Tribunal in Paris, which at least pretended to try 
the accused before sentencing them to death. 
This was too slow a process. Prisoners were shot 
in squads, nearly 2,000 of them. Drowning was 
resorted to. Carrier's victims were bound, put 
on boats, and the boats then sunk in the river 
Loire. Women and children were among the 



202 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

number. Even the Committee of Public Safety- 
was shocked at Carrier's fiendish ingenuity and 
demanded an explanation. He had the insolence 
to pretend that the drownings were accidental. 
" Is it my fault that the boats did not reach their 
destination?" he asked. The number of bodies 
in the river was so great that the water was 
poisoned and for that reason the city govern- 
ment of Nantes forbade the eating of fish. Car- 
rier was later removed by the Committee, but 
was not further punished by it, though ultimately 
he found his way to the guillotine. 

Meanwhile at Paris the Revolutionary Tri- 
bunal was daily sending its victims to the guillo- 
tine, after trials which were travesties of justice. 
Guillotines were erected in two of the public 
squares and each day saw its executions. Week 
after week went by, and head after head dropped 
into the insatiable basket. Many of the victims 
were emigres or non-juring priests who had come 
back to France, others were generals who had 
failed of the indispensable victory and had been 
denounced as traitors. Others still were persons 
who had favored the Revolution at an earlier 
stage and had worked for it, but who had later 
been on the losing side in the fierce party contests 
which had rent the Convention. Nowadays po- 
litical struggles lead to the overthrow of min- 



THE CONVENTION 203 

isters. But in France, as in Renaissance Italy, 
they led to the death of the defeated party, or at 
least of its leaders. As the blood-madness grew 
in intensity, it was voted by the Convention, in 
order to speed up the murderous pace, that the 
Revolutionary Tribunal after hearing a case for 
three days might then decide it without further 
examination if it considered "its conscience suffi- 
ciently enlightened." 

The Girondists were conspicuous victims. 
Twenty-one of them were guillotined on October 
31, 1793, among them Madame Roland, who went 
to the scaffold "fresh, calm, smiling," according 
to a friend who saw her go. She had regretted 
that she "had not been born a Spartan or a 
Roman," a superfluous regret, as was shown by 
the manner of her death, " at only thirty-nine," 
words with which she closed the passionate 
Memoirs she wrote while in prison. Mounting 
the scaffold she caught sight of a statue of lib- 
erty. " O Liberty, how they've played with 
you!" she exclaimed. 

She had been preceded some days before by 
Marie Antoinette, the daughter of an empress, 
the wife of a king, child of fortune and of mis- 
fortune beyond compare. The Queen had been 
subjected to an obscene trial, accused of inde- 
scribable vileness, the corruption of her son. " If 



20 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

I have not answered," she cried, " it is because 
Nature herself rejects such a charge made against 
a mother: I appeal to all who are here." This 
woman's cry so moved the audience to sympathy 
that the officials cut the trial short, allowing the 
lawyers only fifteen minutes to finish. The Queen 
bore herself courageously. She did not flinch. 
She was brave to the end. Marie Antoinette has 
never ceased to command the sympathy of pos- 
terity, as her tragic story, and the fall to which 
her errors partly led and the proud and noble 
courage with which she met her mournful fate, 
have never ceased to move its pity and respect. 
She stands in history as one of its most melan- 
choly figures. 

Charlotte Corday, a Norman girl, who had 
stabbed the notorious Marat to death, thinking 
thus to free her country, paid the penalty with 
serenity and dignity. All through these months 
men witnessed a tragic procession up the scaf- 
fold's steps of those who were great by position 
or character or service or reputation; Bailly, 
celebrated as an astronomer and as the Mayor 
of Paris in the early Revolution; the Duke of 
Orleans, who had played a shameless part in the 
Revolution, having been demagogue enough to 
discard his name and call himself Philip Equal- 
ity, and having infamously voted, as a member 



THE CONVENTION 205 

of the Convention, for the death of his cousin, 
Louis XVI; Barnave, next to Mirabeau one of 
the most brilliant leaders of the Constituent As- 
sembly; and so it went, daily executions in Paris 
and yet others in the provinces. Some, fleeing 
the terror that walked by day and night, caught 
at bay, committed suicide, like Condorcet, last 
of the philosophers, and gifted theorist of the 
Republic. Still others wandered through the 
countryside haggard, gaunt, and were finally 
shot down, as beasts of the field. Yet all this 
did not constitute " the Great Terror," as it was 
called. That came later. 

Thus far there was at least a semblance or pre- 
tense of punishing the enemies of the Republic, 
the enemies of France. But now these odious 
methods were to be used as a means of destroy- 
ing political and personal enemies. Politics 
assumed the character and risks of war. 

We have seen that since August 10, 1792, there 
were two powers in the state, the Commune or 
government of Paris and the Convention or gov- 
ernment of France, now directed by the Commit- 
tee of Public Safety. These two had in the main 
cooperated thus far, overthrowing the mon- 
archy, overthrowing the Girondists. But now 
dissension raised its head and harmony was no 
more. The Commune was in the control of the 



206 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

most violent party that the Revolution had de- 
veloped. Its leaders were Hebert and Chaumette. 
Hebert conducted a journal, the Fere Duchesne, 
which was both obscene and profane and which 
was widely read in Paris by the lowest classes. 
Hebert and Chaumette reigned in the City Hall, 
drew their strength from the rabble of the streets 
which they knew how to incite and hurl at their 
enemies. They were ultra radicals, audacious, 
truculent. They constantly demanded new and 
redoubled applications of terror. For a while 
they dominated the Convention. Carrier, one 
of the Convention's representatives on mission, 
was really a tool of the Commune. 

It was the Commune which now forced the 
Convention to attempt the dechristianization of 
France. For this purpose a new calendar was 
desired, a calendar that should discard Sun- 
days, saints' days, religious festivals, and set 
up novel and entirely secular divisions of time. 
Henceforth the month was to be divided, not 
into weeks, but into decades or periods of ten 
days. Every tenth day was to be the rest day. 
The days of the months were changed to indi- 
cate natural phenomena, July becoming Ther- 
midor, or period of heat; April becoming Ger- 
minal, or budding time; November becoming 
Brumaire, or period of fogs. Henceforth men 



THE CONVENTION 207 

were to date, not from the birth of Christ, but 
from the birth of Liberty. The year One of 
Liberty began September 21, 1792. The world 
was young again. The day was divided into 
ten hours, not twenty-four, and the ten were 
subdivided and subdivided into smaller units. 
This calendar was made obligatory. But great 
was the havoc created by the new chronology. 
Parents were required to instruct their children 
in the new method of reckoning time. But the 
parents had been brought up on the old sys- 
tem and experienced much difficulty in telling 
what time of day it was according to the new 
terminology. Watchmakers were driven to add 
another circle to the faces of their watches. 
One circle carried the familiar set of figures, the 
other carried the new. Thus was one difficulty 
partially conjured away. The new calendar 
lasted twelve years. It was frankly and inten- 
tionally anti-Christian. The Christian era was 
repudiated. 

More important was the attempt to improvise 
a new religion. Reason was henceforth to be 
worshiped, no longer the Christian God. A be- 
ginning was made in the campaign for dechris- 
tianization by removing the bells from the 
churches, " the Eternal's gewgaws," they were 
called, and by making cannon and coin out of 



ao8 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

them. Death was declared to be " but an eternal 
sleep " — thus Heaven, and Hell as well, was 
abolished. There was a demand that church 
spires be torn down " as by their domination 
over other buildings they seem to violate the 
principle of equality," and many were conse- 
quently sacrificed. This sorry business reached 
its climax in the formal establishment by the 
Commune of Paris of the Worship of Reason. 
On November 10, 1793, the Cathedral of Notre 
Dame was converted into a "Temple of Reason." 
The ceremony of that day has been famous for a 
century and its fame may last another. A dancer 
from the opera, wearing the three colors of the 
republic, sat, as the Goddess of Reason, upon the 
Altar of Liberty, where formerly the Holy Vir- 
gin had been enthroned, and received the hom- 
age of her devotees. After this many other 
churches in Paris, and even in the provinces, were 
changed into Temples of Reason. The sacred 
vessels used in Catholic services were burned 
or melted down. In some cases the stone saints 
that ornamented, or at least diversified, the fa- 
cades of churches, were thrown down and broken 
or burned. At Notre Dame in Paris they were 
boarded over, and thus preserved for a period 
when their contamination would not be feared 
or felt. Every tenth day services were held, 



THE CONVENTION 209 

They might take the form of philosophical dis- 
courses or political, or the form of popular ban- 
quets or balls. 

The proclamation of this Worship of Reason 
was the high-water mark in the fortunes of the 
Commune. The Convention had been compelled 
to yield, the Committee of Public Safety to ac- 
quiesce in conduct of which it did not approve. 
Robespierre was irritated, partly because he had 
a religion of his own which he preferred and 
which he wished in time to bring forward and im- 
pose upon France, partly because as a member 
of the great Committee he resented the exist- 
ence of a rival so powerful as the Commune. 
The Hebertists had shot their bolt. Robespierre 
now shot his. In a carefully prepared speech 
he declared that " Atheism is aristocratic. The 
idea of a Supreme Being who watches over 
oppressed innocence and who punishes trium- 
phant crime, is thoroughly democratic." He fur- 
tively urged on all attacks upon the blasphemous 
Commune as when Danton declared, " These 
anti-religious masquerades in the Convention 
must cease." 

But Robespierre was the secret enemy of Dan- 
ton as well, though for a very different reason. 
The Commune stood for the Terror in all its 
forms and demanded that it be maintained in all 



2io THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

its vigor. On the other hand Danton, Camille 
Desmoulins, and their friends, ardent supporters 
of the Terror as long as it was necessary, be- 
lieved that now the need for it had passed and 
wished its rigor mitigated and the system gradu- 
ally abandoned. The armies of the Republic were 
everywhere successful, the invaders had been 
driven back, and domestic insurrections had been 
stamped out. Sick at heart of bloodshed now 
that it was no longer required, the Dantonists 
began to recommend clemency to the Convention. 
The Committee of Public Safety was opposed 
to both these factions, the Hebertists and the 
Dantonists, and Robespierre was at the center 
of an intrigue to ruin both. The description of 
the machinations and manceuvers which went on 
in the Convention cannot be undertaken here. 
To make them clear would require much space. 
It must suffice to say that first the Committee 
directed all its powers against the Commune and 
dared on March 13, 1794, to order the arrest of 
Hebert and his friends. Eleven days later they 
were guillotined. The rivalry of the Commune 
was over. The Convention was supreme. But 
the Committee had no desire to bring the Terror 
to an end. Several of its members saw their own 
doom in any lessening of its severity. Looking 
out for their own heads, they therefore resolved 



THE CONVENTION 211 

to kill Danton, as the representative of the dan- 
gerous policy of moderation. This man who had 
personified as no one else had done the national 
temper in its crusade against the allied mon- 
archs, who had been the very central pillar of the 
state in a terrible crisis, who, when France was 
for a moment discouraged, had nerved her to new 
effort by the electrifying cry, "We must dare ^ 
and dare again and dare without end/' now 
fell a victim to the wretched and frenzied inter- 
necine struggles of the politicians, because, now 
that the danger was over, he advocated, with his 
vastly heightened prestige, a return to modera- 
tion and conciliation. Terror as a means of an- 
nihilating his country's enemies he approved. 
Terror as a means of oppressing his fellow-coun- 
trymen, the crisis once passed, he deplored and 
tried to stop. He failed. The wheel was tearing 
around too rapidly. He was one of the tempestu- 
ous victims of the Terror. When he plead for 
peace, for a cessation of sanguinary and ferocious 
partisan politics, his rivals turned venomously, 
murderously against him. Conscious of his pa- 
triotism he did not believe that they would dare 
to strike him. A friend entered his study as he 
was sitting before the fire in revery and told him 
that the Committee of Public Safety had ordered 
his arrest. "Well, then, what then?" said Danton. 



212 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

"You must resist." "That means the shedding of 
blood, and I am sick of it. I would rather be guillo- 
tined than guillotine," he replied. He was urged 
to fly. "Whither fly?" he answered. "You 
do not carry your country on the sole of your 
shoe," and he muttered, " They will not dare, 
they will not dare." 

But they did dare. The next day he was in 
prison. In prison he was heard to say, " A year 
ago I proposed the establishment of the Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal. I ask pardon for it, of God 
and man." And again, " I leave everything in 
frightful confusion; not one of them under- 
stands anything of government. Robespierre 
will follow me. I drag down Robespierre. One 
had better be a poor fisherman than meddle 
with the governing of men." On the scaffold 
he exclaimed, " Danton, no weakness!" His 
last words were addressed to the executioner. 
" Show my head to the people; it is worth show- 
ing." 

The fall of Danton left Robespierre the most 
conspicuous person on the scene, the most influ- 
ential member of the Convention and of the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety. He was master of the 
Jacobins. The Commune was filled with his 
friends, anxious to do his bidding. The Revolu- 
tionary Tribunal was controlled and operated by 



THE CONVENTION 213 

his followers. For nearly four months, from 
April 5 to July 27, he was practically dictator. 

A very singular despot for a people like the 
French. His qualities were not those which have 
characterized the leaders or the masses of that 
nation. The most authoritative French his- 
torian of this period, Aulard, notes this fact. As 
a politician Robespierre was "astute, mysterious, 
undecipherable." "What we see of his soul is 
most repellent to our French instincts of frank- 
ness and loyalty. Robespierre was a hypocrite 
and he erected hypocrisy into a system of govern- 
ment." 

He had begun as a small provincial lawyer. 
He fed upon Rousseau, and was the narrow and 
anemic embodiment of Rousseau's ideas. He 
had made his reputation at the Jacobin Club, 
where he delivered speeches carefully retouched 
and finished, abounding in platitudes that 
pleased, entirely lacking in the fire, the dash, 
the stirring, impromptu phrases of a Mirabeau 
or a Danton. His style was correct, mediocre, 
thin, formal, academic. "Virtue" was his stock 
in trade and he made virtue odious by his ever- 
lasting talk of it, by his smug assumption of moral 
superiority, approaching even the hazardous pre- 
tension to perfection. He was forever singing 
his own praises with a lamentable lack of humor 



2i 4 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

and of taste. " I have never bowed beneath the 
yoke of baseness and corruption," he said. He 
won the title of "The Incorruptible." 

As a politician his policy had been to use up 
his enemies, and every rival was an enemy, by 
suggesting vaguely but opportunely that they 
were impure, corrupt, immoral, and by setting 
the springs in motion that landed them on the 
scaffold. He had himself stepped softly, warily, 
past the ambushes that lay in wait for the care- 
less or the impetuous. By such processes he had 
survived and was now the man of the hour, im- 
mensely popular with the masses, and feared by 
those who disliked him. How would he use his 
power, his opportunity? 

He used it, not to bring peace to a sadly dis- 
tracted country, not to heal the wounds, not to 
clinch the work of the Revolution, but to attempt 
to force a great nation to enact into legislation 
the ideas of a highly sentimental philosopher, 
Rousseau. It was to be a Reign of Virtue. 
Robespierre's ambition was to make virtue tri- 
umphant, a laudable purpose, if the definition of 
virtue be satisfactory and the methods for bring- 
ing about her reign honorable and humane. But 
in this case they were not. 

Robespierre stands revealed, as he also stands 
condemned, by the two acts associated with his 



THE CONVENTION 215 

career as dictator, the proclamation of a new 
religion and the Law of Prairial altering for 
the worst the already monstrous Revolutionary 
Tribunal. Robespierre had once said in public, 
" If God did not exist we should have to in- 
vent him." Fortunately for a man of such 
poverty of thought as he, he did not have to 
resort to invention but found God already in- 
vented by his idolized Rousseau. He devoted his 
attention to getting the Convention to give offi- 
cial sanction to Rousseau's ideas concerning the 
Deity. The Convention at his instigation for- 
mally recognized "the existence of the Supreme 
Being and the Immortality of the Soul." On 
June 8, a festival was held in honor of the new 
religion, quite as famous, in its way, as the cere- 
monies connected with the inauguration, a few 
months before, of the Worship of Reason. It was 
a wondrous spectacle, staged by the master hand 
of the artist David. A vast amphitheater was 
erected in the gardens of the Tuileries. Thither 
marched the members of the Convention in sol- 
emn procession, carrying flowers and sheaves of 
grain, Robespierre at the head, for he was presi- 
dent that day and played the pontiff, a part 
which suited him. He set fire to colossal figures, 
symbolizing Atheism and Vice, and then floated 
forth upon a long rhapsody. "Here," he cried 



216 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

from the platform* "is the Universe assembled. 
O Nature, how sublime, how exquisite, thy 
power! How tyrants will pale at the tidings of 
our feast!"/' A hundred thousand voices chanted 
a sacred hymn which had been composed for the 
occasion and for which they had been training for 
a week. Robespierre stood the cynosure of all 
eyes, at the very summit of ambition, receiving 
boundless admiration as he thus inaugurated the 
new worship of the Supreme Being, and breathed 
the intoxicating incense that arose. Profound 
was the irony of this scene, the incredible cul- 
mination of a century of skepticism. Some un- 
godly persons made merry over this mummery, 
indulging in indiscreet gibes at "The Incor- 
ruptible's " expense. The power of sarcasm was 
not yet dead in France, as this man who never 
smiled now learned. 

Two days later Robespierre caused a bill to be 
introduced into the Convention which showed 
that this delicate hand could brandish daggers as 
well as carry flowers and shocks of corn. The 
irreverent, the dangerous, must be swept like 
chaff into the burning pit. This bill, which be- 
came the Law of 22nd Prairial, made the pro- 
cedure of the Revolutionary Tribunal more 
murderous still. The accused were deprived of 
counsel. Witnesses need not be heard in cases 



THE CONVENTION 217 

where the prosecutor could adduce any ma- 
terial or " moral " proof. Any kind of oppo- 
sition to the government was made punishable 
with death. The question of guilt was left 
to the " enlightened conscience " of the jury. 
The jury was purged of all members who were 
supposed to be lukewarm toward Robespierre. 
The accused might be sent before this packed 
and servile court either by the Convention, or 
by the Committee of Public Safety, or by the 
Committee of General Security, or by the pub- 
lic prosecutor alone. In other words, any life 
in France was at the mercy of this latter offi- 
cial, Fouquier-Tinville, a tool of Robespierre. 
The members of the Convention itself were no 
safer than others, nor were the members of the 
great Committee, if they incurred the displeasure 
of the dictator. 

Now began what is called the Great Terror, as 
if to distinguish it from what had preceded. In 
the thirteen months which had preceded the 22nd 
of Prairial 1,200 persons had been guillotined in 
Paris. In the forty-nine days between that date 
and the fall of Robespierre, on the 9th of Ther- 
midor, 1,376 were guillotined. On two days alone, 
namely the 7th and 8th of July, 150 persons were 
executed. Day after day the butchery went on. 

It brought about the fall of Robespierre. This 



218 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

hideous measure united his enemies, those who 
feared him because they stood for clemency, and 
those who feared him because, though terror- 
ists themselves, they knew that he had marked 
them for destruction. They could lose no more 
by opposing him than by acquiescing, and if they 
could overthrow him they would gain the safety 
of their heads. Thus in desperation and in ter- 
ror was woven a conspiracy — not to end the Ter- 
ror, but to end Robespierre. 

The storm broke on July 27, 1794 (the 9th 
of Thermidor). When Robespierre attempted 
to speak in the Convention, which had cowered 
under him and at his demand had indelibly de- 
based itself by passing the infamous law of 
Prairial, he was shouted down. Cries of " Down 
with the tyrant!" were heard. Attempting to 
arouse the people in the galleries, he this time 
met with no response. The magic was gone. 
There was a confused, noisy struggle, lasting 
several hours. Robespierre's voice failed him. 
"Danton's blood is choking him!" exclaimed one 
of the conspirators. Finally the Convention 
voted his arrest and that of his satellites, his 
brother, Saint-Just, and Couthon. 

All was not yet lost. The Revolutionary Tri- 
bunal was devoted to Robespierre and, if tried, 
there was an excellent chance that he would be 



THE CONVENTION 219 

acquitted. The Commune likewise was favorable 
to him. It took the initiative. It announced an 
insurrection. Its agents broke into his prison, 
released him, and bore him to the City Hall. 
Thereupon the Convention, hearing of this act 
of rebellion, declared him and his associates out- 
laws. No trial therefore was necessary. As soon 
as re-arrested he would be guillotined. Dur- 
ing the evening and early hours of the night a 
confused attempt to organize an attack against 
the Convention went on. But a little before mid- 
night a drenching storm dispersed his thousands 
of supporters in the square. Moreover Robes- 
pierre hesitated, lacked the spirit of decision and 
daring. The whole matter was ended by the 
Convention sending troops against the Com- 
mune. At two in the morning these troops 
seized the Hotel de Ville and arrested Robes- 
pierre and the leading members of the Commune. 
Robespierre had been wounded in the fray, his 
jaw fractured by a bullet. 

He was borne to the Assembly, which declined 
to receive him. "The Convention unanimously 
refused to let him be brought into the sanctuary 
of the law which he had so long polluted," so ran 
the official report of this session. That day he 
and twenty others were sent to the guillotine. 
An enormous throng witnessed the scene and 



220 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

broke into wild acclaim. On the two following 
days eighty-three more executions took place. 

France breathed more freely. The worst, evi- 
dently, was over. In the succeeding months the 
system of the terror was gradually abandoned. 
This is what is called the Thermidorian reaction. 
The various branches of the terrible machine of 
government were either destroyed or greatly al- 
tered. A milder regime began. The storm did 
not subside at once, but it subsided steadily, 
though not without several violent shocks, sev- 
eral attempts on the part of the dwindling Jaco- 
bins to recover their former position by again 
letting loose the street mobs. The policy of the 
Convention came to be summed up in the cry 
"Death to the Terror and to Monarchy!" The 
Convention was now controlled by the moder- 
ates, but it was unanimously republican. Signs 
that a monarchical party was reappearing, de- 
manding the restitution of the Bourbons, but not 
of the Old Regime, prompted the Convention to 
counter-measures designed to strengthen and 
perpetuate the Republic. 

To accomplish this and thus prevent the re- 
lapse into monarchy, the Convention drew up a 
new constitution, the third in six years. Though 
the radicals of Paris demanded vociferously that 
the suspended Constitution of 1793 be now put 



THE CONVENTION 221 

into force, the Convention refused, finding it too 
" anarchical " a document. Instead, it framed the 
Constitution of 1795 or of the Year Three. Uni- 
versal suffrage was abandoned, the motive being 
to reduce the political importance of the Parisian 
populace. Democracy, established on August 
10, 1792, was replaced by a suffrage based upon 
property. There was practically no protest. The 
example of the American states was quoted, none 
of which at that time admitted universal suf- 
frage. The suffrage became practically what it 
had been under the monarchical Constitution of 
1791. The national legislature was henceforth 
to consist of two chambers, not one, as had its 
predecessors. The example of America was again 
cited. "Nearly all the constitutions of these 
states," said one member, "our seniors in the 
cause of liberty, have divided the legislature into 
two chambers; and the result had been public 
tranquillity." It was, however, chiefly the ex- 
perience which France had herself had with 
single-chambered legislatures during the last few 
years that caused her to abandon that form. One 
of the chambers was to be called the Council of 
Elders. This was to consist of 250 members, 
who must be at least forty years of age, and be 
either married or widowers. The other, the Coun- 
cil of the Five Hundred, was to consist of mem- 



222 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

bers of at least thirty years of age. This council 
alone was to have the right to propose laws, 
which could, however, not be put into force un- 
less accepted by the Council of Elders. 

The executive power was to be exercised by a 
Directory, consisting of five persons, of at least 
forty years of age, elected by the Councils, one 
retiring each year. The example of America was 
again recommended, but was not followed be- 
cause the Convention feared that a single execu- 
tive, a president, might remind the French too 
sharply of monarchy or might become a new 
Robespierre. 

The Constitution of 1795 was eminently the re- 
sult of experience, not of abstract theorizing. It 
established a bourgeois republic, as the Constitu- 
tion of 1791 had established a bourgeois mon- 
archy. The Republic was in the hands, therefore, 
of a privileged class, property being the privi- 
lege. 

But the Convention either did not wish or did 
not dare to trust the voters to elect whom they 
might desire to the new Councils. Was there not 
danger that they might elect monarchists and so 
hand over the new republican constitution to its 
enemies? Would the members of the Conven- 
tion, who enjoyed power, who did not wish 
to step down and out, and yet who knew that 



THE CONVENTION 223 

they were unpopular because of the record of the 
Convention, stand any chance of election to the 
new legislature? Yet the habit of power was 
agreeable to them. Would the Republic be safe? 
Was it not their first duty to provide that it 
should not fall into hostile hands? 

Under the influence of such considerations the 
Convention passed two decrees, supplementary 
to the constitution, providing that two-thirds of 
each Council should be chosen from the present 
members of the Convention. 

The constitution was overwhelmingly ap- 
proved by the voters, to whom it was submitted 
for ratification. But the two decrees aroused 
decided opposition. They were represented as 
a barefaced device whereby men who knew 
themselves unpopular could keep themselves in 
power for a while longer. Although the decrees 
were finally ratified, it was by much smaller 
majorities than had ratified the constitution. The 
vote of Paris was overwhelmingly against them. 

Nor did Paris remain contented with casting 
a hostile vote. It proposed to prevent this con- 
summation. An insurrection was organized 
against the Convention, this time by the bour- 
geois and wealthier people, in reality a royalist 
project. The Convention intrusted its defense to 
Barras as commander-in-chief. Barras, who was 



224 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

more a politician than a general, called to his aid 
a little Corsican officer twenty-five years old who, 
two years before, had helped recover Toulon for 
the Republic. This little Buona-Parte, for this 
is the form in which the famous name appears in 
the official reports of the day, was an artillery 
officer, a believer in the efficacy of that weapon. 
Hearing that there were forty cannon in a camp 
outside the city in danger of being seized by the 
insurgents, Bonaparte sent a young dare-devil 
cavalryman, Joachim Murat, to get them. Murat 
and his men dashed at full speed through the city, 
drove back the insurgents, seized the cannon and 
dragged them, always at full speed, to the Tui- 
leries, which they reached by six o'clock in the 
morning. As one writer has said, "Neither the 
little general nor the superb cavalier dreamed 
that, in giving Barras cannon to be used against 
royalists, each was winning a crown for him- 
self." 

The cannon were placed about the Tuileries, 
where sat the Convention, rendering it impreg- 
nable. Every member of the Convention was 
given a rifle and cartridges. On the 13th of 
Vendemiaire (October 5) on came the insurgents 
in two columns, down the streets on both sides 
of the Seine. Suddenly at four-thirty in the 
afternoon a violent cannonading was heard. It 



THE CONVENTION 225 

was Bonaparte making his debut. The Conven- 
tion was saved and an astounding career was be- 
gun. This is what Carlyle, in his vivid way, 
calls " the whiff of grapeshot which ends what 
we specifically call the French Revolution," an 
imaginative and inaccurate statement, quite char- 
acteristic of this vehement historian. Though 
it did not end the Revolution, it did, however, 
end one phase of it and inaugurated another. 

Three weeks later, on October 26, 1795, the 
Convention declared itself dissolved. It had had 
an extraordinary history, only a few aspects of 
which have been described in this brief account. 
In the three years of its existence it had displayed 
prodigious activity along many lines. Meeting 
in the midst of appalling national difficulties born 
of internal dissension and foreign war, attacked 
by sixty departments of France and by an aston- 
ing array of foreign powers, England, Prussia, 
Austria, Piedmont, Holland, Spain, it had tri- 
umphed all along the line. Civil war had been 
stamped out and in the summer of 1795 three 
hostile states, Prussia, Holland, and Spain, made 
peace with France and withdrew from the war. 
France was actually in possession of the Austrian 
Netherlands and of the German provinces on 
the west bank of the Rhine. She had practically 
attained the so-called natural boundaries. War 



226 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

still continued with Austria and England. That 
problem was passed on to the Directory. 

During these three years the Convention had 
proclaimed the Republic in the classic land of 
monarchy, had voted two constitutions, had sanc- 
tioned two forms of worship and had finally sep- 
arated church and state^a jthing of extreme diffi- 
culty in any European country. It had put a 
king to death, had organized and endured a reign 
of tyranny, which long discredited the very idea 
of a republic among multitudes of the French, 
and which immeasurably weakened the Republic 
by cutting off so many men who, had they lived, 
would have been its natural and experienced de- 
fenders for a full generation longer, since most of 
them were young. The Republic used up its ma- 
terial recklessly, so that when the man arrived 
who wished to end it and establish his personal 
rule, this sallow Italian Buona-Parte, his task 
was comparatively easy, the opposition being 
leaderless or poorly led. On the other hand, the 
Republic had had its thrilling victories, its heroes, 
and its martyrs, whose careers and teachings 
were to be factors in the history of France for 
fully a century to come. 

The Convention had also worked mightily and 
achieved much in the avenues of peaceful devel- 
opment. It had given France a system of 



THE CONVENTION 227 

weights and measures, more perfect than the 
world had ever seen, the metric system, since 
widely adopted by other countries. It had laid 
the foundations and done the preliminary work 
for a codification of the laws, an achievement 
which Napoleon was to carry to completion and 
of which he was to monopolize the renown. It 
devoted fruitful attention to the problem of na- 
tional education, believing, with Danton, that 
"next to bread, education is the first need of the 
people," and that there ought to be a national 
system, free, compulsory, and entirely secular. 
"The time has come," said the eloquent tribune, 
to establish the great principle which appears to 
be ignored, " that children belong to the Re- 
public before they belong to their parents." A 
great system of primary and secondary educa- 
tion was elaborated, but it was not put into actual 
operation, owing to the lack of funds. On the 
other hand, much was done for certain special 
schools. Among the invaluable creations of the 
Convention were certain institutions whose fame 
has steadily increased, whose influence has been 
profound, the Normal School, the Polytechnic 
School, the Law and Medical Schools of Paris, 
the Conservatory of Arts and Crafts, the Na- 
tional Archives, the Museum of the Louvre, the 
National Library, and the Institute. While some 



228 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

of these had their roots in earlier institutions, all 
such were so reorganized and amplified and en- 
riched as to make them practically new. To 
keep the balance of our judgment clear we should 
recall these imperishable services to civilization 
rendered by the same assembly which is more 
notorious because of its connection with the ini- 
quitous Reign of Terror. The Republic had its 
glorious trophies, its honorable records, from 
which later times were to derive inspiration and 
instruction. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE DIRECTORY 

THE Directory lasted from October 27, 1795, to 
November 19, 1799. It took its name from the 
form of the executive branch of the Republic, as 
determined by the Constitution of 1795. Its his- 
tory of four years was troubled, uncertain, and 
ended in its violent overthrow. 

Its first and most pressing problem was the 
continued prosecution of the war. As already 
stated, Prussia, Spain, and Holland had with- 
drawn from the coalition and made peace with 
the Convention. But England, Austria, Pied- 
mont, and the lesser German states were still in 
arms against the Republic. The first duty of the 
Directory was, therefore, to continue the war 
with them and to defeat them. France had al- 
ready overrun the Austrian Netherlands, that is, 
modern Belgium, and had declared them annexed 
to France. But to compel Austria, the owner, 
to recognize this annexation she must be beaten. 
The Directory therefore proceeded with vigor 
to concentrate its attention upon this object. As 

France had thrown back her invaders, the fight- 
229 



230 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ing was no longer on French soil. She now 
became the invader, and that long series of con- 
quests of various European countries by ag- 
gressive French armies began, which was to end 
only twenty years later with the fall of the great- 
est commander of modern times, if not of all his- 
tory. The campaign against Austria, planned by 
the Directory, included two parallel and aggres- 
sive movements against that country — an attack 
through southern Germany, down the valley of 
the Danube, ending, it was hoped, at Vienna. 
This was the campaign north of the Alps. South 
of the Alps, in northern Italy, France had ene- 
mies in Piedmont and again in Austria, which 
had possession of the central and rich part of the 
Po valley, namely, Lombardy, with Milan as the 
capital. 

The campaign in Germany was confided to 
Jourdan and Moreau; that in Italy to General 
Bonaparte, who made of it a stepping-stone to 
fame and power incomparable. 

Napoleon Bonaparte was born at Ajaccio in 
Corsica in 1769, a short time after the island had 
been sold by Genoa to France. The family was 
of Italian origin but had been for two centuries 
and a half resident in the island. His father, 
Charles Bonaparte, was of the nobility but was 
poor, indolent, pleasure-loving, a lawyer by pro- 



THE DIRECTORY 231 

fession. His mother, Laetitia Ramolino, was a 
woman of great beauty, of remarkable will, of ex- 
traordinary energy. Poorly educated, this 
"mother of kings" was never able to speak the 
French language without ridiculous mistakes. 
She had thirteen children, eight of whom lived 
to grow up, five boys and three girls. The father 
died when the youngest, Jerome, was only three 
months old. Napoleon, the second son, was edu- 
cated in French military schools at Brienne and 
Paris, as a sort of charity scholar. He was very 
unhappy, surrounded as he was by boys who 
looked down upon him because he was poor while 
they were rich, because his father was unim- 
portant while theirs belonged to the noblest fam- 
ilies in France, because he spoke French like the 
foreigner he was, Italian being his native tongue. 
In fact he was tormented in all the ways of which 
schoolboys are past masters. He became sullen, 
taciturn, lived apart by himself, was unpopular 
with his fellows, whom, in turn, he despised, con- 
scious, as he was, of powers quite equal to any of 
theirs, of a spirit quite as high. His boyish let- 
ters home were remarkably serious, lucid, intelli- 
gent. He was excellent in mathematics, and was 
fond of history and geography. At the age of 
sixteen he left the military school and became a 
second lieutenant of artillery. One of his teach- 



232 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ers described him at this time as follows: "Re^ 
served and studious, he prefers study to amuse- 
ment of any kind and enjoys reading the best 
authors; is diligent in the study of the abstract 
sciences, caring little for anything else. He is 
taciturn and loves solitude, is capricious, haughty, 
and excessively self-centered. He talks little but 
is quick and energetic in his replies, prompt and 
incisive in repartee. He has great self-esteem, is 
ambitious, with aspirations that will stop at 
nothing. Is worthy of patronage." 

Young Bonaparte read the intoxicating litera- 
ture of revolt of the eighteenth century, Voltaire, 
Turgot, particularly Rousseau. "Even when I 
had nothing to do," he said later, "I vaguely 
thought that I had no time to lose." As a young 
sub-lieutenant he had a wretchedly small salary. 
"I have no resources here but work," he wrote 
his mother. "I sleep very little. I go to bed at 
ten, I rise at four. I have only one meal a day, 
at three o'clock." He read history extensively 
regarding it as "the torch of truth, the destroyer 
of prejudice." He tried his hand at writing, es- 
says, novels, but particularly a history of Cor- 
sica, for at this time his great ambition was to be 
the historian of his native land. He hated 
France and dreamed of a war of inde- 
pendence for Corsica. He spent much time in 



THE DIRECTORY 233 

Corsica, securing long furloughs, which, more- 
over, he overstayed. As a consequence he finally 
lost his position in the army, which, though 
poorly salaried, still gave him a living. He re- 
turned to Paris in 1792 hoping to regain it, but 
the disturbed state of affairs was not propitious. 
Without a profession, without resources, he was 
almost penniless. He ate in cheap restaurants. 
He pawned his watch — and, as an idle but in- 
terested spectator, he witnessed some of the 
famous " days " of the Revolution, the invasion of 
the Tuileries by the mob on the 20th of June, 
when Louis XVI was forced to wear the bonnet 
rouge, the attack of August 10th when he was 
deposed, the September Massacres. Bonaparte's 
opinion was that the soldiers should have shot 
a few hundred, then the crowd would have run. He 
was restored to his command in August, 1792. In 
1793 he distinguished himself by helping recover 
Toulon for the Republic and in 1795 by defending 
the Convention against the insurrection of Ven- 
demiaire, which was a lucky crisis for him. 

Having conquered a Parisian mob, he was him- 
self conquered by a woman. He fell madly in 
love with Josephine Beauharnais, a widow six 
years older than himself, whose husband had 
been guillotined a few days before the fall of 
Robespierre, leaving her poor and with two 



234 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

children. Josephine did not lose her heart, but 
she was impressed, indeed half terrified, by 
the vehemence of Napoleon's passion, the in- 
tensity of his glance, and she yielded to his rapid, 
impetuous courtship, with a troubled but vivid 
sense that the future had great things in store 
for him. " Do they " (the Directors) " think that 
I need their protection in order to rise?" he had 
exclaimed to her. "They will be glad enough 
some day if I grant them mine. My sword is at 
my side and with it I can go far." "This pre- 
posterous assurance," wrote Josephine, "affects 
me to such a degree that I can believe every- 
thing may be possible to this man, and, with his 
imagination, who can tell what he may be 
tempted to undertake?" 

Two days before they were married Bonaparte 
was appointed to the command of the Army of 
Italy. His sword was at his side. He now un- 
sheathed it and made some memorable passes. 
Two days after the marriage he left his bride in 
Paris and started for the front, in a mingled mood 
of desperation at the separation and of exultation 
that now his opportunity had come. Sending 
back passionate love-letters from every station, 
his spirit and his senses all on fire, feeling that he 
was on the very verge of achievement, he has- 
tened on to meet the enemy and, as was quickly 



THE DIRECTORY 235 

evident, "to tear the very heart out of glory." 
The wildness of Corsica, his native land, was in 
his blood, the land of fighters, the land of the 
vendetta, of concentrated passion, of lawless 
energy, of bravery beyond compare, concerning 
which Rousseau had written in happy prescience 
twenty years before, " I have a presentiment that 
this little island will some day astonish Europe." 
That day had come. The young eagle it had 
nourished was now preening for his flight, pre- 
pared to astonish the universe. 

The difficulties that confronted Bonaparte 
were numerous and notable. One was his youth 
and another was that he was unknown. The 
Army of Italy had been in the field three years. 
Its generals did not know their new commander. 
Some of them were older than he and had al- 
ready made names for themselves. They re- 
sented this appointment of a junior, a man whose 
chief exploit had been a street fight in Paris. 
Nevertheless when this slender, round-shoul- 
dered, small, and sickly-looking young man ap- 
peared they saw instantly that they had a master. 
He was imperious, laconic, reserved with them. 
"It was necessary," he said afterward, "in order 
to command men so much older than myself." 
He was only five feet two inches tall, but, said 
Massena, " when he put on his general's hat he 



236 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

seemed to have grown two feet. He questioned 
us on the position of our divisions, on the spirit 
and effective force of each corps, prescribed the 
course we were to follow, announced that he 
would hold an inspection on the morrow, and on 
the day following attack the enemy." Augereau, 
a vulgar and famous old soldier, full of strange 
oaths and proud of his tall figure, was abusive, 
derisive, mutinous. He was admitted to the Gen- 
eral's presence and passed an uneasy moment. 
" He frightened me," said Augereau, " his first 
glance crushed me. I cannot understand it." 

It did not take these officers long to see that 
the young general meant business and that he 
knew very thoroughly the art of war. His speech 
was rapid, brief, incisive. He gave his orders 
succinctly and clearly and he let it be known that 
obedience was the order of the day. The cold 
reception quickly became enthusiastic coopera- 
tion. 

Bonaparte won ascendency over the soldiers 
with the same lightning rapidity. They had been 
long inactive, idling through meaningless 
manceuvers. He announced immediate action. 
The response was instantaneous. He inspired 
confidence and he inspired enthusiasm. He took 
an army that was discouraged, that was in rags, 
even the officers being almost without shoes, an 



THE DIRECTORY 237 

army on half-rations. He issued a bulletin which 
imparted to them his own exaltation, his belief 
that the limits of the possible could easily be 
transcended, that it is all a matter of will. He 
got into their blood and they tingled with impa- 
tience and with hope. "There was so much of the 
future in him," is the way Marmont described 
the impression. "Soldiers," so ran this bulletin, 
"soldiers, you are ill-fed and almost naked; the 
government owes you much, it can give you 
nothing. Your patience, the courage which you 
exhibit in the midst of these crags, are worthy 
of all admiration; but they bring you no atom 
of glory; not a ray is reflected upon you. I will 
conduct you into the most fertile plains in the 
world. Rich provinces, great cities will be in 
your power; there you will find honor, glory, and 
wealth. Soldiers of Italy, can it be that you will 
be lacking in courage or perseverance?" 

Ardent images of a very mundane and material 
kind rose up before him and he saw to it that 
his soldiers shared them. By portraying very 
earthly visions of felicity Mahomet, centuries be- 
fore, had stirred the Oriental zeal of his follow- 
ers to marvelous effort and achievement. Bona- 
parte took suggestions from Mahomet on more 
than one occasion in his life. 

Bonaparte's first Italian campaign has re- 



238 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

mained in the eyes of military men ever since a 
masterpiece, a classic example of the art of war. 
It lasted a year, from April, 1796, to April, 1797. 
It may be summarized in the words, " He came, 
he saw, he conquered." He confronted an allied 
Sardinian and Austrian army, and his forces were 
much inferior in number. His policy was there- 
fore to see that his enemies did not unite, and 
then to beat each in turn. His enemies combined 
had 70,000 men. He had about half that number. 
Slipping in between the Austrians and Sardini- 
ans he defeated the former, notably at Dego, and 
drove them eastward. Then he turned westward 
against the Sardinians, defeated them at Mon- 
dovi and opened the way to Turin, their capital. 
The Sardinians sued for peace and agreed that 
France should have the provinces of Savoy and 
Nice. One enemy had thus been eliminated by 
the "rag heroes," now turned into "winged vic- 
tories." Bonaparte summarized these achieve- 
ments in a bulletin to his men, which set them 
vibrating. "Soldiers," he said, "in fifteen days 
you have won six victories, taken twenty-one 
stand of colors, fifty-five pieces of cannon, and 
several fortresses, and conquered the richest part 
of Piedmont. You have taken 1,500 prisoners and 
killed or wounded 10,000 men. . . . But, sol- 
diers, you have done nothing, since there remains 



THE DIRECTORY 239 

something for you to do. You have still battles 
to fight, towns to take, rivers to cross." 

Bonaparte now turned his entire attention to 
the Austrians, who were in control of Lombardy. 
Rushing down the southern bank of the Po, he 
crossed it at Piacenza. Beaulieu, the Austrian 
commander, withdrew beyond the Adda River. 
There was no way to get at him but to cross the 
river by the bridge of Lodi, a bridge 350 feet 
long and swept on the other side by cannon. To 
cross it in the face of a raking fire was necessary 
but was well-nigh impossible. Bonaparte ordered 
his grenadiers forward. Halfway over they were 
mowed down by the Austrian fire and began to 
recoil. Bonaparte and other generals rushed to 
the head of the columns, risked their lives, in- 
spired their men, and the result was that they got 
across in the very teeth of the murderous fire and 
seized the Austrian batteries. " Of all the actions 
in which the soldiers under my command have 
been engaged," reported Bonaparte to the Di- 
rectory, "none has equaled the tremendous pass- 
age of the bridge of Lodi." 

From that day Bonaparte was the idol of his 
soldiers. He had shown reckless courage, con- 
tempt of death. Thenceforth they called him af- 
fectionately "The Little Corporal." The Austri- 
ans retreated to the farther side of the Mincio 



240 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

and to the mighty fortress of Mantua. On May 
16 Bonaparte made a triumphal entry into Milan. 
He sent a force to begin the siege of Mantua. 
That was the key to the situation. He could 
not advance into the Alps and against Vienna 
until he had taken it. On the other hand if 
Austria lost Mantua, she would lose her hold 
upon Italy. 

Four times during the next eight months, from 
June, 1796, to January, 1797, Austria sent down 
armies from the Alps in the attempt to relieve 
the beleaguered fortress. Each time they were 
defeated, by the prodigious activity, the precision 
of aim, of the French general, who continued his 
policy of attacking his enemy piecemeal, before 
their divisions could unite. By this policy his 
inferior forces, for his numbers were inferior to 
the total of the opposed army, were always as a 
matter of fact so applied as to be superior to 
the enemy on the battlefield, for he attacked when 
the enemy was divided. It was youth against age, 
Bonaparte being twenty-seven, Wurmser and 
the other Austrian generals almost seventy. It 
was new methods against old, originality against 
the spirit of routine. The Austrians came down 
from the Alpine passes in two divisions. Here 
was Bonaparte's chance, and wonderfully 
did he use it. In war, said Moreau to him two 



THE DIRECTORY 241 

years later, " the greater number always beat the 
lesser." "You are right," replied Bonaparte. 
" Whenever, with smaller forces I was in the 
presence of a great army, arranging mine rapidly, 
I fell like a thunderbolt upon one of its wings, 
tumbled it over, profited by the disorder which 
always ensued to attack the enemy elsewhere, 
always with my entire force. Thus I defeated 
him in detail and victory was always the triumph 
of the larger number over the smaller." All this 
was accomplished only by forced marches. " It * 
is our legs that win his battles," said his sol- 
diers. He shot his troops back and forth like a 
shuttle. By the rapidity of his movements he 
made up for his numerical weakness. Of course 
this success was rendered possible by the mistake 
of his opponents in dividing their forces when 
they should have kept them united. 

Even thus, with his own ability and the mis- 
takes of his enemies cooperating, the contest was 
severe, the outcome at times trembled in the 
balance. Thus at Areola, the battle raged for 
three days. Again, as at Lodi, success depended 
upon the control of a bridge. Only a few miles 
separated the two Austrian divisions. If the 
Austrians could hold the bridge, then their junc- 
tion could probably be completed. Bonaparte 
seized a flag and rushed upon the bridge, accom- 



242 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

panied by his staff. The Austrians leveled a 
murderous fire at them. The columns fell back, 
several officers having been shot down. They re- 
fused to desert their general, but dragged him 
with them by his arms and clothes. He fell into 
a morass and began to sink. " Forward to save 
the General!" was the cry and immediately the 
French fury broke loose, they drove back the 
Austrians and rescued their hero. He had, how- 
ever, not repeated the exploit of Lodi. He had 
not crossed the bridge. But the next day his 
army was victorious and the Austrians retreated 
once more. The three days' battle was over 
(November 15-17, 1796). 

Two months later a new Austrian army came 
down from the Alps for the relief of Mantua and 
another desperate battle occurred, at Rivoli. On 
January 13-14, 1797, Bonaparte inflicted a crush- 
ing defeat upon the Austrians, routed them, and 
sent them spinning back into the Alps again. 
Two weeks later Mantua surrendered. Bona- 
parte now marched up into the Alps, constantly 
outgeneraling his brilliant new opponent, the 
young Archduke Charles, forcing him steadily 
back. When on April 7 he reached the little town 
of Leoben, about 100 miles from Vienna, Austria 
sued for peace. A memorable and crowded year 
of effort was thus brought to a brilliant close. 



THE DIRECTORY 243 

In its twelve months' march across northern 
Italy the French had fought eighteen big bat- 
tles, and sixty-five smaller ones. " You have, 
besides that, " said Bonaparte in a bulletin to the 
army, "sent 30,000,000 from the public treasury 
to Paris. You have enriched the Museum of 
Paris with 300 masterpieces of ancient and mod- 
ern Italy, which it has taken thirty ages to pro- 
duce. You have conquered the most beautiful 
country of Europe. The French colors float for 
the first time upon the borders of the, Adriatic." 
In another proclamation he told them they were 
forever covered with glory, that when they had 
completed their task and returned to their homes 
their fellow citizens, when pointing to them 
would say, "He was of the Army of Italy." 

Thus rose his star to full meridian splendor. 
No wonder he believed in it. 

All through this Italian campaign Bonaparte 
acted as if he were the head of the state, not its 
servant. He sometimes followed the advice of 
the Directors, more often he ignored it, fre- 
quently he acted in defiance of it. Military mat- 
ters did not alone occupy his attention. He tried 
his hand at political manipulation, with the 
same confidence and the same success which he 
had shown on the field of battle. He became 
a creator and a destroyer of states. Italy was 



244 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

not at that time a united country but was a 
collection of small, independent states. None of 
these escaped the transforming touch of the 
young conqueror. He changed the old aristo- 
cratic republic of Genoa into the Ligurian Re- 
public, giving it a constitution similar to that of 
France. He forced doubtful princes, like the 
Dukes of Parma and Modena, to submission and 
heavy payments. He forced the Pope to a sim- 
ilar humiliation, taking some of his states, spar- 
ing most of them, and levying heavy exactions. 

His most notorious act, next to the conquest 
of the successive Austrian armies, was the over- 
throw, on a flimsy pretext and with diabolic guile, 
of the famous old Republic of Venice. 

" Once did she hold the gorgeous East in fee ; 
And was the safeguard of the West : the worth 
Of Venice did not fall below her birth, 
Venice, the Eldest Child of Liberty." 

Such was the thought that came to the 
poet Wordsworth as he contemplated this out- 
rage, resembling in abysmal immorality the 
contemporary partition of Poland at the hands 
of the monarchs of Prussia, Austria, and Rus- 
sia. At least this clear, bright, pagan republi- 
can general could have claimed, had he cared to, 
that he was no worse than the kings of the 



THE DIRECTORY 245 

eighteenth century who asserted that their rule 
was ordained of God. Bonaparte was no worse; 
he was also no better; he was, moreover, far 
more able. He conquered Venice, one of the old- 
est and proudest states in Europe, and held it 
as a pawn in the game of diplomacy, to which he 
turned with eagerness and talent, now that the 
war was over. 

Austria had agreed in April, 1797, to the pre- 
liminary peace of Leoben. The following sum- 
mer was devoted to the making of the final peace, 
that of Campo Formio, concluded October 17, 
1797. During these months Bonaparte lived in 
state in the splendid villa of Montebello, near 
Milan, basking in the dazzling sunshine of his 
sudden and amazing fortune. There he kept 
a veritable court, receiving ambassadors, talking 
intimately with artists and men of letters, sur- 
rounded by young officers, who had caught the 
swift contagion of his personality and who were 
advancing with his advance to prosperity and re- 
nown. /There, too, at Montebello, were Josephine 
and the brothers and the sisters of theyoungvictor 
and also his mother, who kept a level head in 
prosperity as she had in adversity — all irradiated 
with the new glamour of their changed position 
in life. The young man who a few years before 
had pawned his watch and had eaten six-cent 



246 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

dinners in cheap Parisian restaurants now dined 
in public in the old manner of French kings, al- 
lowing the curious to gaze upon him. A body- 
guard of Polish lancers attended whenever he 
rode forth. 

His conversation dazzled by its ease and rich- 
ness. It was quoted everywhere. Some of it was 
calculated to arouse concern in high quarters. 
"What I have done so far," he said, "is nothing. 
I am but at the beginning of the career I am to 
run. Do you imagine that I have triumphed in 
Italy in order to advance the lawyers of the Di- 
rectory? . . . Let the Directory attempt to de- 
prive me of my command and they will see who 
is the master. The nation must have a head 
who is rendered illustrious by glory." Two years 
later he saw to it that she had such a head. 

The treaty of Campo Formio initiated the 
process of changing the map of Europe which 
was to be carried on bewilderingly in the years 
to come. Neither France, champion of the new 
principles of politics, nor Austria, champion of 
the old, differed in their methods. Both bar- 
gained and traded as best they could, and the 
result was an agreement that contravened the 
principles of the French Revolution, of the rights 
of peoples to determine their own destinies, the 
principle of popular sovereignty. For the agree- 



THE DIRECTORY 247 

ment simply registered the arbitrament of the 
sword, was frankly based on force, and on noth- 
ing else. French domestic policy had been 
revolutionized. French foreign policy had re- 
mained stationary. 

By the Treaty of Campo Formio Austria re- 
linquished her possessions in Belgium to France 
and abandoned to her the left bank of the Rhine, 
agreeing to bring about a congress of the Ger- 
man states to effect this change. Austria also 
gave up her rights in Lombardy and agreed to 
recognize the new Cisalpine Republic which 
Bonaparte created out of Lombardy, the duchies 
of Parma and Modena, and out of parts of the 
Papal States and Venetia. In return for this the 
city, the islands, and most of the mainland of 
Venice, were handed over to Austria, as were 
also Dalmatia and Istria. Austria became an 
Adriatic power. The Adriatic ceased to be a 
Venetian lake. 

The French people were enthusiastic over the 
acquisition of Belgium and the left bank of the 
Rhine. They were disposed, however, to be in- 
dignant at the treatment of Venice, the rape of a 
republic by a republic. But they were obliged 
to take the fly with the ointment and to adapt 
themselves to the situation. Thus ended the 
famous Italian campaign, which was the step- 



248 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

ping-stone by which Napoleon Bonaparte started 
on his triumphal way. 

He had, moreover, not only conquered Italy. 
He had plundered her. One of the features of 
this campaign had been that it had been based 
upon the principle that it must pay for itself and 
yield a profit in addition, for the French treasury. 
Bonaparte demanded large contributions from 
the princes whom he conquered. The Duke of 
Modena had to pay ten million francs, the re- 
public of Genoa fifteen, the Pope twenty. He 
levied heavily upon Milan. Not only did he 
make Italy support his army but he sent large 
sums to the Directory, to meet the ever-threaten- 
ing deficit. 

Not only that, but he shamelessly and sys- 
tematically robbed her of her works of art. This 
he made a regular feature of his career as con- 
queror. In this and later campaigns, whenever 
victorious, he had his agents ransack the gal- 
leries and select the pictures, which he then de- 
manded as the prize of war, conduct which 
greatly embittered the victims but produced 
pleasurable feelings in France. The entry of 
the first art treasures into Paris created great 
excitement. Enormous cars bearing pictures 
and statues, carefully packed, but labeled on the 
outside, rolled through the streets to the accom- 



THE DIRECTORY 249 

paniment of martial music, the waving of flags, 
and shouts of popular approval; "The Trans- 
figuration" by Raphael; "The Christ" by Ti- 
tian; the Apollo Belvedere, the Nine Muses, the 
Laocoon, the Venus de Medici. 
y During his career Bonaparte enriched the Mu- 
seum of the Louvre with over a hundred and 
fifty paintings by Raphael, Rembrandt, Rubens, 
Titian, and Van Dyck, to mention only a few 
of the greater names. After his fall years later 
many of these were returned to their former 
owners. Yet many remained. The famous 
bronze horses of Venice, of which the Vene- 
tians had robbed Constantinople centuries be- 
fore, as Constantinople had long before that 
robbed Rome, were transported to Paris after the 
conquest of Venice in 1797, were transported 
back to Venice after the overthrow of Napoleon 
and were put in place again, there to remain for 
a full 100 years, until the year 191 5, when they 
were removed once more, this time by the Vene- 
tians themselves, for purposes of safety against 
the dangers of the Austrian war of that year. 

After this swift revelation of genius in the 
Italian campaign the laureled hero returned to 
Paris, the cynosure of all eyes, the center of 
boundless curiosity. He knew, however, that the 
way to keep curiosity alive is not to satisfy it, 



250 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

for, once satisfied, it turns to other objects. Be- 
lieving that the Parisians, like the ancient Athe- 
nians, preferred to worship gods that were un- 
known, he discreetly kept in the background, af- 
fected simplicity of dress and demeanor, and won 
praises for his "modesty," quite ironically mis- 
placed. Modesty was not his forte. He was 
studying his future very carefully, was analyzing 
the situation very closely. He would have liked 
to enter the Directory. Once one of the five he 
could have pocketed the other four. But he was 
only twenty-eight and Directors must be at least 
forty years of age. He did not wish or intend to 
imitate Cincinnatus by returning with dignity 
to the plow. He was resolved to "keep his glory 
warm." Perceiving that, as he expressed it, " the 
pear was not yet ripe," he meditated, and the re- 
sult of his meditations was a spectacular ad- 
venture. 

After the Peace of Campo Formio only one 
power remained at war with France, namely 
England. But England was most formidable — 
because of her wealth, because of her colonies, 
because of her navy. She had been the center of 
the coalition, the pay-mistress of the other ene- 
mies, the constant fomenter of trouble, the patron 
of the Bourbons. " Our Government," said Na- 
poleon at this time, "must destroy the English 



THE DIRECTORY 251 

monarchy or it must expect itself to be destroyed 
by these active islanders. Let us concentrate 
our energies on the navy and annihilate England. 
That done, Europe is at our feet." The annihila- 
tion of England was to be the most constant 
subject of his thought during his entire career, 
baffling him at every stage, prompting him to 
gigantic efforts, ending in catastrophic failure 
eighteen years later at Waterloo, and in the 
forced repinings of St. Helena. 

The Directory now made Bonaparte com- 
mander of the army of England, and he began 
his first experiment in the elusive art of destroy- 
ing these " active islanders." Seeing that a direct 
invasion of England was impossible he sought out 
a vulnerable spot which should at the same time 
be accessible, and he hit upon Egypt. Not that 
Egypt was an English possession, for it was not. 
It belonged to the Sultan of Turkey. But it was 
on the route to India and Bonaparte, like many 
of his contemporaries, considered that England 
drew her strength, not from English mines and 
factories, from English brains and characters, but 
from the fabulous wealth of India. Once cut that 
nerve and the mighty colossus would reel and 
fall. England was not an island; she was a world- 
empire. As such she stood in the way of all other 
would-be world-empires, then as now. The 



252 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

year 1914 saw no new arguments put forth by 
her enemies in regard to England that were 
not freely uttered in 1797. Bonaparte denounced 
this "tyrant of the seas" quite in our latter-day 
style. If there must be tyranny it was intoler- 
able that it should be exercised by others. He 
now received the ready sanction of the Directors 
to his plan for the conquest of Egypt. Once con- 
quered, Egypt would serve as a basis of opera- 
tions for an expedition to India which would 
come in time. The Directors were glad to get 
him so far away from Paris, where his popularity 
was burdensome, was, indeed, a constant menace. 
The plan itself, also, was quite in the traditions 
of the French foreign office. Moreover the po- 
tent fascination of the Orient for all imaginative 
minds, as offering an inviting, mysterious field 
for vast and dazzling action, operated powerfully 
upon Bonaparte. What destinies might not be 
carved out of the gorgeous East, with its limit- 
less horizons, its immeasurable, unutilized oppor- 
tunities? The Orient had appealed to Alexander 
the Great with irresistible force as it now ap- 
pealed to this imaginative young Corsican, every 
energy of whose rich and complex personality 
was now in high flood. "This little Europe has 
not enough to offer," he remarked one day to his 
schoolboy friend, Bourrienne. "The Orient is 



THE DIRECTORY 253 

the place to go to. All great reputations have 
been made there." " I do not know what would 
have happened to me," he said later, " if I had not 
had the happy idea of going to Egypt." He was 
a child of the Mediterranean and as a boy had 
drunk in its legends and its poetry. As wildly 
imaginative as he was intensely practical, both 
imagination and cool calculation recommended 
the adventure. 

Once decided on, preparations were made with 
promptness and in utter secrecy. On May 19, 
1798, Bonaparte set sail from Toulon with a 
fleet of 400 slow-moving transports bearing 
an army of 38,000 men. A brilliant corps 
of young generals accompanied him, Berthier, 
Murat, Desaix, Marmont, Lannes, Kleber, tried 
and tested in Italy the year before. He also took 
with him a traveling library in which Plutarch's 
Lives and Xenophon's Anabasis and the Koran 
were a few of the significant contents. Fellow- 
voyagers, also, were over 100 distinguished schol- 
ars, scientists, artists, engineers, for this expedi- 
tion was to be no mere military promenade, but 
was designed to widen the bounds of human 
knowledge by an elaborate study of the products 
and customs, the history and the art of that coun- 
try, famous, yet little known. This, indeed, was 
destined to be the most permanent and valuable 



254 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

result of an expedition which laid the broad foun- 
dations of modern Egyptology in "The Descrip- 
tion of Egypt," a monumental work which pre- 
sented to the world in sumptuous form the dis- 
coveries and investigations of this group of 
learned men. 

The hazards were enormous. Admiral Nel- 
son with a powerful English fleet was in the 
Mediterranean. The French managed to escape 
him. Stopping on the way to seize the impor- 
tant position of Malta and to forward the con- 
tents of its treasury to the Directors, Bonaparte 
reached his destination at the end of June and 
disembarked in safety. The nominal ruler of 
Egypt was the Sultan of Turkey, but the real 
rulers were the Mamelukes, a sort of feudal mili- 
tary caste. They constituted a splendid body of 
cavalrymen, but they were no match for the in- 
vaders, as they lacked infantry and artillery, and 
were, moreover, far inferior in numbers. 

Seizing Alexandria on July 2 the French army 
began the march to Cairo. The difficulties of the 
march were great, as no account had been taken, 
in the preparations, of the character of the cli- 
mate and the country. The soldiers wore the 
heavy uniforms in vogue in Europe. In the 
march across the blazing sands they experienced 
hunger, thirst, heat. Many perished from thirst, 



THE DIRECTORY 255 

serious eye troubles were caused by the frightful 
glare, suicide was not infrequent. Finally, how- 
ever, after nearly three weeks of this agony, the 
Pyramids came in sight, just outside Cairo. 
There Bonaparte administered a smashing de- 
feat to the Mamelukes, encouraging his soldiers 
by one of his thrilling phrases, "Soldiers, from 
the summit of these pyramids forty centuries 
look down upon you." The Battle of the Pyra- 
mids, July 21, 1798, gave the French control of 
Cairo. The Mamelukes were dispersed. They 
had lost 2,000 men. Bonaparte had lost very few. 

But no sooner had the French conquered the 
country than they became prisoners in it. For, 
on August 1 Nelson had surprised the French 
fleet as it was lying in the harbor of Abukir 
Bay, east of Alexandria, and had captured or 
destroyed it. Only two battleships and a frigate 
managed to escape. This Battle of the Nile, as 
it was called, was one of the most decisive sea 
fights of this entire period. It was Bonaparte's 
first taste of British sea power. It was not his 
last. 

Bonaparte received the news of this terrible 
disaster, which cut him off from France and 
cooped him up in a hot and poor country, with 
superb composure. "Well! we must remain in 
this land, and come forth great, as did the an- 



256 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

cients. This is the hour when characters of a 
superior order should show themselves." And 
later he said that the English "will perhaps com- 
pel us to do greater things than we intended." 

He had need of all his resources, material and 
moral. Hearing that the Sultan of Turkey had 
declared war upon him, he resolved in January, 
1799, to invade Syria, one of the Sultan's prov- 
inces, wishing to restore or reaffirm the confi- 
dence of his soldiers by fresh victories and think- 
ing, perhaps, of a march on India or on Constan- 
tinople, taking "Europe in the rear," as he ex- 
pressed it. If such was his hope, it was destined 
to disappointment. The crossing of the desert 
from Egypt into Syria was painful in the ex- 
treme, marked by the horrors of heat and thirst. 
The soldiers marched amid clouds of sand blown 
against them by a suffocating wind. They how- 
ever seized the forts of Gaza and Jaffa, and de- 
stroyed a Turkish army at Mt. Tabor, near Naza- 
reth, but were arrested at Acre, which they could 
not take by siege, because it was on the seacoast 
and was aided by the British fleet, but which they 
partly took by storm, only to be forced finally to 
withdraw because of terrific losses. For two 
months the struggle for Acre went on. Plague 
broke out, ammunition ran short, and Bonaparte 
was again beaten by sea power. He led his army 



THE DIRECTORY 257 

back to Cairo in a memorable march, covering 
300 miles in twenty-six days, over scorching 
sands and amidst appalling scenes of disaster and 
desperation. He had sacrificed 5,000 men, had 
accomplished nothing, and had been checked for 




the first time in his career. On reaching Cairo 
he had the effrontery to act as if he had been tri- 
umphant, and sent out lying bulletins, not caring 
to have the truth known. 

A few weeks later he did win a notable victory, 
this time at Abukir, against a Turkish army that 



258 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

had just disembarked. This he correctly de- 
scribed when he announced, " It is one of the fin- 
est I have ever witnessed. Of the army landed 
by the enemy not a man has escaped." Over 
10,000 Turks lost their lives in this, the last ex- 
ploit of Bonaparte in Egypt. For now he re- 
solved to return to France, to leave the whole 
adventure in other hands, seeing that it must 
inevitably fail, and to seek his fortune in fairer 
fields. He had heard news from France that 
made him anxious to return. A new coalition 
had been formed during his absence, the French 
had been driven out of Italy, France itself was 
threatened with invasion. The Directory was 
discredited and unpopular because of its incom- 
petence and blunders. Bonaparte did not dare in- 
form his soldiers, who had endured so much, of 
his plan. He did not even dare to tell Kleber, to 
whom he entrusted the command of the army 
by a letter which reached the latter too late for 
him to protest. He set sail secretly on the night 
of August 21, 1799, accompanied by Berthier, 
Murat, and five other officers and by two or three 
scientists. Kleber was later assassinated by a 
Mohammedan fanatic and the French army was 
forced to capitulate and evacuate Egypt, in 
August, 1 801. That ended the Egyptian expedi- 
tion, 



THE DIRECTORY 259 

It was no easy thing to get back from Egypt 
to France with the English scouring the seas and 
the winds against him. Sometimes the little sail- 
boat on which Bonaparte had taken passage was 
beaten back ten miles a day. Then the wind 
would shift at night and progress would be made. 
It took three weeks of hugging the southern 
shore of the Mediterranean before the narrows 
between Africa and Sicily were reached. These 
were guarded by an English battleship. But the 
French slipped through at night, lights out. 
Reaching Corsica they stopped several days, the 
winds dead against them. It seemed as if every 
one on the island claimed relationship with their 
fellow citizen who had been rendered "illustri- 
ous by glory." Bonaparte saw his native land 
for the last time in his life. Finally he sailed for 
France, and was nearly overhauled by the Brit- 
ish, who chased him to almost within sight of 
land. The journey from the coast to Paris was a 
continuous ovation. The crowds were such that 
frequently the carriages could advance but 
slowly. Evenings there were illuminations every- 
where. When Paris was reached delirium broke 
forth. 

He arrived in the nick of time, as was his wont. 
Finally the pear was ripe. The government was 
in the last stages of unpopularity and discredit. 



a6o THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Incompetent and corrupt, it was also unsuccess- 
ful. The Directory was in existence for four 
years, from October, 1795, to November, 1799. 
Its career was agitated. The defects of the con- 
stitution, the perplexing circumstances of the 
times, the ambitions and intrigues of individuals, 
seeking personal advantage and recking little of 
the state, had strained the institutions of the 
country almost to the breaking point, and had 
created a widespread feeling of weariness and 
disgust. Friction had been constant between 
the Directors and the legislature, and on two oc- 
casions the former had laid violent hands upon 
the latter, once arresting a group of royalist depu- 
ties and annulling their election, once doing the 
same to a group of radical republicans. They had 
thus made sport of the constitution and destroyed 
the rights of the voters. Their foreign policy, 
after Bonaparte had sailed for Egypt, had been 
so aggressive and blundering that a new coalition 
had been formed against France, consisting of 
England, Austria, and Russia, which country 
now abandoned its eastern isolation and entered 
upon a period of active participation in the affairs 
of western Europe. The coalition was success- 
ful, the French were driven out of Germany 
back upon the Rhine, out of Italy, and the inva- 
sion of France was, perhaps, impending. The do- 



THE DIRECTORY 261 

mestic policy of the Directors had also resulted 
in fanning once more the embers of religious war 
in Vendee. 

In these troubled waters Bonaparte began 
forthwith to fish. He established connections 
with a group of politicians who for one reason 
and another considered a revision of the consti- 
tution desirable and necessary. The leader of the 
group was Sieves, a man who plumed himself on 
having a complete knowledge of the art and 
theory of government and who now wished to 
endow France with the perfect institutions of 
which he carried the secret in his brain. Sieves 
was a man of Olympian conceit, of oracular ut- 
terances, a coiner of telling phrases, enjoying an 
immoderate reputation as a constitution-maker. 
His phrase was now that to accomplish the de- 
sired change he needed "a sword." He would 
furnish the pen himself. The event was to prove, 
contrary to all proverbs, that the pen is weaker 
than the sword, at least when the latter belongs 
to a Napoleon Bonaparte. Bonaparte, who really 
despised "this cunning priest," as he called him, 
was nevertheless quite willing to use him as a 
stepping-stone. Heaping flatteries upon him he 
said: "We have no government, because we 
have no constitution ; at least not the one we need. 
It is for your genius to give us one." 



262 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

The plan these and other conspirators worked 
out was to force the Directors to resign, willy- 
nilly, thus leaving France without an executive, 
a situation that could not possibly be permitted 
to continue; then to get the Council of Elders 
and the Council of the Five Hundred to appoint 
a committee to revise the constitution. Natur- 
ally Sieves and Bonaparte were to be on that 
committee, if all went well. Then let wisdom 
have her sway. The conspirators had two of 
the Directors on their side and a majority of the 
Elders, and fortunately the President of the 
Council of Five Hundred was a brother of Na- 
poleon, Lucien Bonaparte, a shallow but cool- 
headed rhetorician, to whom the honors of the 
critical day were destined to be due. 

Thus was plotted in the dark the coup d'etat 
of Brumaire which landed Napoleon in the sad- 
dle, made him ruler of a great state, and opened 
a new and prodigious chapter in the history of 
Europe. There is no English word for coup 
d'etat, as fortunately the thing described is alien 
to the history of English-speaking peoples. It 
is the seizure of the state, of power, by force and 
ruse, the overthrow of the form of government 
by violence, by arms. There had been coups 
d'etat before in France. There were to be others 
later, in the nineteenth century. But the coup 



THE DIRECTORY 263 

d'etat of 18th and 19th Brumaire (November 9 
and 10, 1799) is the most classical example of 
this device, the most successful, the most mo- 
mentous in its consequences. 

But how to set the artful scheme in motion? 
There was the danger that the deputies of the 
Five Hundred might block the way, danger of a 
popular insurrection in Paris of the old familiar 
kind, if the rumor got abroad that the Republic 
was in peril. The conspirators must step warily. 
They did so — and they nearly failed — and had 
they failed, their fate would have been that of 
Robespierre. 

* A charge was trumped up, for which no evi- 
dence was given, that a plot was being concerted 
against the Republic. Not an instant must be 
lost, if the state was to be saved. The Council 
of Elders, informed of this, and already won over 
to the conspiracy, thereupon voted, upon the 18th 
of Brumaire, that both Councils should meet the 
following day at St. Cloud, several miles from 
Paris, and that General Bonaparte should take 
command of the troops for the purpose of pro- 
tecting them. / 

^The next day, Sunday, the two Councils met 
in the palace of St. Cloud. Delay occurring in 
arranging the halls for the extraordinary meet- 
ing, the suspicious legislators had time to confer, 



264 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

to concert opposition. The Elders, when their 
session finally began at two o'clock, demanded 
details concerning the pretended plot. Bona- 
parte entered and made a wild and incoherent 
speech. They were " standing on a volcano," he 
told them. He was no " Caesar " or " Cromwell " 
intent upon destroying the liberties of his coun- 
try. "General, you no longer know what you 
are saying," whispered Bourrienne, urging him 
to leave the chamber, which he immediately did. 
/ This was a bad beginning; but worse was yet 
to come. Bonaparte went to the Council of Five 
Hundred, accompanied by four grenadiers. He 
was greeted with a perfect storm of wrath. Cries 
of "Outlaw him, outlaw him!" "Down with 
the Dictator, down with the tyrant ! " rent the air. 
Pandemonium reigned. He received blows, was 
pushed and jostled, and was finally dragged 
fainting from the hall by the grenadiers, his coat 
torn, his face bleeding. Outside he mounted his 
horse in the courtyard, before the soldiers. 

It was Lucien who saved this badly bungled 
day. Refusing to put the motion to outlaw his 
brother, he left the chair, made his way to the 
courtyard, mounted a horse and harangued the 
soldiers/ telling them that a band of assassins 
was terrorizing the Assembly, that his life and 
that of Napoleon were no longer safe, and de- 



THE DIRECTORY 265 

manding, as President of the Five Hundred, that 
the soldiers enter the hall and clear out the 
brigands and free the Council. The soldiers 
hesitated. Then Lucien seized Napoleon's 
sword, pointed it at his brother's breast, and 
swore to kill him if he should ever lay violent 
hands on the Republic. The lie and the melo- 
drama worked. The soldiers entered the hall, 
led by Murat. The legislators escaped through 
the windows. 

/That evening groups of Elders and of the Five 
Hundred who favored the conspirators met, 
voted the abolition of the Directory, and ap- 
pointed three Consuls, Sieyes, Ducos, and General 
Bonaparte, to take their place. They then ad- 
journed for four months, appointing, as their 
final act, committees to cooperate with the Con- 
suls in the preparation of a new constitution, 
rendered necessary by the changed conditions. 

The three Consuls promised "fidelity to the 
Republic, one and indivisible, to liberty, equality, 
and the representative system of government." 
At six o'clock on Monday morning every one 
went back to Paris. The grenadiers returned to 
their garrison singing revolutionary songs and 
thinking most sincerely that they had saved the 
Republic and the Revolution. No outbreak oc- 
curred in Paris. The coup d'etat was popular. 



266 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Government bonds rose rapidly, nearly doubling 
in a week. 

Such was the Little Corporal's rise to civil 
power. It was fortunate, as we have seen, that 
not all the ability of his remarkable family was 
monopolized by himself. Lucien had his particu- 
lar share, a distinct advantage to his kith and kin. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE CONSULATE 

THUS the famous young warrior had clutched at 
power and was not soon to let it slip. It had been 
a narrow escape. Fate had trembled dangerously 
in the balance on that gray November Sunday 
afternoon, but the gambler had won. His thin, 
sallow face, his sharp, metallic voice, his abrupt, 
imperious gesture, his glance that cowed and 
terrified, his long disordered hair, his delicate 
hands, became a part of the history of the times, 
manifesting the intensely vivid impression which 
he had made upon his age and was to deepen. He 
was to etch the impress of his amazing person- 
ality with deep, precise, bold strokes upon the 
institutions and the life of France. 

He was, in reality, a flinty young despot with 
a pronounced taste for military glory. "I love 
power," he said later, "as a musician loves his 
violin. I love it as an artist." He was now in a 
position to indulge his taste. 

Pending a wider and a higher flight, there were 

two tasks that called for the immediate attention 

of the three Consuls, who now took the place for- 
267 



268 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

merly occupied by the five Directors. A new 
constitution must be made, and the war against 
the coalition must be carried on. 

The Constitution of the Year VIII (1799), the 
fourth since the beginning of the Revolution, 
hastily composed and put into force a month 
after the coup d'etat, was in its essentials the 
work of Bonaparte and was designed to place 
supreme power in his hands. This had not been 
at all the purpose of Sieves or of the committees 
appointed to draft the document. But Sieves' 
plan, which had not been carefully worked out 
but was confused and uncertain in many particu- 
lars, encountered the abrupt disdain of Bona- 
parte. There was to be a Grand Elector with a 
palace at Versailles and an income of six million 
francs a year. This was the place evidently in- 
tended for Bonaparte, who immediately killed it 
with the statement that he had no desire to be 
merely " a fatted pig." Impatient with this 
scheme and with others suggested by the com- 
mittees, Bonaparte practically dictated the con- 
stitution, using, to be sure, such of the sugges- 
tions made by the others as seemed to him good 
or harmless. The result was the organization of 
that phase of the history of the Republic which 
is called the Consulate and which lasted from 
1799 to 1804. 



THE CONSULATE 269 

The executive power was vested in three Con- 
suls who were to be elected for ten years and to 
be reeligible. They were to be elected by the 
Senate, but, to get the system started, the consti- 
tution indicated who they should be — Bonaparte, 
First Consul; Cambaceres, the second, and Le- 
brun, the third. Practically all the powers were 
to be in the hands of the First Consul, the ap- 
pointment of ministers, ambassadors, officers of 
the army and navy, and numberless civil officials, 
including judges, the right to make war and 
peace, and treaties, subject to the sanction of 
the Legislature. 

The First Consul was also to have the initia- 
tive in all legislation. Bills were to be prepared 
by a Council of State, were then to be submitted 
to a body called the Tribunate, which was to have 
the right to discuss them but not to vote them. 
Then they were to go to the Legislative Body, 
which was to have the power to vote them but 
not discuss them. Moreover this "assembly of 
300 mutes" must discharge its single function 
of voting in secret. There was also to be a fourth 
body, higher than the others — the Senate, which 
was to be the guardian of the constitution and 
was also to be an electing body, choosing the 
Consuls, the members of the Tribunate and the 
Legislature from certain lists, prepared in a cum- 



270 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

bersome and elaborate way, and pretending to 
safeguard the right of the voters, for the suf- 
frage was declared by the constitution to be uni- 
versal. No time need be spent on this aspect of 
the constitution, for it was a sham and a decep- 
tion. 

All this elaborate machinery was designed to 
keep up the fiction of the sovereignty of the 
people, the great assertion of the Revolution. 
The Republic continued to exist. The people 
were voters. They had their various assemblies, 
thus ingeniously selected. Practically, however, 
and this is the matter that most concerns us, 
popular sovereignty was gone, Bonaparte was 
sovereign. He had more extensive executive 
powers than Louis XVI had had under the Con- 
stitution of 1791. He really had the legislative 
power also. No bill could be discussed or voted 
that had not been first prepared by his orders. 
Once voted it could not go into force until he pro- 
mulgated it. France was still a republic in name ; 
practically, however, it was a monarchy, scarcely 
veiled at that. Bonaparte's position was quite as 
attractive as that of any monarch by divine right, 
except for the fact that he was to hold it for a 
term of ten years only and had no power to be- 
queath it to an heir. He was to remedy these 
details later. 



THE CONSULATE 271 

Having given France a constitution, he secured 
the enactment of a law which placed all the local 
government in his hands. There was to be a 
prefect at the head of each department, a sub- 
prefect for a smaller division, a mayor for every 
town or commune. The citizens lost the power 
to manage their own local affairs, and thus their 
training in self-government came to an end. Gov- 
ernment, national and local, was centralized in 
Paris, more effectively, even, than in the good 
old days of the Bourbons and their intendants. 

Having set his house in order, having gained 
a firm grip on the reins of power, Bonaparte now 
turned his attention to the foreign enemies of 
France. The coalition consisted of England, 
Austria, and Russia. England was difficult to 
get at. The Russians were dissatisfied with their 
allies and were withdrawing from cooperation. 
There remained Austria, the enemy Bonaparte 
had met before. 

One Austrian army was on the Rhine and 
Bonaparte sent Moreau to attack it. Another 
was in northern Italy and he went in person to 
attend to that. While he had been in Egypt the 
Austrians had won back northern Italy. Melas, 
their general, had driven Massena into Genoa, 
where the latter hung on like grim death, with 
rations that would soon be exhausted. Bona- 



272 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

parte's plan was to get in between the Austrians 
and their own country, to attack them in the rear, 
thus to force them to withdraw from the siege 
of Genoa in order to keep open their line of com- 
munication. In the pursuit of this object he ac- 
complished one of his most famous exploits, the 
crossing of the Great Saint Bernard pass over the 
Alps, with an army of 40,000, through snow and 
ice, dragging their cannon in troughs made out of 
hollowed logs. It was a matter of a week. Once 
in Italy he sought out the Austrians and met 
them unexpectedly at Marengo (June 14, 1800). 
The battle came near being a defeat, owing to 
the fact that Bonaparte blundered badly, hav- 
ing divided his forces, and that Desaix's division 
was miles away. The battle began at dawn and 
went disastrously for the French. At one o'clock 
the Austrian commander rode back to his head- 
quarters, believing that he had won and that the 
remaining work could be left to his subordinates. 
The French were pushed back and their retreat 
threatened to become a stampede. The day was 
saved by the appearance of Desaix's division on 
the scene, at about five o'clock. The battle was 
resumed with fury, Desaix himself was killed, 
but the soldiers avenged his glorious death by a 
glorious victory. By seven o'clock the day of 
strange vicissitudes was over. The Austrians 



THE CONSULATE 273 

signed an armistice abandoning to the French 
all northern Italy as far as the Mincio. 

Six months later Moreau won a decisive vic- 
tory over the Austrians in Germany at Hohen- 
linden (December 3, 1800), thus opening the road 
to Vienna. Austria was now compelled to sue 
for peace. The Treaty of Luneville (February 
9, 1801) was in the main a repetition of the 
Treaty of Campo Formio. 

As had been the case after Campo Formio, so 
now, after the break-up of this second coalition, 
France remained at war with only one nation, 
England. These two nations had been at war 
continuously for eight years. England had de- 
feated the French navy and had conquered 
many of the colonies of France and of the allies 
or dependencies of France, that is, of Holland and 
Spain. She had just compelled the French in 
Egypt, the army left there by Bonaparte, to agree 
to evacuate that country. But her debt had 
grown enormously and there was widespread 
popular dislike of the war. A change in the 
ministry occurred, removing the great war leader, 
William Pitt. England agreed to discuss the 
question of peace. The discussion went on for 
five months and ended in the Peace of Amiens 
(March, 1802). England recognized the exist- 
ence of the French Republic. She restored all 



274 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

the French colonies and some of the Dutch and 
Spanish, retaining only Ceylon and Trinidad. 
She promised to evacuate Malta and Egypt, 
which the French had seized in 1798 and which 
she had taken from them. Nothing was said of 
the French conquest of Belgium and the left bank 
of the Rhine. This was virtually acquiescence in 
the new boundaries of France, which far exceeded 
those of the ancient monarchy. 

Thus Europe was at peace for the first time in 
ten years. Great was the enthusiasm in both 
France and England. 

The peace, however, was most unstable. It 
lasted just one year. 

Napoleon said on one occasion, " I am the Rev- 
olution." On another he said that he had "de- 
stroyed the Revolution." There was much error 
and some truth in both these statements. 

The Consulate, and the Empire which suc- 
ceeded the Consulate, preserved much of the work 
of the Revolution and abolished much, in con- 
formity with the ideas and also the personal in- 
terests of the new ruler. Bonaparte had very 
definite opinions concerning the Revolution, con- 
cerning the French people, and concerning his 
own ambitions. These opinions constituted the 
most important single factor in the life of France 
after 1799. Bonaparte sympathized with, or at 



THE CONSULATE 275 

least tolerated, one of the ideas of the Revolu- 
tion, Equality. He detested the other leading 
idea, Liberty. In his youth he had fallen under 
the magnetic spell of Rousseau. But that had 
passed and thenceforth he dismissed Rousseau 
summarily as a "madman." He accepted the 
principle of equality because it alone made pos- 
sible his own career and because he perceived the 
hold it had upon the minds of the people. He 
had no desire to restore the Bourbons and the 
feudal system, the incarnation of the principle of 
inequality and privilege. He stood right athwart 
the road to yesterday in this respect. It was he 
and his system that kept the Bourbons exiles 
from France fifteen years longer, so long indeed 
that when they did finally return it was largely 
without their baggage of outworn ideas. Bona- 
parte thus prevented the restoration of the Old 
Regime. That was done for, for good and all. 
Privilege, abolished in 1789, remained abolished. 
The clergy, nobility, and third estate had been 
swept away. There remained only a vast mass of 
French citizens subject to the same laws, paying 
the same taxes, enjoying equal chances in life, 
as far as the state was concerned. The state 
showed no partiality, had no favorites. All 
shared in bearing the nation's burdens in propor- 
tion to their ability. And no class levied taxes 



276 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

upon another — tithes and feudal dues were not 
restored. No class could exercise a monopoly 
of any craft or trade — the guilds with all their 
restrictions remained abolished. Moreover all 
now had an equal chance at public employment 
in the state or in the army. 

Bonaparte summed this policy up in the phrase 
"careers open to talent." This idea was not 
original with him, it was contained in the Dec- 
laration of the Rights of Man. But he held it. 
Under him there were no artificial barriers, any 
one might rise as high as his ability, his industry, 
his service justified, always on condition of his 
loyalty to the sovereign. Every avenue was kept 
open to ambition and energy. Napoleon's mar- 
shals, the men who attained the highest positions 
in his armies, were humbly born — Massena was 
the son of a saloon-keeper, Augereau of a mason, 
Ney of a cooper, and Murat of a country inn- 
keeper. None of these men could have possibly 
become a marshal under the Old Regime, nor 
could Bonaparte himself possibly ever have risen 
to a higher rank than that of colonel and then 
only when well along in life. Bonaparte did not 
think that all men are equal in natural gifts or 
in social position, but he maintained equality be- 
fore the law, that priceless acquisition of the Rev- 
olution. 



THE CONSULATE 277 

He did not believe in liberty nor did he be- 
lieve that, for that matter, the French believed 
in it. His career was one long denial or nega- 
tion of it. Neither liberty of speech, nor lib- 
erty of the press, neither intellectual nor po- 
litical liberty, received anything from him but 
blows and infringements. In this respect his 
rule meant reaction to the spirit and the prac- 
tice of the Old Regime. It is quite true that 
the Convention and the Directory had also 
trampled ruthlessly upon this principle, but it is 
also quite true that neither he nor they could 
successfully defy what is plainly a dominant pre- 
occupation, a deep-seated longing of the modern 
world. For the last hundred years the ground 
has been cumbered with those who thought they 
could silence this passion for freedom, and who 
found out, to their cost and the cost of others, 
that their efforts to imprison the human spirit 
were unavailing. There are still, after all these 
instructive hundred years, rulers who share that 
opinion and act upon it. They have been able 
to preserve themselves and their methods of gov- 
ernment in certain countries. But their day of 
reckoning, it may safely be prophesied, is coming, 
as it came for Napoleon himself. They fight for 
a losing cause, as the history of the modern world 
shows. 



278 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

The activities of Bonaparte as First Consul, 
after Marengo and during the brief interval of 
peace, were unremitting and far-reaching. It 
was then that he gave his full measure as a civil 
ruler. He was concerned with binding up the 
wounds or open sores of the nation, with deter- 
mining the precise form of the national institu- 
tions, with fashioning the mould through which 
the national life was to go pulsing for a long- 
future, with consolidating the foundations of his 
power. A brief examination of this phase of his 
activity is essential to a knowledge of the later 
history of France, and to our appreciation of his 
own matchless and varied ability, of the power of 
sheer intellect and will applied to the problems 
of a society in flux. 

First, the party passions which had rioted for 
ten years must be quieted. Bonaparte's policy 
toward the factions was conciliation, coupled with 
stern and even savage repression of such elements 
as refused to comply with this primary require- 
ment. There was room enough in France for all, 
but on one condition, that all accept the present 
rulers and acquiesce in the existing institutions 
and laws of the land. Offices would be open 
freely to former royalists, Jacobins, Girondists, on 
equal terms, no questions asked save that of loy- 
alty. As a matter of fact Bonaparte exercised his 



THE CONSULATE 279 

vast appointing power in this sense for the pur- 
pose of effacing all distinctions, all unhappy re- 
minders of a troubled past. The laws against the 
emigres and the recalcitrant priests were relaxed. 
Of over 100,000 emigrants, all but about 1,000 
irreconcilables received, by successive decrees, 
the legal right to return and to recover their es- 
tates, if these had not been already sold. Only 
those who placed their devotion to the House of 
Bourbon above all other considerations found the 
door resolutely closed. 

Bonaparte soon perceived that the strength of 
the Bourbon cause lay not in the merits or talents 
of the royal family itself or its aristocratic sup- 
porters, but in its close identification with the 
authorities of the Roman Catholic Church. 
Through all the angry religious warfare of the 
Revolution the mass of the people had remained 
faithful to the priests and the priests were sub- 
ject to the bishops. The bishops had refused to 
accept the various laws of the Revolution con- 
cerning them and had as a consequence been 
driven from the country. They were living mostly 
in England and in Germany, taking their cue 
from the Pope, who recognized Louis XVIII, 
brother of Louis XVI, as the legitimate ruler of 
France. 

Thus the religious dissension was fused with 



280 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

political opposition — royalists and bishops were 
in the same galley. Bonaparte determined to sever 
this connection, thus leaving the extreme royal- 
ists high and dry, a staff of officers without an 
army. No sooner had he returned from Marengo 
than he took measures to show the Catholics that 
they had nothing to fear from him, that they 
could enjoy their religion undisturbed if they did 
not use their liberty, under cover of religion, to 
plot against him and against the Revolutionary 
settlement. He was in all this not actuated by 
any religious sentiment himself, but by a purely 
political sentiment — he was himself, as he said, 
"Mohammedan in Egypt, Catholic in France," 
not because he considered that either was in the 
exclusive or authentic possession of the truth, but 
because he was a man of sense who saw the fu- 
tility of trying to dragoon by force men who were 
religious into any other camp than the one to 
which they naturally belonged. Bonaparte also 
saw that religion was an instrument which he 
might much better have on his side than allow to 
be on the side of his enemies. He looked on re- 
ligion as a force in politics, nothing else. Purely 
political, not spiritual, considerations determined 
his policy in now concluding with the Pope the 
famous treaty or Concordat, which reversed 
much of the work of the Revolutionary assem- 



, 



THE CONSULATE 281 

blies, and determined the relations of church and 
state in France for the whole nineteenth century. 
This important piece of legislation of the year 
1802 lasted 103 years, being abrogated only under 
the present republic, in 1905. 

Bonaparte's thought was that by restoring 
the Catholic Church to something like its former 
primacy he would weaken the royalists. The 
people must have a religion, he said, but the re- 
ligion must be in the hands of the government. 
Many of his adherents did not agree at all with 
him in this attitude. They thought it far wiser 
to keep church and state divorced as they had 
been by the latest legislation of the Revolution. 
Bonaparte discussed the matter with the famous 
philosopher Volney, whom he had just appointed 
a senator, saying to him, "France desires a re- 
ligion." Volney replied that France also desired 
the Bourbons. At this Bonaparte assaulted the 
philosopher and gave him such a kick that he fell 
and lost consciousness. The army officers who 
were anti-clerical were bitter in their opposition 
and jibes, but Bonaparte went resolutely ahead. 
He knew the influence that priests exercise over 
their flocks and he intended that they should ex- 
ercise it in his behalf. He meant to control them 
as he controlled the army and the thousands of 
state officials. The control of religion ought to 



282 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

be vested in the ruler. " It is impossible to gov- 
ern without it," he said. He therefore turned to 
the Pope and made the treaty. " If the Pope had 
not existed," he said, " I should have had to create 
him for this occasion." 

By the Concordat the Catholic religion was 
recognized by the Republic to be that "of the 
great majority of the French people" and its 
free exercise was permitted. The Pope agreed 
to a reorganization involving a diminution in the 
number of bishoprics. He also recognized the 
sale of the church property effected by the Revo- 
lution. Henceforth the bishops were to be ap- 
pointed by the First Consul but were to be actu- 
ally invested by the Pope. The bishops in turn 
were to appoint the priests, with the consent of 
the government. The bishops must take the oath 
of fidelity to the head of the state. Both bishops 
and priests were to receive salaries from the state. 
They really became state officials. 

The Concordat gave great satisfaction to the 
mass of the population for two reasons — it gave 
them back the normal exercise of the religion in 
which they believed, and it confirmed their titles 
to the lands of the church which they had bought 
during the Revolution, titles which the church 
now recognized as legal. The church soon found 
that Bonaparte regarded it as merely another 



THE CONSULATE 283 

source of influence, an instrument of rule. The 
clergy now became his supporters and in large 
measure abandoned royalism. Moreover Bona- 
parte, by additional regulations to which he did 
not ask the Pope's assent, bound the clergy hand 
and foot to his own chariot. 

The Concordat was nevertheless a mistake. 
France had worked out a policy of entire separa- 
tion of church and state which, had it been al- 
lowed to continue, would have brought the bless- 
ing of toleration into the habits of the country. 
But the Concordat cut this promising develop- 
ment short and by tying church and state to- 
gether in a union which each shortly found dis- 
agreeable it left to the entire nineteenth century 
an irritating and a dangerous problem. Nor did 
it preserve, for long, happy relations between 
Napoleon and the Pope. Not many years later 
a quarrel arose between them which grew and 
grew until the Pope excommunicated Napoleon 
and Napoleon seized the Pope and kept him pris- 
oner. Napoleon himself came to consider the 
Concordat as the worst blunder in his career. 
However, its immediate advantages were con- 
siderable. 

" My real glory," said Napoleon at St. Helena, 
"is not my having won forty battles. What will 
never be effaced, what will endure forever, is my 



284 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Civil Code." He was undoubtedly mistaken as 
to the durability of this achievement, but he was 
correct in placing it higher than that activity 
which occupied far more of his time. The famous 
Code Napoleon was an orderly, systematic, com- 
pact statement of the laws of France. Pre-revo- 
lutionary France had been governed by a per- 
plexing number of systems of law of different 
historical origins. Then had come, with the 
Revolution, a flood of new legislation, inspired 
by different principles and greatly increasing the 
sum-total of laws in force. It was desirable to 
sift and harmonize all these statutes, and to pre- 
sent to the people of France a body of law, clear, 
rational, and logically arranged, so that hence- 
forth all the doubt, uncertainty, and confusion 
which had hitherto characterized the administra- 
tion of justice might be avoided and every 
Frenchman might easily know what his legal 
rights and relations were, with reference to 
the state and his fellow-citizens. The Con- 
stituent Assembly, the Convention, the Direc- 
tory, had all appreciated the need of this codifi- 
cation and had had committees at work upon 
it, but the work had been uncompleted. Bona- 
parte now lent the driving force of his personality 
to the accomplishment of this task, and in a com- 
paratively brief time the lawyers and the Coun- 



THE CONSULATE 285 

cil of State to whom he intrusted the work had it 
finished. The code to which Napoleon attached 
his name preserved the principle of civil equality- 
established by the Revolution. It was immedi- 
ately put into force in France and was later intro- 
duced into countries conquered or influenced by 
France, Belgium, the German territories west 
of the Rhine, and Italy. 

Bonaparte's own direct share in this monu- 
mental work was considerable and significant. 
Though no lawyer himself, and with little techni- 
cal knowledge of law, his marvelous intellectual 
ability, the precision, penetration, and pertinence 
of many of his criticisms, suggestions, questions, 
gave color and tone and character to the com- 
pleted work. He presided over many of the ses- 
sions of the Council of State devoted to the elab- 
oration of this code. " He spoke," says a witness, 
"without embarrassment and without pretension. 
He was never inferior to any member of the 
Council; he often equaled the ablest of them by 
the ease with which he seized the point of a ques- 
tion, by the justness of his ideas and the force of 
his reasoning; he often surprised them by the 
turn of his phrases and the originality of his ex- 
pression." Called a new Constantine by the 
clergy for having made the Concordat, Bonaparte 
was considered by the lawyers a new Justinian. 



286 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

He was as a matter of fact, in many respects, the 
superior of both. 

During these years of the Consulate Bonaparte 
achieved many other things than those which 
have been mentioned. He improved the system 
of taxation greatly, and brought order into the 
national finances. He founded the Bank of 
France, which still exists — and another institu- 
tion which has come down to our own day, the 
Legion of Honor, for the distribution of honors 
and emoluments to those who rendered distin- 
guished service to the state. Opposed as un-dem- 
ocratic, as offensive to the principle of equality, 
it was nevertheless instituted. Though open to 
those who had rendered civil service as well as 
to those who had rendered military, as a matter 
of fact Napoleon conferred only 1,400 crosses out 
of 48,000 upon civilians. 

Nor did this exhaust the list of durable achieve- 
ments of this crowded period of the Consulate. 
The system of national education was in part 
reorganized, and industry and commerce received 
the interested attention of the ambitious ruler. 
Roads were improved, canals were cut, ports 
were dredged. The economic development of the 
country was so rapid as to occasion some un- 
easiness in England. 

Thus was carried through an extensive and 



THE CONSULATE 287 

profound renovation of the national life. This 
period of the Consulate is that part of Bona- 
parte's career which was most useful to his fel- 
low-men, most contributory to the welfare of his 
country. His work was not accomplished with- 
out risk to himself. As his reputation and au- 
thority increased, the wrath of those who saw 
their way to power barred by his formidable per- 
son increased also. At first the royalists had 
looked to him to imitate the English General 
Monk who had used his position for the restora- 
tion of Charles II. But Bonaparte had no notion 
of acting any such graceful and altruistic a part. 
When this became apparent certain reckless 
royalists commenced to plot against him, began 
considering that it was possible to murder him. 
An attack upon him occurred shortly after Ma- 
rengo. Many lives were lost, but he escaped 
with his by the narrowest margin. 

A more serious plot was woven in London in 
the circle of the Count of Artois, younger brother 
of Louis XVI. The principal agents were Georges 
Cadoudal and Pichegru. Bonaparte, through his 
police, knew of the plot. He hoped, in allowing 
it to develop, to get his hands on the Count of 
Artois. But the Count did not land in France. 
Cadoudal and his accomplices were taken and 
shot. Pichegru was found strangled in prison. 



288 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 

Bonaparte wished to make an example of the 
House of Bourbon which would be remembered. 
This led him to commit a monstrous crime. He 
ordered the seizure on German soil of the young 
Duke d'Enghien, the Prince of Conde, a mem- 
ber of a branch of the Bourbon family. The 
prince, who was innocent of any connection 
whatever with the conspiracy, was abducted, 
brought to Vincennes at five o'clock on the 
evening of March 20, 1804, was sent before 
a court-martial at eleven o'clock and at half- 
past two in the night was taken out into the 
courtyard and shot. This was assassination pure 
and simple and it was Bonaparte's own act. 
It has remained ever since an odious blot upon 
his name, which the multitudinous seas cannot 
wash out. Its immediate object, however, was 
achieved. The royalists ceased plotting the mur- 
der of the Corsican. 

A few days after this Bonaparte took another 
step forward in the consolidation of his powers. 
In 1802, after the Treaty of Amiens had been 
made, he had astutely contrived to have his con- 
sulate for ten years transformed into a consulate 
for life, with the right to name his successor. 
The only remaining step was taken in 1804 when 
a servile Senate approved a new constitution de- 
claring him Emperor of the French, " this change 






THE CONSULATE 289 

being demanded by the interests of the French 
people." It was at any rate agreeable to the 
French people, who in a popular vote or plebis- 
cite ratified it overwhelmingly. Henceforth he 
is designated by his first name, in the manner of 
monarchs. It happened to be a more musical 
and sonorous name than most monarchs have 
possessed. 

"I found the crown of France lying on the 
ground,'' Napoleon once said, "and I picked it 
up with my sword," a vivid summary of an im- 
portant chapter in his biography. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 

THE Empire lasted ten years, from 1804 to 1814. 
It was a period of uninterrupted warfare in which 
a long series of amazing victories was swallowed 
up in final, overwhelming defeat. The central, 
overmastering figure in this agitating story, dom- 
inating the decade so completely that it is known 
by his name, was this man whose ambition 
vaulted so dizzily, only to o'erleap itself. Na- 
poleon ranks with Alexander, Caesar, Charle- 
magne, as one of the most powerful conquerors 
and rulers of history. It would be both inter- 
esting and instructive to compare these four. It 
is by no means certain that Napoleon would not 
be considered the greatest of them all. Certainly 
we have far more abundant information concern- 
ing him than we have concerning the others. 

When he became emperor he was thirty-five 
years old and was in the full possession of all his 
magnificent powers. For he was marvelously 
gifted. His brain was a wonderful organ, swift 
in its processes, tenacious in its grip, lucid, pre- 
cise, tireless, and it was served by an incredibly 
290 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 291 

capacious and accurate memory. "He never 
blundered into victory," says Emerson, "but won 
his battles in his head, before he won them on 
the field." All his intellectual resources were 
available at any moment. He said of himself, 
" Different matters are stowed away in my brain 
as in a chest of drawers. When I wish to inter- 
rupt a piece of work I close that drawer and open 
another. None of them ever get mixed, never 
does this inconvenience or fatigue me. When I 
feel sleepy I shut all the drawers and go to sleep." 
Napoleon possessed a varied and vivid imag- 
ination, was always, as he said, "living two years 
in advance," weaving plans and dreams and then 
considering coolly the necessary ways and means 
to realize them. This union of the practical and 
the poetic, the realistic and the imaginative, each 
raised to the highest pitch, was rendered potent 
by a will that recognized no obstacles, and by 
an almost superhuman activity. Napoleon loved 
work, and no man in Europe and few in all his- 
tory have labored as did he. "Work is my ele- 
ment, for which I was born and fitted," he said 
at St. Helena, at the end of his life. "I have 
known the limits of the power of my arms and 
legs; I have'never discovered those of my power 
of work." Working twelve or sixteen and, if 
necessary, twenty hours a day, rarely spending 



292 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

more than fifteen or twenty minutes at his meals, 
able to fall asleep at will, and to awaken with 
his mind instantly alert, he lost no time and drove 
his secretaries and subordinates at full speed. We 
gain some idea of the prodigious labor accom- 
plished by him when we consider that his pub- 
lished correspondence, comprising 23,000 pieces, 
fills thirty-two volumes and that 50,000 addi- 
tional letters dictated by him are known to be in 
existence but have not yet been printed. Here 
was no do-nothing king but the most industrious 
man in Europe. Happy, too, only in his work. 
The ordinary pleasures of men he found tedious, 
indulging in them only when his position ren- 
dered it necessary. He rarely smiled, he never 
laughed, his conversation was generally a mono- 
logue, but brilliant, animated, trenchant, rushing, 
frequently rude and impertinent. He had no 
scruples and he had no manners. He was ill- 
bred, as was shown in his relations with women, 
of whom he had a low opinion. His language, 
whether Italian or French, • lacked distinction, 
finish, correctness, but never lacked saliency or 
interest. The Graces had not presided over his 
birth, but the Fates had. He had a magnificent 
talent as stage manager and actor, setting the 
scenes, playing the parts consummately in all the 
varied ceremonies in which he was necessarily 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 293 

involved, coronation, reviews, diplomatic audi- 
ences, interviews with other monarchs. His proc- 
lamations, his bulletins to his army were master- 
pieces. He could cajole in the silkiest tones, 
could threaten in the iciest, could shed tears or 
burst into violence, smashing furniture and bric- 
a-brac when he felt that such actions would pro- 
duce the effect desired. The Pope, Pius VII, see- 
ing him once in such a display of passion, ob- 
served, " tragedian," " comedian." 

He had no friends, he despised all theorists 
like those who had sowed the fructifying seeds 
of the Revolution broadcast, he harried all oppo- 
nents out of the country or into silence, he made 
his ministers mere hard-worked servants, but he 
won the admiration and devotion of his soldiers 
by the glamour of his victories, he held the peas- 
antry in the hollow of his hand by constantly 
guaranteeing them their lands and their civil 
equality, the things which were, in their opinion, 
the only things in the Revolution that counted. 
He was as little as he was big. He would lie 
shamelessly, would cheat at cards, was supersti- 
tious in strange ways. He is a man of whom 
more evil and more good can be said and has 
been said than of many historical figures. He 
cannot be easily described, and certainly not in 
any brief compass. 



294 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

Now that Napoleon was emperor he proceeded 
to organize the state imperially. Offices with 
high-sounding, ancient titles were created and 
filled. There was a Grand Chamberlain, a Grand 
Marshal of the Palace, a Grand Master of Cere- 
monies, and so on. A court was created, ex- 
pensive, and as gay as it could be made to be 
at a soldier's orders. The Emperor's family, de- 
clared Princes of France, donned new titles and 
prepared for whatever honors and emoluments 
might flow from the bubbling fountain-head. The 
court resumed the manners and customs which 
had been in vogue before the Revolution. Re- 
publican simplicity gave way to imperial preten- 
sions, attitudes, extravagances, pose. The con- 
stitution was revised to meet the situation, and 
Napoleon was crowned in a memorable and 
sumptuous ceremony in Notre Dame, the Pope 
coming all the way from Rome to assist — but not 
to crown. At the critical point in the splendid 
ceremony Napoleon crowned himself and then 
crowned the Empress. But the Pope poured 
the holy oil upon Napoleon's head. This former 
lieutenant of artillery thus became the "an- 
ointed of the Lord," in good though irregular 
standing. He crowned himself a little later King 
of Italy, after he had changed the Cisalpine Re- 
public into the Kingdom of Italy (1805). 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 295 

The history of the Empire is the history of ten 
years of uninterrupted war. Europe saw a uni- 
versal menace to the independence and liberty 
of all states in the growing and arrogant ascend- 
ency of France, an ascendency and a threat all 
the more obvious and dangerous now that that 
country was absolutely in the hands of an auto- 
crat, and that too an autocrat who had grown 
great by war and whose military tastes 
and talents would now have free rein. 
Napoleon was evoking on every occasion, inten- 
tionally and ostentatiously, the imperial sou- 
venirs of Julius Caesar and of Charlemagne. 
What could this mean except that he planned to 
rule not only France, but Europe, consequently 
the world? Unless the other nations were will- 
ing to accept subordinate positions, were will- 
ing to abdicate their rank as equals in the 
family of nations, they must fight the dictator- 
ship which was manifestly impending. Funda- 
mentally this is what the ten years' war meant, 
the right of other states to live and prosper, 
not on mere sufferance of Napoleon, but by 
their own right and because universal domi- 
nation or the undue ascendency of any sin- 
gle state would necessarily be dangerous to 
the other states and to whatever elements of 
civilization they represented. France already 



296 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

had that ascendency in 1804. Under Napoleon 
she made a tremendous effort to convert it 
into absolute and universal domination. She 
almost succeeded. That she failed was due 
primarily to the steadfast, unshakable opposi- 
tion of one power, England, which never ac- 
quiesced in her pretensions, which fought them 
at every stage with all her might, through good 
report and through evil report, stirring up oppo- 
sition wherever she could, weaving coalition 
after coalition, using her money and her navy 
untiringly in the effort. It was a war of the 
giants. A striking aspect of the matter was the 
struggle between sea-power, directed by Eng- 
land, and land-power, directed by Napoleon. 

While the Empire was being organized in 1804 
a new coalition was being formed against France, 
the third in the series we are studying. England 
and France had made peace at Amiens in 1802. 
That peace lasted only a year, until May 17, 1803. 
Then the two states flew to arms again. The 
reasons were various. England was jealous of 
the French expansion which had been secured 
by the treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, 
French control of the left bank of the Rhine, 
French domination over considerable parts of 
the Italian peninsula, particularly French con- 
quest of Belgium, including the fine port of Ant- 






THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 297 

werp. England had always been opposed to 
French expansion, particularly northward along 
the Channel, which Englishmen considered and 
called the English Channel. The English did 
not wish any rival along those shores. However, 
despite this, they had finally consented to make 
the Peace of Amiens. The chief motive was the 
condition of their industries. The long war, 
since 1793, had damaged their trade enormously. 
They hoped, by making peace with France, to 
find the markets of the Continent open to them 
once more, and thus to revive their trade. But 
they shortly saw that this was not at all the 
idea of France. Napoleon wished to develop the 
industries of France, wished to have French in- 
dustries not only supply the French market but 
win the markets of the other countries on the Con- 
tinent. He therefore established high protective 
tariffs with this end in view. Thus English com- 
petition was excluded or at least greatly reduced. 
The English were extremely angry and did not 
at all propose to lie down supinely, beaten without 
a struggle. That had never been their custom. 
War would be less burdensome, said their busi- 
ness men. For England commerce was her very 
breath of life. Without it she could not exist. 
This explains why, now that she entered upon a 
struggle in its defense, she did not lay down her 



298 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

arms again until she had her rival safely impris- 
oned in the island of St. Helena. 

There were other causes of friction between 
the two countries which rendered peace most 
unstable. With both nations ready for war, 
though not eager for it, causes for rupture were 
not hard to find. War broke out between them 
in May, 1803. Napoleon immediately seized Han- 
over, a possession in Germany of the English 
king. He declared the long coast of Europe from 
Hanover southward and eastward to Taranto in 
Italy blockaded, that is, closed to English com- 
merce, and he began to prepare for an invasion 
of England itself. This was a difficult task, re- 
quiring much time, for France was inferior to 
England on the seas, and yet, unless she could 
control the Channel for a while at least, she could 
not send an army of invasion. Napoleon estab- 
lished a vast camp of 150,000 men at Boulogne 
to be ready for the descent. He hastened the 
construction of hundreds of flat-boats for trans- 
port. Whether all this was mere make-believe 
intended to alarm England, whether he knew 
that after all it was a hopeless undertaking, and 
was simply displaying all this activity to compel 
England to think that peace would be wiser than 
running the risk of invasion, we do not positively 
know. 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 299 

At any rate England was not intimidated. She 
prepared for defense, and she also prepared for 
offense by seeking and finding allies on the Conti- 
nent, by building up a coalition which might hold 
Napoleon in check, which might, it was hoped, 
even drive France back within her original 
boundaries, taking away from her the recent ac- 
quisitions of Belgium, the left bank of the Rhine, 
and the Italian annexations and protectorates. 
England made a treaty to this effect with Russia, 
which had her own reasons for opposing France 
— her dread of his projects in the eastern Medi- 
terranean at the expense of the Turkish Empire. 
For if any one was to carve up the Turkish Em- 
pire Russia wished to do it herself. The English 
agreed to pay subsidies to the Czar, a certain 
amount for every 100,000 men she should fur- 
nish for the war. 

Finally in 1805 Austria entered the coalition, 
jealous of Napoleon's aggressions in Italy, 
anxious to wipe out the memory of the defeats 
of the two campaigns in which he had conquered 
her in 1796 and 1800, eager, also, to recover the 
position she had once held as the dominant power 
in the Italian peninsula. 

Such was the situation in 1805. When he was 
quite ready Napoleon struck with tremendous 
effect, not against England, which he could not 



300 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

reach because of the silver streak of sea that lay 
between them, not against Russia, which was too 
remote for immediate attention, but against his 
old-time enemy, Austria, and he bowled her over 
more summarily and more humiliatingly than he 
had ever done before. 

The campaign of 1805 was another Napoleonic 
masterpiece. The Austrians, not waiting for 
their allies, the Russians, to come up, had sent 
an army of 80,000 men under General Mack up 
the Danube into Bavaria. Mack had taken his 
position at Ulm, expecting that Napoleon would 
come through the passes of the Black Forest, 
the most direct and the usual way for a French 
army invading southern Germany. But not at 
all. Napoleon had a very different plan. Send- 
ing enough troops into the Black Forest region 
to confirm Mack in his opinion that this was the 
strategic point to hold, and thus keeping him 
rooted there, Napoleon transferred his Grand 
Army from Boulogne and the shores of the Eng- 
lish Channel, where it had been training for the 
past two years, across Germany from north to 
south, a distance of 500 miles, in twenty-three 
days of forced marches, conducted in astonish- 
ing secrecy and with mathematical precision. He 
thus threw himself into the rear of Mack's army, 
between it and Vienna, cutting the line of com- 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 301 

munication, and repeating the strategy of the 
Great Saint Bernard and Marengo campaign of 
1800. Mack had expected Napoleon to come 
from the west through the Black Forest. In- 
stead, when it was too late, he found him coming 
from the east, up the Danube, toward Ulm. Na- 
poleon made short work of Mack, forcing him to 
capitulate at Ulm, October 20th. "I have accom- 
plished what I set out to do," Napoleon wrote 
Josephine. " I have destroyed the Austrian army 
by means of marches alone." It was a victory 
won by legs — 60,000 prisoners, 120 guns, more 
than thirty generals. It had cost him only 1,500 
men. 

The way was now open down the Danube to 
Vienna. Thither, along poor roads and through 
rain and snow, Napoleon rushed, covering the 
distance in three weeks. Vienna was entered in 
triumph and without resistance, as the Emperor 
Francis had retired in a northeasterly direction, 
desiring to effect a junction with the oncoming 
Russian army. Napoleon followed him and 
on December 2, 1805, won perhaps his most 
famous victory, the battle of Austerlitz, on the 
first anniversary of his coronation as Emperor. 
All day long the battle raged. The sun breaking 
through the wintry fogs was considered a favor- 
able omen by the French and henceforth became 



302 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

the legendary symbol of success. The fighting 
was terrific. The bravery of the soldiers on both 
sides was boundless, but the generalship of Na- 
poleon was as superior as that of the Austro- 
Russians was faulty. The result was decisive, 
overwhelming. The allies were routed and sent 
flying in every direction. They had lost a large 
number of men and nearly all of their artillery. 
Napoleon, with originally inferior numbers, had 
not used all he had, had not thrown in his re- 
serves. No wonder he addressed his troops in 
an exultant strain. " Soldiers, I am satisfied with 
you. In the battle of Austerlitz you have justi- 
fied all my expectations by your intrepidity; you 
have adorned your eagles with immortal glory." 
No wonder that he told them that they were 
marked men, that on returning to France all they 
would need to say in order to command admira- 
tion would be: "I was at the battle of Auster- 
litz." 

The results of this brief and brilliant campaign 
were various and striking. The Russians did not 
make peace, but withdrew in great disorder as 
best they could to their own country. But 
Austria immediately signed a peace and a very 
costly one, too. By the Treaty of Pressburg, 
dictated by Napoleon, who now had beaten her 
disastrously for the third time, she suffered her 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 303 

greatest humiliation, her severest losses. She 
ceded Venetia, a country she had held for 
eight years, since Campo Formio, to the King- 
dom of Italy, whose king was Napoleon. Is- 
tria and Dalmatia also she ceded to Napoleon. 
Of all this coast-line of the upper Adriatic 
she retained only the single port of Trieste. 
Not Austria but France was henceforth the 
chief Adriatic power. The German principalities, 
Bavaria and Baden, had sided with Napoleon in 
the late campaign and Austria was now compelled 
to cede to each of them some of her valuable pos- 
sessions in south Germany. Shut out of the 
Adriatic, shut out of Italy, Austria lost 3,000,000 
subjects. She became nearly a land-locked coun- 
try. Moreover she was compelled to acquiesce 
in other changes that Napoleon had made or was 
about to make in various countries. 

Napoleon began now to play with zest the con- 
genial role of Charlemagne about which he was 
prone to talk enthusiastically and with rhetorical 
extravagance. Having magically made himself 
Emperor, he now made others kings. As he 
abased mountains, so he exalted valleys. In the 
early months of 1806 he created four kings. He 
raised Bavaria and Wurtemberg, hitherto only 
duchies, to the rank of kingdoms, which they have 
since held, " in grateful recompense for the at- 



304 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

tachment they have shown the Emperor," he 
said. During the campaign the King of Naples 
had at a critical moment sided with his enemies. 
Napoleon therefore issued a simple decree, 
merely stating that the House of Bourbon had 
ceased to rule in Naples. He gave the vacant 
throne to his brother Joseph, two years older 
than himself. Joseph, who had first studied to 
become a priest, then to become an army officer, 
and still later to become a lawyer, now found 
himself a king, not by the grace of God, but by 
the grace of a younger brother. 

The horn of plenty was not yet empty. Na- 
poleon, after Austerlitz, forced the Batavian Re- 
public, that is Holland, to become a monarchy 
and to accept his brother Louis, thirty-two years 
of age, as its king. Louis, as mild as his brother 
was hard, thought that the way to rule was to 
consult the interests and win the affections of 
his subjects. As this was not Napoleon's idea, 
Louis was destined to a rough and unhappy, 
and also brief, experience as king. "When men 
say of a king that he is a good man, it means that 
he is a failure," was the information that Napo- 
leon sent Louis for his instruction. 

The number of kingdoms at Napoleon's dis- 
posal was limited, temporarily at least. But he 
had many other favors to bestow, which were not 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 305 

to be despised. Nor were they despised. His 
sister Elise was made Princess of Lucca and Car- 
rara, his sister Pauline, a beautiful and luxurious 
young creature, married Prince Borghese and 
became Duchess of Guastalla, and his youngest 
sister, Caroline, who resembled him in strength 
of character, married Murat, the dashing cavalry 
officer, who now became Duke of Berg, an arti- 
ficial state which Napoleon created along the 
lower Rhine. 

Two brothers, Lucien and Jerome, were not 
provided for, and thereby hangs a tale. Each 
had incurred Napoleon's displeasure, as each had 
married for love and without asking his consent. 
He had other plans for them and was enraged at 
their independence. Both were expelled from 
the charmed circle, until they should put away 
their wives and marry others according to Na- 
poleon's taste, not theirs. This Lucien stead- 
fastly refused to do, and so he, who by his pres- 
ence of mind on the 19th Brumaire had saved 
the day and rendered all this story possible, stood 
outside the imperial favor, counting no more 
in the history of the times. When Jerome, the 
youngest member of this astonishing family, and 
made of more pliable stuff, awoke from love's 
young dream, and at the furious demands of 
Napoleon, put away his beautiful American 



306 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

bride, the Baltimore belle, Elizabeth Patterson, 
then he too became a king. All who worshiped 
Mammon in those exciting days received their 
appropriate reward. 

It would be pleasant and very easy to continue 
this catalogue of favors, scattered right and left 
by the man who had rapidly grown so great. 
Officials of the state, generals of the army, and 
more distant relatives received glittering prizes 
and went on their way rejoicing, anxious for 
more. Appetite is said to grow by that on which 
it feeds. 

More important far than this flowering of family 
fortunes was another result of the Austerlitz 
campaign, the transformation of Germany, ef- 
fected by the French with the eager and selfish 
cooperation of many German princes. That 
transformation, which greatly reduced the dis- 
tracting number of German states, by allowing 
some to absorb others, had already been going 
on for several years. When France acquired 
the German territory west of the river Rhine, it 
was agreed, in the treaties of Campo Formio 
and Luneville, that the princes thus dispossessed 
should receive compensations east of the river 
Rhine. This obviously could not be done liter- 
ally and for all, as every inch of territory east of 
the Rhine already had its ruler. As a matter of 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 307 

fact the change was worked out by compensat- 
ing only the hereditary rulers. There were, both 
on the left bank and on the right and all through- 
out Germany, many petty states whose rulers 
were not hereditary — ecclesiastical states, and 
free imperial cities. Now these were tossed to 
the princes who ruled by hereditary right, as 
compensation for the territories they had lost 
west of the river Rhine. This wholesale destruc- 
tion of petty German states for the advantage of 
other lucky German states was accomplished not 
by the Germans themselves, which would have 
been shameless enough, but was accomplished in 
Paris. In the antechambers of the First Consul, 
particularly in the parlors of Talleyrand, the dis- 
graceful begging for pelf went on. Talleyrand 
grew rapidly rich, so many were the "gifts" — 
one dreads to think what they would be called in 
a vulgar democracy — which German princes gave 
him for his support in despoiling their fellow Ger- 
mans. For months the disgusting traffic went 
on, and when it ended in the " Conclusion " of 
March, 1803, really dictated by Bonaparte, the 
number of German principalities had greatly de- 
creased. All the ecclesiastical states of Germany, 
with one single exception, had disappeared and 
of the fifty free cities only six remained. All 
went to enlarge other states. At least the map 



308 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

of Germany was simpler, but the position of the 
Church and of the Empire was greatly altered. 
Of the 360 states which composed the Holy 
Roman or German Empire in 1792 only eighty- 
two remained in 1805. 

All this had occurred before Austerlitz. After 
Austerlitz the pace was increased, ending in the 
complete destruction of the Empire. Paris again 
became the center of German politics and in- 
trigues, as in 1803. The result was that in 1806 
the new kings of Bavaria and Wiirtemberg and 
fourteen other German princes renounced their 
allegiance to the German Emperor, formed a new 
Confederation of the Rhine (July 12, 1806), rec- 
ognized Napoleon as their "Protector," made an 
offensive and defensive alliance with him which 
gave to him the control of their foreign policy, 
the settlement of questions of peace and war, and 
guaranteed him 63,000 German troops for his 
wars. Fresh annexations to these states were 
made. Thus perished many more petty German 
states, eagerly absorbed by the fortunate sixteen. 

Perished also the Holy Roman Empire which 
had been in existence, real or shadowy, for a 
thousand years. The secession of the sixteen 
princes and the formation of the Confederation 
of the Rhine killed it. It was only formal inter- 
ment, therefore, when Napoleon demanded of the 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 309 

Emperor Francis, whom he had defeated at 
Austerlitz, that he renounce his title as Holy 
Roman Emperor. This Francis hastened to do 
(August 6, 1806), contenting himself henceforth 
with the new title he had given himself two years 
earlier, when Napoleon had assumed the imperial 
title. Henceforth he who had been Francis II 
of the Holy Roman Empire was called Francis 
I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria. 

Napoleon, who could neither read nor speak a 
word of German, was now the real ruler of a large 
part of Germany, the strongest factor in German 
politics. To French domination of West Ger- 
many, annexed to France earlier, came an im- 
portant increase of influence. It was now that 
French ideas began in a modified form to remold 
the civil life of South Germany. Tithes were 
abolished, the inequality of social classes in the 
eyes of the law was reduced though not de- 
stroyed, religious liberty was established, the 
position of the Jews was improved. The Ger- 
mans lost in self-respect from this French domi- 
nation, the patriotism of such as were patriotic 
was sorely wounded at the sight of this alien 
rule, but in the practical contrivances of a mod- 
ernized social life, worked out by the French 
Revolution, and now in a measure introduced 
among them, they had a salutary compensation. 



310 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

While all this shifting of scenes was being ef- 
fected Napoleon had kept a large army in South 
Germany. The relations with Prussia, which 
country had been neutral for the past ten years, 
since the Treaty of Basel of 1795, were becoming 
strained and grew rapidly more so. The policy 
of the Prussian King, Frederick William III, was 
weak, vacillating, covetous. His diplomacy was 
playing fast and loose with his obligations as a 
neutral and with his desires for the territorial 
aggrandizement of Prussia. Napoleon's atti- 
tude was insolent and contemptuous. Both sides 
made an unenviable but characteristic record in 
double-dealing. The sordid details, highly dis- 
creditable to both, cannot be narrated here. 
Finally the war party in Berlin got the upper 
hand, led by the high-spirited and beautiful 
Queen Louise and by the military chiefs, relics 
of the glorious era of Frederick the Great, who 
thought they could do what Frederick had done, 
that is, defeat the French with ease. As if to give 
the world some intimation of the terrible signifi- 
cance of their displeasure they went to the 
French Embassy in Berlin and bravely whetted 
their swords upon its steps of stone. The royal- 
ist officers at Versailles in the early days of the 
Revolution had shown no more inane folly in 
playing with fire than did the Prussian military 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 311 

caste at this time. The one had learned its les- 
son. The other was now to go to the same piti- 
less school of experience. 

Hating France and having an insensate confi- 
dence in their own superiority, the Prussian war 
party forced the government to issue an ulti- 
matum to Napoleon, Emperor of the French, 
demanding that he withdraw his French troops 
beyond the Rhine. Napoleon knew better how 
to give ultimatums than how to receive them. 
He had watched the machinations of the Prussian 
ruling class with close attention. He was abso- 
lutely prepared when the rupture came. He now 
fell upon them like a cloudburst and administered 
a crushing blow in the two battles of Jena and 
Auerstadt, fought on the same day at those two 
places, a few miles apart (October 14, 1806), he 
himself in command of the former, Davout of the 
latter. The Prussians fought bravely, but their 
generalship was bad. Their whole army was dis- 
organized, became panic-stricken, streamed from 
the field of battle as best it could, no longer re- 
ceiving or obeying orders, many throwing away 
their arms, fleeing in every direction. Thousands 
of prisoners were taken and in succeeding days 
French officers scoured the country after the 
fugitives, taking thousands more. The collapse 
was complete. There was no longer any Prus- 



312 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

sian army. One after another all the fortresses 
fell. 

On the 25th of October' Napoleon entered Ber- 
lin in triumph. He had previously visited the 
tomb of Frederick the Great at Potsdam in order 
to show his admiration for his genius. He had 
the execrable taste, however, to take the dead 
Frederick's sword and sash and send them to 
Paris as trophies. "The entire kingdom of Prus- 
sia is in my hands," he announced. He planned 
that the punishment should be proportionate to 
his rage. He drew up a decree deposing the 
House of Hohenzollern but did not issue it, wait- 
ing for a more spectacular moment. He laid 
enormous war contributions upon the unhappy 
victim. 

Napoleon postponed the announcement of the 
final doom until he should have finished with 
another enemy, Russia. Before leaving Berlin 
for the new campaign he issued the famous de- 
crees which declared the British Isles in a state 
of blockade and prohibited commerce with them 
on the part of his dominions and those of his 
allies. 

In the campaign of 1806 the Russians had been 
allied with the Prussians although they had taken 
no part, as the latter had not waited for them to 
come up. Napoleon now turned his attention to 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 313 

them. Going to Warsaw, the leading city of that 
part of Poland which Prussia had acquired in 
the partition of that country, he planned the new 
campaign, which was signalized by two chief 
battles, Eylau and Friedland. The former was 
one of the most bloody of his entire career. 
Fighting in the midst of a blinding snowstorm 
on February 8, 1807, Napoleon narrowly escaped 
defeat. The slaughter was frightful — "sheer 
butchery," said Napoleon later. "What car- 
nage," said Ney, " and no results," thus ac- 
curately describing this encounter. Napoleon 
managed to keep the field and in his usual way 
he represented the battle as a victory. But it 
was a drawn battle. For the first time in Europe 
he had failed to win. The Russian soldiers fought 
with reckless bravery — " it was necessary to kill 
them twice," was the way the French soldiers 
expressed it. 

Four months later, however, on June 14, 1807, 
on the anniversary of Marengo, Napoleon's star 
shone again unclouded. He won a victory at 
Friedland which, as he informed Josephine, "is 
the worthy sister of Marengo, Austerlitz, and 
Jena." The victory was at any rate so decisive 
that the Czar, Alexander I, consented to make 
overtures for peace. The Peace of Tilsit was 
concluded by the two Emperors in person after 



3H NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

many interviews, the first one of which was held 
on a raft in the middle of the river Niemen. Not 
only did they make peace, but they went further 
and made a treaty of alliance, offensive and 
defensive. Napoleon gained a great diplomatic 
victory, which completely altered the previous 
diplomatic system of Europe, a fitting climax 
to three years of remarkable achievement upon 
the field of battle. Exercising upon Alexander 
all his powers of fascination, of flattery, of imagi- 
nation, of quick and sympathetic understanding, 
he completely won him over. The two Emper- 
ors conversed in the most dulcet, rapturous way. 
" Why did not we two meet earlier? " exclaimed 
the enthusiastic Czar of All the Russias. With 
their two imperial heads bowed over a map 
of Europe they proceeded to divide it. Alex- 
ander was given to understand that he might 
take Finland, which he coveted, from Sweden, 
and attractive pickings from the vast Turk- 
ish Empire were dangled somewhat vaguely 
before him. On the other hand he recog- 
nized the changes Napoleon had made or was 
about to make in Western Europe, in Italy, and 
in Germany. Alexander was to offer himself as 
a mediator between those bitter enemies, Eng- 
land and France, and, in case England declined 
to make peace, then Russia would join France in 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 315 

enforcing the continental blockade, which was 
designed to bring England to terms. 

Napoleon out of regard for his new friend and 
ally promised to allow Prussia still to exist. The 
decree dethroning the House of Hohenzollern 
was never issued. But Napoleon's terms to Prus- 
sia were very severe. She must give up all her 
territory west of the river Elbe. Out of this and 
other German territories Napoleon now made the 
Kingdom of Westphalia which he gave to his 
brother Jerome, who had by this time divorced 
his American wife. Prussia's eastern possessions 
were also diminished. Most of what she had ac- 
quired in the partitions of Poland was taken from 
her and created into the Grand Duchy of War- 
saw, to be ruled over by the sovereign of Saxony, 
whose title of Elector Napoleon at this juncture 
now changed into that of King. These three 
states, Westphalia, Saxony, and the Duchy of 
Warsaw, now entered the Confederation of the 
Rhine, whose name thus became a misnomer, as 
the Confederation included not only the Rhen- 
ish and South German states but stretched from 
France to the Vistula, including practically all 
Germany except Prussia, now reduced to half 
her former size, and except Austria. 

Naturally Napoleon was in high feather as 
he turned homeward. Naturally, also, he was 



316 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

pleased with the Czar. " He is a handsome 
good young emperor, with more mind than he 
is generally credited with " — such was Napo- 
leon's encomium. Next to being sole master 
of all Europe came the sharing of mastery 
with only one other. A few months later 
he wrote his new ally that " the work of Tilsit 
will regulate the destinies of the world." 
There only remained the English, " the active 
islanders," not yet charmed or conquered. In 
the same letter to the Czar Napoleon refers to 
them as " the enemies of the world " and told 
how they could be easily brought to book. He 
had forgotten, or rather he had wished to have 
the world forget, that there was one monstrous 
flaw in the apparent perfection of his prodigious 
success. Two years before, on the very day after 
the capitulation of Ulm, Admiral Nelson had 
completely destroyed the French fleet in the 
battle of Trafalgar (October 21, 1805), giving 
his life that England might live and inspir- 
ing his own age and succeeding ages by the 
cry, " England expects every man to do his 
duty!" 

The French papers did not mention the battle 
of Trafalgar, but it nevertheless bulks large in 
history. This was Napoleon's second taste of 
sea-power, his first having been, as we have 



THE EARLY YEARS OF THE EMPIRE 317 

seen, in Egypt, several years before, also at the 
hands of Nelson. 

Napoleon returned to Paris in the pride of 
power and of supreme achievement. But, it is 
said, pride cometh before a fall. Was the race 
mistaken when it coined this cooling phrase of 
proverbial wisdom? It remained to be seen. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 

AFTER Tilsit there remained England, always 
England, as the enemy of France. In 1805 Na- 
poleon had defeated Austria, in 1806 Prussia, in 
1807 Russia. Then the last-named power had 
shifted its policy completely, had changed part- 
ners, and, discarding its former allies, had be- 
come the ally of its former enemy. 

Napoleon was now in a position to turn his 
attention to England. As she was mistress of 
the seas, as she had at the battle of Trafalgar in 
1805 destroyed the French navy, the Emperor 
was compelled to find other means, if there were 
any, of humbling the elusive enemy. Eng- 
land must be beaten, but how? Napoleon now 
adopted a policy which the Convention and the 
Directory had originated. Only he gave to it a 
gigantic application and development. This was 
the Continental System, or the Continental 
Blockade. If England could not be conquered 
directly by French fleets and armies, she might 
be conquered indirectly. 

England's power lay in her wealth, and her 
318 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 319 

wealth came from her factories and her com- 
merce which carried their products to the mar- 
kets of the world, which brought her the necessary 
raw materials, and which kept open the fruitful 
connection with her scattered colonies. Cut this 
artery, prevent this commerce, close these mar- 
kets, and her prosperity would be destroyed. 
Manufacturers would be compelled to shut down 
their factories. Their employees, thrown out of 
work, would face starvation. With that doom 
impending, the working classes and the industrial 
and commercial classes, threatened with ruin, 
would resort to terrific pressure upon the Eng- 
lish government, to insurrections, if necessary, 
to compel it to sue for peace. Economic warfare 
was now to be tried on a colossal scale. By ex- 
hausting England's resources it was hoped and 
expected that England would be exhausted. 

By the Berlin Decrees (November 1806) Na- 
poleon declared a blockade of the British Isles, 
forbade all commerce with them, all correspond- 
ence, all trade in goods coming from England 
or her colonies, and ordered the confiscation and 
destruction of all English goods found in France 
or in any of the countries allied with her. No 
vessel coming from England or England's col- 
onies should be admitted to their ports. To this 
England replied by severe Orders in Council, 



320 , NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

which Napoleon capped by additional decrees, 
issued from Milan. 

This novel form of warfare had very im- 
portant consequences. This struggle with Eng- 
land dominates the whole period from 1807 
to 1814. It is the central thread that runs 
through all the tangled and tumultuous history 
of those years. There were plays within the play, 
complications and struggles with other nations 
which sometimes rose to such heights as mo- 
mentarily to obscure the titanic contest between 
sea-power and land-power. But the fundamental, 
all-inclusive contest, to which all else was sub- 
sidiary or collateral, was the war to the knife 
between these two, England and France. Every- 
where we see its influence, whether in Spain or 
Russia, in Rome or Copenhagen, along the Dan- 
ube or along the Tagus. 

The Continental System had this peculiarity, 
that, to be successful in annihilating English 
prosperity and power, it must be applied every- 
where and constantly. The Continent must be 
sealed hermetically against English goods. Only 
then, with their necessary markets closed to them 
everywhere, would the English be forced to yield. 
Let there be a leak anywhere, let there be a strip 
of coast, as in Portugal or Spain or Italy, where 
English ships could touch and land their goods, 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 321 

and through that leak England could and would 
penetrate, could and would distribute her wares 
to eager customers, thus escaping the industrial 
strangulation intended by the Emperor of the 
French. This necessity Napoleon saw clearly. 
It was never absent from his mind. It inspired 
his conduct at very step. It involved him in- 
evitably and, in the end, disastrously, in a policy 
of systematic and widespread aggressions upon 
other countries, consequently in a costly succes- 
sion of wars. 

To close simply the ports of France and of 
French possessions to English commerce would 
not at all accomplish the object aimed at. Na- 
poleon must have the support of every other sea- 
board country in Europe. This he sought to get. 
He was willing to get it peacefully if he could, 
prepared to get it by violence, if he must. He 
secured the adhesion of Russia by the Treaty of 
Tilsit. Austria and Prussia, having been so de- 
cisively beaten, had to consent to apply the sys- 
tem to their dominions. Little Denmark, 
perforce, did the same when the demand came. 
Sweden, on the other hand, adhered to the 
English alliance. Consequently Russia was 
urged to take Finland, which belonged to 
Sweden, with its stretch of coast-line and its 
excellent harbors. Napoleon's brother Louis, 



322 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

King of Holland, would not enforce the block- 
ade, as to do so meant the ruin of Holland. 
Consequently he was in the end forced to 
abdicate and Holland was annexed to France 
(1810). France also annexed the northern 
coasts of Germany up to Lubeck, including 
the fine ports of Bremen and Hamburg and the 
mouths of those rivers which led up into central 
Germany (1810). In Italy the Pope wished to 
remain neutral, but there must be no neutrals, in 
Napoleon's and also in England's opinion, if it 
could be prevented. In this case it could. Con- 
sequently Napoleon annexed part of the Papal 
States to the so-called Kingdom of Italy, of which 
he was himself the King, and part he incorporated 
directly and without ado into the French Empire 
(1809). Immediately the Pope excommunicated 
him and preached a holy war against the impi- 
ous conqueror. Napoleon in turn took the Pope 
prisoner and kept him such for several years. 
This was injecting the religious element again 
into politics, as in the early days of the Revolu- 
tion, to the profound embitterment of the times. 
Some of these events did not occur immediately 
after Tilsit, but did occur in the years from 1809 
to 1811. 

What did occur immediately after Tilsit was a 
famous and fatal misadventure in Portugal and 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 323 

Spain. Portugal stood in close economic and po- 
litical relations with England and was reluctant 
to enforce the restrictions of the Continental 
Blockade. Her coast-line was too important to 
be allowed as an open gap. Therefore Napoleon 
arranged with Spain for the conquest and parti- 
tion of that country. French and Spanish armies 
invaded Portugal, aiming at Lisbon. Before they 
arrived Napoleon had announced in his impres- 
sive and laconic fashion that "the fall of the 
House of Braganza furnishes one more proof 
that ruin is inevitable to whomsoever attaches 
himself to the English." The royal family es- 
caped capture by sailing for the colony of Brazil 
and seeking safety beyond the ocean. There 
they remained until the overthrow of Napoleon. 
This joint expedition had given Napoleon the 
opportunity to introduce large bodies of troops 
into the country of his ally, Spain. They now re- 
mained there, under Murat, no one knew for what 
purpose. No one, except Napoleon, in whose 
mind a dark and devious plan was maturing. The 
French had dethroned the House of Bourbon 
in France during the Revolution. Napoleon had 
himself after Austerlitz dethroned the House of 
Bourbon in Naples and had put his brother 
Joseph in its place. There remained a branch 
of that House in Spain, and that branch was 



324 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

in a particularly corrupt and decadent state. 
The King, Charles IV, was utterly incom- 
petent; the Queen grossly immoral and en- 
dowed with the tongue of a fishwife; her 
favorite and paramour, Godoy, was the real 
power behind the throne. The whole unsavory 
group was immensely unpopular in Spain. On 
the other hand, the King's son, Ferdinand, was 
idolized by the Spanish people, not because 
of anything admirable in his personality, which 
was utterly despicable, but because he was op- 
posed to his father, his mother, and Godoy. Na- 
poleon thought the situation favorable to his 
plan, which was to seize the throne thus occu- 
pied by a family rendered odious by its character 
and impotent by its dissensions. By a treacher- 
ous and hypocritical diplomacy he contrived to 
get Charles IV, the Queen, Godoy, and Ferdi- 
nand to come to Bayonne in southern France. 
No hungry spider ever viewed more coolly a 
more helpless prey entangled in his web. By a 
masterly use of the black arts of dissimulation, 
vituperation, and intimidation he swept the 
whole royal crew aside. Charles abdicated his 
throne into the hands of Napoleon, who there- 
upon forced Ferdinand to renounce his rights 
under a thinly veiled threat that, if he did not, the 
Duke d'Enghien would not be the only member 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 325 

of the House of Bourbon celebrated for an un- 
toward fate. Ferdinand and his brothers were 
sent as prisoners to a chateau at Valeneay. The 
vacant throne was then given by Napoleon to 
his brother Joseph, who thereupon abdicated the 
kingship of Naples, which now passed to Murat, 
Napoleon's brother-in-law. 

Napoleon later admitted that it was this 
Spanish business that destroyed him. "I em- 
barked very badly on the Spanish affair, I con- 
fess; the immorality of it was too patent, 
the injustice too cynical." But this was the 
judgment of retrospect. He entered upon the 
venture with a light heart, confident that at 
most he would encounter only a feeble opposi- 
tion. " Countries full of monks like yours," 
he told Ferdinand, "are easy to subdue. There 
may be some riots, but the Spaniards will quiet 
down when they see that I offer them the integ- 
rity of the boundaries of their kingdom, a liberal 
constitution, and the preservation of their re- 
ligion and their national customs." Contrary 
to his expectation the conduct of the Spaniards 
was quite the reverse of this. He might offer 
them, as he did, better government than they 
had ever had. They hated him as a thief and 
trickster, also as a heretic, as a man whose char- 
acter and policies and ideas were anathema. 



326 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

Napoleon embarked on a five years' war with 
them, which baffled him at every stage, drained 
his resources, in a contest that was inglorious, 
resources which should have been husbanded 
most carefully for more important purposes. 
" If it should cost me 80,000 men " to conquer 
Spain, " I would not attempt it," he said at the 
beginning, " but it will not take more than 
12,000." A ghastly miscalculation, for it was to 
take 300,000 and to end in failure. 

He encountered in Spain an opposition very 
different in kind and quality from any he had met 
hitherto in Italy or Germany, baffling, elusive, 
wearing. Previously he had waged war with 
governments only and their armies, not with 
peoples rising as one man, resolved to die rather 
than suffer the loss of their independence. The 
people of Italy, the people of Austria, the people 
of Germany, had not risen. Their governments 
had not appealed to them, but had relied upon 
their usual weapon, professional armies. De- 
feating these, as Napoleon had done with com- 
parative ease, the governments had then sued 
for peace and endured his terms. No great wave 
of national feeling, daring all, risking all, had 
swept over the masses of those countries where 
he had hitherto appeared. France had herself 
undergone this very experience and her armies 






THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 327 

had won their great successes because they were 
aglow with the spirit of nationality, which had 
been so aroused and intensified by the Revolu- 
tion. Now other countries were to take a page 
out of her book, at the very time that she was 
showing a tendency to forget that page herself. 
The Spanish rising was the first of a series of 
popular, national, instinctive movements that 
were to end in Napoleon's undoing. 

The kind of warfare that the Spaniards car- 
ried on was peculiar, determined by the physical 
features of the land and by the circumstances in 
which they found themselves. Lacking the lead- 
ership of a government — their royal family being 
virtually imprisoned in France — poor and with- 
out large armies, they fought as guerrillas, little 
bands, not very formidable in themselves indi- 
vidually, but appearing now here, now there, now 
everywhere, picking off small detachments, 
stragglers, then disappearing into their moun- 
tain fastnesses. They thus repeated the history 
of their long struggles with the Moors. Every 
peasant had his gun and every peasant was in- 
spired by loyalty to his country, and by religious 
zeal, as the Vendeans had been. The Catholic 
clergy entered again upon the scene, fanning 
the popular animosity against this despoiler of 
the Pope, and against these French free-thinkers. 



328 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

Napoleon had aroused two mighty forces which 
were to dog his footsteps henceforth, that of 
religious zeal, and that of the spirit of national- 
ity, each with a fanaticism of its own. 

Even geography, which Napoleon had hitherto 
made minister to his successes, was now against 
him. The country was poor, the roads were ex- 
ecrable, the mountains ran in the wrong direc- 
tion, right across his path, the rivers also. In 
between these successive mountain ranges, in 
these passes and valleys, it was difficult for large 
armies, such as Napoleon's usually were, to oper- 
ate. It was easy for mishaps to occur, for guerrilla 
bands or small armies to cut off lines of com- 
munication, for them to appear in front and in the 
rear at the same time. The country was admi- 
rable for the defensive, difficult for the offensive. 
This was shown early in the war when General 
Dupont was caught in a trap and obliged to ca- 
pitulate with an army of 20,000 at Baylen (July 
1808). This capitulation produced a tremendous 
impression throughout Europe. It was the first 
time a French army corps had been compelled 
to ground arms in full campaign. It was the 
heaviest blow Napoleon had yet received in his 
career. It encouraged the Spaniards, and other 
peoples also, who were only waiting to see the 
conqueror trip and who were now fired with 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 329 

hope that the thing might be done again. Na- 
poleon was enraged, stormed against the unfor- 
tunate army, declared that from the beginning 
of the world nothing "so stupid, so silly, so cow- 
ardly" had been seen. They had had a chance 
to distinguish themselves, "they might have 
died," he said. Instead they had surrendered. 

Joseph, the new king, who had been in his 
capital only a week, left it hurriedly and with- 
drew toward the Pyrenees, writing his brother 
that Spain was like no other country, that they 
must have an army of 50,000 to do the fighting, 
another of 50,000 to keep open the line of com- 
munications, and 100,000 gallows for traitors and 
scoundrels. 

There was another feature of this war in the 
Peninsula, England's participation. An army 
was sent out under Sir Arthur Wellesley, later 
Duke of Wellington, to cooperate with the Por- 
tuguese and Spaniards. Wellesley, who had al- 
ready distinguished himself in India, now began 
to build up a European reputation as a careful, 
original, and resourceful commander. Landing 
at Lisbon, the expedition shortly forced the 
French commander Junot to capitulate at Cintra 
(August 1808), as Dupont had been forced to 
in the preceding month at Baylen. 

These were disasters which Napoleon could 



330 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

not allow to stand unanswered. His prestige, 
his reputation for invincibility must remain un- 
diminished or Europe generally would become 
restless, with what result no one could foretell. 
He resolved therefore to go to Spain himself and 
show the Spaniards and all other peoples how 
hopeless it was to oppose him, how minor and 
casual defeats of his subordinates meant nothing, 
how his own mighty blows could no more be 
parried than before. But, before going, he wished 
to make quite sure of the general European situ- 
ation. He arranged therefore for an interview 
at Erfurt in the center of Germany with his ally, 
Alexander of Russia. The two emperors spent 
a fortnight discussing their plans, examining 
every phase of the international situation (Sep- 
tember-October 1808). This Erfurt Interview 
was the most spectacular episode in Napo- 
leon's career as a diplomatist. He sought to 
dazzle Europe with his might, to impress the 
imaginations of men, and their fears, to show that 
the Franco-Russian alliance, concluded at Tilsit 
the year before, stood taut and firm and could 
not be shaken. All the kings and princes of Ger- 
many were summoned to give him, their " Pro- 
tector," an appropriate and glittering setting. 
Napoleon brought with him the best theatrical 
troop in Europe, the company of the Theatre 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 331 

Frangais, and they played, as the pretentious ex- 
pression was, to "a parterre of kings." On one 
occasion when Talma, the famous tragedian, re- 
cited the words, 

"The friendship of a great man 
Is a true gift of the gods," 

the Czar arose, seized Napoleon's hand, and gave 
the signal for applause. Day after day was filled 
with festivities, dinners, balls, hunts, reviews. 
The gods of German literature and learning, 
Goethe and Wieland, paid their respects. Mean- 
while the two allies carefully canvassed the situ- 
ation. In general the Czar was cordial, for he 
saw his profit in the alliance. But now and then 
a little rift in the lute appeared. One day, as 
they were discussing, Napoleon became angry, 
threw his hat on the floor and stamped upon it. 
Alexander merely observed, " You are angry, 
I am stubborn. With me anger gains nothing. 
Let's talk, let's reason together, or I shall 
leave." 

The result of the interview was in the main 
satisfactory enough to both. The accord be- 
tween the two seemed complete. The alliance was 
renewed, a new treaty was made, which was to 
be kept secret " for ten years at least," and now 
Napoleon felt free to direct his attention to 
the annoying Spanish problem, resolved to end 



332 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

it once for all. Assembling a splendid army 
of 200,000 men, he crossed the Pyrenees and 
in a brief campaign of a month he swept 
aside all obstacles with comparative ease, and 
entered Madrid (December 1808). There he 
remained a few weeks sketching the institutions 
of the new Spain which he intended to create. 
It would certainly have been a far more rational 
and enlightened and progressive state than it 
ever had been in the past. He declared the In- 
quisition, which still existed, abolished; also the 
remains of the feudal system; also the tariff 
boundaries which shut off province from prov- 
ince to the great detriment of commerce. He 
closed two-thirds of the monasteries, which were 
more than superabundant in this orthodox 
land. But, just as no individual cares to be re- 
formed under the compulsion of a master, so the 
Spaniards would have nothing to do with these 
modern improvements in the social art, imposed 
by a heretic and a tyrant, who had wantonly 
filched their throne and invaded their country. 
Napoleon might perhaps have established his 
control over Spain so firmly that the new institu- 
tions might have struck root, despite this oppo- 
sition. But time was necessary and time was 
something he could not command. In Madrid 
only a month, he was compelled to hurry back 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 333 

to France because of alarming news that reached 
him. He never returned to Spain. 

Austria had thrown down the gauntlet again. 
It was entirely natural for her to seek at the 
convenient opportunity to avenge the humilia- 
tions she had repeatedly endured at the hands 
of France, to recover the position she had lost. 
Moreover the close alliance of Russia and France 
and Napoleon's seizure of the Spanish crown 
rilled her with alarm. If Napoleon was capable 
of treating in this way a hitherto submissive ally, 
such as Spain had been, what might he not do 
to a chronic enemy and now a mere neutral 
like Austria, particularly as the latter had no- 
where to look for support since Russia had 
deserted the cause. Moreover Austria had 
learned something from her disastrous experi- 
ences; among other things that her previous 
military system was defective in that it made no 
appeal to the people, to national sentiment. Af- 
ter Austerlitz the army was reorganized and a 
great militia was created composed of all men 
between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. 
A promising invigoration of the national con- 
sciousness began. What occasion could be more 
convenient for paying off old scores and regain- 
ing lost ground than this, with Napoleon weak- 
ened by the necessity of holding down a spirited 



334 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

and outraged nation like the Spanish, resolved 
to go to any lengths, and by the necessity of 
checking or crushing the English in Portugal? 

Under the influence of such considerations the 
war party gained the ascendency, and Austria, 
under the lead of Archduke Charles, brother of 
the Emperor and a very able commander, began 
a war in the spring of 1809. This war, which Na- 
poleon did not seek, from which he had nothing 
to gain, was another Austrian mistake. Austria 
should have allowed more time for the full de- 
velopment of her new military system before 
running perilous risks again. 

The Austrians paid for their precipitancy. 
Napoleon astonished them again by the rapidity 
of his movements. In April, 1809, he fought 
them in Bavaria, five battles in five days, throw- 
ing them back. Then he advanced down the 
Danube, entered Vienna without difficulty and 
crossed the river to the northern bank, whither 
the army of the Archduke had withdrawn. 
There Napoleon fought a two days' battle at 
Essling (May 21-22). The fighting was furious, 
the village of Essling changing hands nine 
times. Napoleon was seriously checked. He 
was obliged to take refuge for six weeks on the 
Island of Lobau in the Danube, until additional 
troops were brought up from Italy, and from 



THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 335 

Germany. Then, when his army was sufficiently 
reinforced, he crossed to the northern bank again 
and fought the great battle of Wagram (July 
5-6). He was victorious, but in no superlative 
sense as at Austerlitz. The Archduke's army 
retired from the field in good order. The losses 
had been heavy, but no part of the army had been 
captured, none of the flags taken. This was the 
last victorious campaign fought by Napoleon. 
Even in it he had won his victory with unac- 
customed difficulty. His army was of inferior 
quality, many of his best troops being detained 
by the inglorious Spanish adventure and the new 
soldiers proving inferior to the old veterans. 
Moreover he was encountering an opposition 
that was stronger in numbers, because of the 
army reforms just alluded to, while opposing 
generals were learning lessons from a study of 
his methods and were turning them against him. 
Archduke Charles, for instance, revered Na- 
poleon's genius, but he now fought him tooth 
and nail and with ability. 

After Wagram, Austria again made peace with 
Napoleon, the Peace of Vienna or of Schon- 
brunn. Austria was obliged to relinquish exten- 
sive territories. Galicia, which was the part of 
Poland she had acquired in the famous parti- 
tions, now went — a part of it to the Grand Duchy 



336 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

of Warsaw, a part of it to Russia. She was also 
forced to cede to France Trieste, Carniola, and 
part of Carinthia and Croatia. These were made 
into the Illyrian Provinces, which were declared 
imperial territory, although not formally an- 
nexed to France. Austria lost 4,000,000 sub- 
jects, nearly a sixth of all that she possessed. 
She lost her only port and became entirely land- 
locked. 

Having defeated Austria for the fourth time, 
Napoleon treated Europe to one of those swift 
transformation scenes of which he was fond 
as showing his easy and incalculable mastery 
of the situation. He contracted a marriage 
alliance with the House of Hapsburg which he 
had so repeatedly humbled, one of the proudest 
royal houses in Europe. He had long considered 
the advisability of a divorce from Josephine, as 
she had given him no heir and as the stability of 
the system he had erected depended upon his 
having one. At his demand the Senate dissolved 
his marriage with Josephine, and the ecclesi- 
astical court in Paris was even more accomodat- 
ing, declaring that owing to some irregularity 
the marriage had never taken place at all. Free 
thus by action of the State and the Church he 
asked the Emperor of Austria for the hand of 
his daughter, the Archduchess Marie Louise, 






THE EMPIRE AT ITS HEIGHT 337 

and received it. This political marriage was con- 
sidered advantageous on both sides. It seemed 
likely to prevent any further trouble between 
the two countries, to serve as a protection to 
Austria, to raise Napoleon's prestige by his con- 
nection with one of the oldest and proudest 
reigning houses of Europe, and to insure the 
continuance of the regime he had established 
with such display of genius. Thus only seven- 
teen years after the execution of Marie Antoi- 
nette, another Austrian princess sat upon the 
throne of France. The marriage occurred in 
1810 and in the following year was born the son 
for whom the title "King of Rome" stood ready. 



CHAPTER X 

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF 
NAPOLEON 

NAPOLEON was now at the zenith of his power. 
He ruled directly over an empire that was far 
larger than the former Kingdom of France. In 
1809 he annexed what remained of the Papal 
States in Italy, together with the incomparable 
city of Rome, thus ending, for the time at least, 
the temporal power of the Pope. In 1810 he 
forced his brother Louis to abdicate the king- 
ship of Holland, which country, was now incor- 
porated in France. He also, as has been al- 
ready stated, extended the empire along the 
northern coasts of Germany from Holland to 
Lubeck, thus controlling Hamburg, Bremen, 
and the mouths of the important German rivers. 
Each one of these annexations was in pursuance 
of his policy of the continental blockade, closing 
so much more of the coast-line of Europe to the 
commerce of England, the remaining enemy 
which he now expected to humble. He was Em- 
peror of a state that had 130 departments. He 
was also King of Italy, a state in the north- 
338 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 339 

eastern part of the peninsula. He was 
Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, 
which included all Germany except Prussia and 
Austria, a confederation which had been en- 
larged since its formation by the addition of 
Westphalia and Saxony and the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw, extending, therefore, clear up to Rus- 
sia. His brother Joseph was King of Spain, his 
brother Jerome King of Westphalia, his brother- 
in-law Murat King of Naples. All were mere sat- 
ellites of his, receiving and executing his orders. 
Russia was his willing ally. Prussia and Austria 
were his allies, the former because forced to 
be, the latter at first for the same reason, and 
later because she saw an advantage in it. No 
ruler in history had ever dominated so much 
of Europe. This supreme, incomparable pre- 
eminence had been won by his sword, supple- 
mented by his remarkable statesmanship and 
diplomacy. 

England alone remained outside the pale, Eng- 
land alone had not been brought to bend the 
knee to the great conqueror. Even she was 
breathing heavily, because the Continental Sys- 
tem was inflicting terrible damage upon her. 
Factories were being forced to shut down, multi- 
tudes of laborers were being thrown out of work 
or were receiving starvation wages, riots and 



340 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

other evidences of unrest and even desperation 
seemed to indicate that even she must soon come 
to terms. 

But this vast and imposing fabric of power 
rested upon uncertain bases. Built up, story 
upon story, by this highly imaginative and able 
mind, the architect left out of reckoning or de- 
spised the strains and stresses to which it was 
increasingly subjected. The rapidity with which 
this colossal structure fell to pieces in a few 
years shows how poorly consolidated it was, how 
rickety and precarious its foundations. Even a 
slight analysis will reveal numerous and fore- 
boding elements of weakness beneath all this 
pomp and pageantry of power. Erected by the 
genius of a single man it depended solely upon 
his life and fortunes — and fortune is notoriously 
fickle. Built up by war, by conquest, it was nec- 
essarily environed by the hatred of the con- 
quered. With every advance, every annexation, 
it annexed additional sources of discontent. 
Based on force, it could only be maintained by 
force. There could be and there was in all this 
vast extent of empire no common loyalty to the 
Emperor. Despotism, and Napoleon's regime 
was one of pitiless despotism, evoked no loyalty, 
only obedience based on fear. Europe has al- 
ways refused to be dominated by a single nation 



EUROPE IN 1811 

AT THE HEIGHT OF NAPOLEONS POWER 



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DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 341 

or by a single ruler. It has run the risk several 
times in its history of passing under such a yoke, 
but it always in the end succeeded in escaping 
it. Universal dominion is an anachronism. The 
secret of Great Britain's hold upon many of the 
component parts of her empire lies in the fact 
that she allows them liberty to develop their own 
l ife in their own way. But such a conception 
was utterly beyond Napoleon, contrary to all 
his instincts and convictions. His empire meant 
the negation of liberty in the various countries 
which he dominated, France included. Na- 
poleon's conquests necessarily ranged against 
him this powerful and unconquerable spirit. The 
more conquests, the more enemies, only waiting 
intently for the moment of liberation, scanning 
the horizon everywhere for the first sign of 
weakness which to them would be the harbinger 
of hope. This they found in Spain, and in the 
Austrian campaign of 1809 in which the ma- 
chinery of military conquest had creaked, had 
worked clumsily, had threatened at one moment 
to break down. 

There was a force in the world which ran di- 
rectly counter to Napoleon's projects, the prin- 
ciple of nationality. Napoleon despised this feel- 
ing, and in the end it was his undoing. He might 
have seen that it had been the strength of France 



342 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

a few years earlier, that now this spirit had passed 
beyond the natural boundaries and was waking 
into a new life, was nerving to a new vigor, coun- 
tries like Spain, even Austria and, most con- 
spicuously, Prussia. 

Prussia after Jena underwent the most serious 
humiliation a nation can be called to endure. 
For several years she was under the iron heel of 
Napoleon, who kept large armies quartered on 
her soil, who drained her resources, who inter- 
fered peremptorily in the management of her 
government, who forbade her to have more than 
42,000 soldiers in her army. But out of the very 
depths of this national degradation came Prus- 
sia's salvation. Her noblest spirits were aroused 
to seek the causes of this unexpected and im- 
measurable national calamity and to try to rem- 
edy them. From 1808 to 1812 Prussians, under 
the very scrutiny of Napoleon, who had eyes but 
did not see, worked passionately upon the prob- 
lem of national regeneration. The result sur- 
passed belief. A tremendous national patriotism 
was aroused by the poets and thinkers, the 
philosophers and teachers, all bending their ener- 
gies to the task of quickening among the youth 
the spirit of unselfish devotion to the fatherland. 
An electric current of enthusiasm, of idealism, 
swept through the educational centers and 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 343 

through large masses of the people. The Uni- 
versity of Berlin, founded in 1809, in Prussia's 
darkest hour, was, from the beginning, a dy- 
namic force. It and other universities became 
nurseries of patriotism. 

Prussia underwent regeneration in other ways. 
Particularly memorable was the work of two 
statesmen, Stein and Hardenberg. Stein, in con- 
sidering the causes of Prussia's unexampled 
woes, came to the conclusion that they lay in 
her defective or harmful social and legal institu- 
tions. The masses of Prussia were serfs, bound 
to the soil, their personal liberty gravely re- 
stricted, and, as Stein said, " patriots cannot be 
made out of serfs." He persuaded the King to 
issue an edict of emancipation, abolishing serf- 
dom. The Prussian king, he said, was no longer 
"the king of slaves, but of free men." Many 
other reforms were passed abolishing or reduc- 
ing class distinctions and privileges. In all this 
Stein was largely imitating the French Revolu- 
tionists who by their epoch-making reforms had 
released the energies of the French so that their 
power had been vastly multiplied. The army, 
too, was reorganized, opportunity was opened 
to talent, as in France, with what magical 
results we have seen. As Napoleon forbade that 
the Prussian army should number more than 



344 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

42,000 men, the ingenious device was hit upon 
of having men serve with the colors only a brief 
time, long enough to learn the essentials of the 
soldier's life. Then they would pass into the 
reserve and others would be put rapidly through 
the same training. By this method several times 
42,000 men received a military training whose 
effectiveness was later to be proved. 

Thus Prussia's regeneration went on. The 
new national spirit, wonderfully invigorated, 
waited with impatience for its hour of probation. 
It should be noted, however, that these reforms, 
which resembled in many respects those accom- 
plished in France by the Constituent Assembly 
and the Convention, and which were in fact sug- 
gested by them, rested, however, on very differ- 
ent principles. There was in Prussia no asser- 
tion of the Rights of Man, no proclamation of the 
people as sovereign. In Prussia it was the king 
who made the reforms, not the people. The 
theory of the divine right of the monarch was 
not touched, but was maintained as sacred as 
ever. There was reform in Prussia but no rev- 
olution. Prussia took no step toward democ- 
racy. This distinction has colored the whole 
subsequent history of that kingdom and colors 
it today. "Everything for the people, nothing 
by the people," was evidently the underlying 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 345 

principle in this work of national reorganization. 
Even these reforms were not carried out com- 
pletely, owing to opposition from within the 
kingdom and from without. But, though incom- 
plete, they were very vitalizing. 

Napoleon's policies had created other enmities 
in abundance which were mining the ground be- 
neath him. His treatment of the Pope, whom he 
held as a prisoner and whose temporal power he 
had abolished by incorporating his states, a part 
in the French Empire and a part in the Kingdom 
of Italy, made the Catholic clergy everywhere 
hostile, and offended the faithful. Rome, hith- 
erto the papal capital, was declared the second 
city of the Empire and served as a title for Na- 
poleon's son. All rights of the Pope were thus 
cavalierly ignored. The subtle and vast influ- 
ence of the church was of course now directed 
to the debasement of the man it had previously 
conspicuously favored and praised. In addition 
to combating the rising tide of n ationality , Na- 
poleon henceforth also had his quarrel with the 
Papacy . 

Into these entanglements he had been brought 
by the necessities of his conflict with England, 
by the continental blockade. For it was that 
system that drove him on from one aggression 
to another, from annexation to annexation. 



346 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

That system, too, created profound discontent 
in all the countries of the continent, including 
France itself. By enormously raising the price 
of such necessaries as cotton and sugar and cof- 
fee and tea, products of Britain's colonies or of 
the tropical countries with which she traded, 
they introduced hardship and irritation into 
every home. The normal course of business was 
turned inside out and men suddenly found their 
livelihood gone and ruin threatening or already 
upon them. To get the commodities to which 
they were accustomed they smuggled on a large 
and desperate scale. This led to new and severe 
regulations and harsher punishments, and thus 
the tyrannical interference in their private lives 
made multitudes in every country hate the 
tyranny and long for its overthrow. Widespread 
economic suffering was the inevitable result of 
the continental system and did more to make 
Napoleon's rule unpopular throughout Europe 
than did anything else except the enormous 
waste of life occasioned by the incessant warfare. 
That system, too, was the chief cause of the cup-, 
ture of the alliance between Russia and France, in 
1812, a rupture which led to appalling disaster 
for Napoleon and was the beginning of the end. 
The whole stupendous superstructure of Na- 
poleonic statecraft and diplomacy fell like a 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 347 

house of cards in the three years 1812, 1813, and 
1814. 

The Franco-Russian alliance, concluded so 
hastily and unexpectedly at Tilsit in 1807, lasted 
nominally nearly five years. It was, however, un- 
popular from the beginning with certain influen- 
tial classes in Russia and its inconveniences be- 
came increasingly apparent. The aristocracy of 
Russia, a powerful body, hated this alliance with 
a country which had abolished its own nobility, 
leaving its members impoverished by the loss of 
their lands and privileges. There could be no 
sympathy between the Russian nobility, based 
upon the grinding serfdom of the masses, and 
the country which had swept all traces of feudal- 
ism aside and proclaimed the equality of men. 
Moreover the Russian nobility hated the con- 
tinental system, as it nearly destroyed the com- 
merce with England in wheat, flax, and timber, 
which was the chief source of their wealth. Fur- 
thermore, the Czar Alexander I, having obtained 
some of the advantages he had expected from his 
alliance, was irritated, now that he did not ob- 
tain others for which he had hoped. He had 
gained Finland from Sweden and the Danubian 
Principalities from Turkey, but the vague though 
alluring prospect of a division of the Turkish 
Empire still remained unfulfilled and was, in- 



348 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

deed, rece'ding into the limbo of the unlikely. 
He wanted Constantinople, and Napoleon made 
it clear he could never have it. Moreover Alex- 
ander was alarmed by Napoleon's schemes with 
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a state made out 
of the Polish provinces which had been ac- 
quired by Prussia and Austria. Alexander had 
no objection to Prussia and Austria losing their 
Polish provinces, but he himself had Polish prov- 
inces and he dreaded anything that looked like 
a resurrection of the former Kingdom of Poland, 
any appeal to the Polish national feeling. 

But the main cause of Alexander's gradual 
alienation from his ally was the continental 
blockade. This was working great financial loss 
to Russia. Moreover its inconveniences were 
coming home to him in other ways. To enforce 
the system more completely in Germany Na- 
poleon seized in 1811 the Grand Duchy of Old- 
enburg, which belonged to Alexander's brother- 
in-law. 

Thus the alliance was being subjected to a 
strain it could not stand. In 1812 it snapped, 
and loud was the report. Napoleon would not 
allow any breach of the continental blockade if 
he could prevent it. He resolved to force Rus- 
sia, as he had forced the rest of the continent, 
to do his bidding. He demanded that she live 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 349 

up to her promises and exclude Biitish com- 
merce. The answers were evasive, unsatisfac- 
tory, and in June, 1812, Napoleon crossed the 
Kiemen with the largest army he ever com- 
manded, over half a million men, the "army of 
twenty nations," as the Russians called it. 
About one-half were French. The rest were a 
motley host of Italians, Danes, Croatians, Dal- 
matians, Poles, Dutchmen, Westphalians, Sax- 
ons, Bavarians, Wiirtembergers, and still others. 
For the first time in his military career Napoleon 
commanded the cooperation of Austria and Prus- 
sia, both of which were compelled to send con- 
tingents. There were 100,000 cavalry and a nu- 
merous and powerful artillery. He had around 
him a brilliant staff of officers, Murat, Ney, 
Eugene Beauharnais, and others. It seemed as 
if no power on earth could resist such an engine 
of destruction. Napoleon himself spoke of the 
expedition as the " last act " of the play. 

It was not quite that, but it was a supremely 
important act, one full of surprises. From the 
very start it was seen that in numbers there is 
sometimes weakness, not strength. This vast 
machine speedily commenced to give way beneath 
its own weight. The army had not advanced five 
days before the commissary department began to 
break down and bread was lacking. Horses, im- 



35Q NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

properly nourished, died by the thousands, thus 
still further demoralizing the commissariat and 
imperiling the artillery. The Russians adopted 
the policy of not fighting but constantly retreat- 
ing, luring the enemy farther and farther into 
a country which they took the pains to devastate 
as they retired, leaving no provisions or supplies 
for the invaders, no stations for the incapaci- 
tated, as they burned their villages on leaving 
them. Napoleon seeking above everything a 
battle, in which he hoped to crush the enemy, 
was denied the opportunity. The Russians had 
studied the Duke of Wellington's methods in 
Portugal and profited by their study. It was 
700 miles from the Niemen to Moscow. Na- 
poleon had had no intention of going so far, 
but the tactics of his enemy forced him steadily 
to proceed. The Czar had announced that he 
would retire into Asia if necessary, rather than 
sign a peace with his enemy on the sacred soil of 
Russia. Napoleon hoped for a battle at Smo- 
lensk, but only succeeded in getting a rear-guard 
action and a city in flames. 

This policy of continual retreat, so irritating 
to the French Emperor, was equally irritating to 
the Russian people, who did not understand the 
reason and who clamored for a change. The 
Russians therefore took up a strong position at 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 351 

Borodino on the route to Moscow. There a bat- 
tle occurred on September 7, 1812, between the 
French army of 125,000 men and the Russian of 
100,000. The battle was one of the bloodiest of 
the whole epoch. The French lost 30,000, the 
Russians 40,000 men. Napoleon's victory was 
not overwhelming, probably because he could 
not bring himself to throw in the Old Guard. 
The Russians retreated in good order, leaving 
the road open to Moscow, which city Napoleon 
entered September 14. The army had experi- 
enced terrible hardships all the way, first over 
roads soaked by constant rains, then later over 
roads intensely heated by July suns and giving 
forth suffocating clouds of dust. Terrible losses, 
thousands a day, had characterized the march of 
700 miles from the Niemen to Moscow. 

Napoleon had resolved on the march to Mos- 
cow expecting that the Russians would consent 
to peace, once the ancient capital was in danger. 
But no one appeared for that purpose. He found 
Moscow practically deserted, only 15,000 there, 
out of a population of 250,000. Moreover the 
day after his entry fires broke out in various parts 
of the city, probably set by Russians. For four 
days the fearful conflagration raged, consuming 
a large part of the city. Still Napoleon stayed 
on, week after week, fearing the effect that 



352 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

the news of a retreat might produce, and 
hoping, against hope, that the Czar would 
sue for peace. Finally there was nothing 
to do, after wasting a month of precious time, 
but to order the retreat. This was a long-drawn- 
out agony, during which an army of 100,000 men 
was reduced to a few paltry thousands, fretted 
all along the route by which they had come by 
Russian armies and by Cossack guerrilla bands, 
horrified by the sight of thousands of their com- 
rades still unburied on the battlefield of Boro- 
dino, suffering indescribable hardships of hun- 
ger and exhaustion and finally caught in all the 
horrors of a fierce Russian winter, clad, as many 
of them were, lightly for a summer campaign. 
The scenes that accompanied this flight and rout 
were of unutterable woe, culminating in the hid- 
eous tragedy of the crossing of the Beresina, the 
bridge breaking down under the wild confusion 
of men fighting to get across, horses frightened, 
the way blocked by carts and wagons, the 
bridges raked by the fire of the Russian artillery. 
Thousands were left behind, many fell or threw 
themselves into the icy river and were frozen 
to death. In the river, says one writer, when 
the Russians came up later they saw " awful 
heaps of drowned soldiers, women, and children, 
emerging above the surface of the waters, and 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 353 

here and there rigid in death like statues on 
their ice-bound horses." A few thousand out of 
all the army finally got out of Russia and across 
the Niemen. Many could only crawl to the hos- 
pitals asking for " the rooms where people 
die." History has few ghastlier pages in all its 
annals. Napoleon himself left the army on De- 
cember 5th, and traveled rapidly incognito to 
Paris, which he reached on the 18th. " I shall 
be back on the Niemen in the spring," was the 
statement with which he tried to make men 
think that the lost position would be soon re- 
covered. 

He did not quite keep the promise. He did not 
get as far back again as the Niemen. But 1813 
saw him battling for his supremacy in Germany, 
as 1812 had seen him battling for it in Russia. 
The Russian disaster had sent a thrill of hope 
through the ranks of his enemies everywhere. 
The colossus might be, indeed appeared to be, 
falling. Had not the auspicious moment arrived 
for annihilating him? Particularly violent was 
the hatred of the Prussians, who had, more than 
other peoples, felt the ruthlessness of his tyranny 
for the last six years. They trembled with eager- 
ness to be let loose and when their King made a 
treaty of alliance with Russia and subsequently 
made a more direct and personal appeal to his 



354 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

people than any Prussian monarch had ever 
made before, they responded enthusiastically. 
There was a significant feature about this Treaty 
of Kalisch with Russia. Russia was not to lay 
down her arms against Napoleon until Prussia 
had recovered an area equal to that which she 
had possessed before the battle of Jena. But the 
area was not to be the same, for Russia was to 
keep Prussia's Polish provinces, now included in 
the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, whose doom was 
decreed. Prussia should have compensation in 
northern Germany. 

Could Napoleon rely on the Confederation of 
the Rhine and on his ally Austria? This re- 
mained to be seen. A reverse would almost 
surely cost him the support of the former and 
the neutrality of the latter. Their loyalty 
would be proportioned to his success. There 
was with them not the same popular wrath as 
with the Prussians. On the other hand, their 
princes had a keen eye for the main chance. 
Austria surely would use Napoleon's necessities 
for her own advantage. The princes of the 
Rhenish Confederation wished to retain the ad- 
vantages they had won largely through their 
complaisant cooperation with Napoleon during 
recent years. Austria wished to recover advan- 
tages she had lost, territory, prestige, badly 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 355 

tattered and torn by four unsuccessful cam- 
paigns. 

Napoleon, working feverishly since the return 
from Russia, finally got an army of over 200,000 
men together. But to do this he had to draw 
upon the youth of France, as never before, call- 
ing out recruits a year before their time for serv- 
ice was due. A large part of them were un- 
trained, and had to get their training on the 
march into Germany. The army was weak in 
cavalry, a decisive instrument in following up a 
victory and clinching it. 

Napoleon was back in central Germany before 
the Russians and Prussians were fully prepared. 
He defeated them at Liitzen and at Bautzen in 
May, 1813, but was unable to follow up his vic- 
tories because of the lack of sufficient cavalry, 
and the campaign convinced him that he could 
accomplish nothing decisive without reinforce- 
ments. He therefore agreed, in an unlucky mo- 
ment, as it later proved, to a six weeks' armistice. 
During that time he did get large reinforcements 
but his enemies got larger. And during that in- 
terval the diplomatic intriguing went against 
him so that when the armistice was over Austria 
had joined the alliance of Russia, Prussia, and 
England, against him. He defeated the Aus- 
trians at Dresden (August 26-27), his last great 



356 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

victory. His subordinates were, however, beaten 
in subsidiary engagements and he was driven 
back upon Leipsic. There occurred a decisive 
three days' battle, the " Battle of the Nations," as 
the Germans call it (October 16-18). In point 
of numbers involved this was the greatest bat- 
tle of the Napoleonic era. Over half a million 
men took part, at most 200,000 under Napoleon, 
300,000 under the commanders of the allies. Na- 
poleon was disastrously defeated and was sent 
flying back across the Rhine with only a small 
remnant. of his army. The whole political struc- 
ture which he had built up in Germany collapsed. 
The members of the Confederation of the Rhine 
deserted the falling star, and entered the alliance 
against him, on the guarantee of their posses- 
sions by the allies. Jerome fled from West- 
phalia and his brief kingdom disappeared. 
Meanwhile Wellington, who for years had been 
aiding the Spaniards, had been successful and 
was crossing the Pyrenees into southern France. 
The coils were closing in upon the lion, who now 
stood at bay. 

The allies moved on after the retreating 
French toward the Rhine. It had been no part 
of their original purpose to demand Napoleon's 
abdication. They now, in November 1813, of- 
fered him peace on the basis of the natural 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 357" 

frontiers of France, the Rhine, the Alps, and the 
Pyrenees. He would not accept but procrasti- 
nated, and made counter-propositions. Even in 
February 1814 he could have retained his throne 
and the historic boundaries of the old Bourbon 
monarchy, had he been willing to renounce the 
rest. He dallied with the suggestion, secretly 
hoping for some turn in luck that would spring 
the coalition apart and enable him to recover the 
ground he had lost. In thus refusing to recog- 
nize defeat, refusing to accept an altered situa- 
tion, he did great harm to France and completed 
his own downfall. His stiff, uncompromising, 
unyielding temper sealed his doom. He was no 
longer acting as the wise statesman, responsible 
for the welfare of a great people who, by their 
unstinted sacrifices, had put him under heavy 
obligations. His was the spirit of the gambler, 
thinking to win all by a happy turn of the cards. 
He was also will incarnate. With will and luck 
all might yet be retrieved. 

He had said, on leaving Germany, " I shall be 
back in May with 250,000 men." He did not ex- 
pect a winter campaign and he felt confident that 
by May he could have another army. The allies, 
however, did not wait for May, but at the close of 
December 1813 streamed across the Rhine and 
invaded France from various directions. France, 



358 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

victorious for eighteen years, now experienced 
what she had so often administered to others. 
The campaign was brief, only two months, Feb- 
ruary and March 1 8 14. Napoleon was hope- 
lessly outnumbered. Yet this has been called 
the most brilliant of his campaigns. Fighting on 
the defensive and on inner lines, he showed mar- 
velous mastery of the art of war, striking here, 
striking there with great precision and swiftness, 
undaunted, resourceful, tireless. The allies 
needed every bit of their overwhelming superior- 
ity in numbers to compass the end of their re- 
doubtable antagonist, with his back against the 
wall and his brain working with matchless lucid- 
ity and with lightning-like rapidity. They 
thought they could get to his capital in a week. 
It took them two months. However, there could 
be but one end to such a campaign, if the allies 
held together, as they did. On the 30th of March 
Paris capitulated and on the following day the 
Czar Alexander and Frederick William III, the 
King of Prussia, made their formal entry into the 
city which the Duke of Brunswick twenty-two 
years before had threatened with destruction if 
it laid sacrilegious hands upon the King or 
Queen. Since that day much water had flowed 
under the bridge, and France and Europe had 
had a strange history, signifying much. 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 359 

The victors would not longer tolerate Na- 
poleon. He was forced to abdicate uncondition- 
ally. He was allowed to retain his title of Em- 
peror, but henceforth he was to rule only over 
Elba, an island nineteen miles long and six miles 
wide, lying off the coast of Tuscany, whence his 
Italian ancestors had sailed for Corsica two cen- 
turies and a half before he was born. Thither 
he repaired, having said farewell to the Old 
Guard in the courtyard of the palace of Fontaine- 
bleau, kissing the flag of France made lustrous 
on a hundred fields. "Nothing but sobbing was 
heard in all the ranks," wrote one of the soldiers 
who saw the scene, "and I can say that I too 
shed tears when I saw my Emperor depart."' 

On the day that Napoleon abdicated, the Sen- 
ate, so-called guardian of the constitution, ob- 
sequious and servile to the Emperor in his days 
of fortune, turned to salute the rising sun, and 
in solemn session proclaimed Louis XVIII King 
of France. The allies, who had conquered Na- 
poleon and banished him to a petty island in the 
Mediterranean, thought they were done with him 
for good and all. But from this complacent 
self-assurance they were destined to a rude 
awakening. Their own errors and wranglings 
at the Congress of Vienna, whither they repaired 
in September 1814 to divide the spoils and de- 



360 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

termine the future organization of Europe, and 
the mistakes and indiscretions of the Bourbons 
whom they restored to rule in France, gave Na- 
poleon the opportunity for the most audacious 
and wonderful adventure of his life. 

Louis XVIII, the new king, tried to adapt him- 
self to the greatly altered circumstances of the 
country to which he now returned in the wake of 
foreign armies after an absence of twenty-two 
years. He saw that he could not be an absolute 
king as his ancestors had been, and he therefore 
granted a Charter to the French, giving them 
a legislature and guaranteeing certain rights 
which they had won and which he saw could not 
safely be withdrawn. His regime assured much 
larger liberty than France had ever experienced 
under Napoleon. Nevertheless certain attitudes 
of his and ways of speaking, and the actions of 
the royalists who surrounded him, and several 
unwise measures of government, soon rendered 
him unpopular and irritated and alarmed the 
people. He spoke of himself as King by the 
grace of God, thus denying the sovereignty of 
the people; he dated his first document, the 
Charter, from " the nineteenth year of my reign," 
as if there had never been a Republic and a Na- 
poleonic Empire; he restored the white flag and 
banished the glorious tricolor which had been car- 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 361 

ried in triumph throughout Europe. What was 
much more serious, he offended thousands of Na- 
poleon's army officers by retiring or putting them 
on half-pay, many thus being reduced to desti- 
tution, and all feeling themselves dishonored. 
Moreover many former nobles who had early 
in the Revolution emigrated from France and 
then fought against her received honors and 
distinctions. Then, in addition, the Roman 
Catholic clergy and the nobles of the court 
talked loudly and unwisely about getting back 
their lands which had been confiscated and 
sold to the peasants, although both the Con- 
cordat of 1802 and the Charter of 1814 dis- 
tinctly recognized and ratified these changes 
and promised that they should not be dis- 
turbed. The peasants were far and away the 
most numerous class in France, and they were 
thus early alienated from the Bourbons by these 
threats at their most vital interest, their property 
rights, which Napoleon had always stoutly main- 
tained. Thus a few months after Napoleon's ab- 
dication the evils of his reign were forgotten, 
the terrible cost in human life, the burdensome 
taxation, the tyranny of it all, and he was looked 
upon as a friend, as a hero to whom the soldiers 
had owed glory and repute and the peasants the 
secure possession of their farms. In this way a 



362 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

mental atmosphere hostile to Louis XVIII, and 
favorable to Napoleon, was created by a few 
months of Bourbon rule. 

Napoleon, penned up in his little island, took 
note of all this. He also heard of the serious dis- 
sensions of the allies now that they were trying 
to divide the spoils at Vienna, of their jealousies 
and animosities, which, in January 1815, rose 
to such a pitch that Austria, France, and Eng- 
land prepared to go to war with Prussia and 
Russia over the allotment of the booty. He also 
knew that they were intriguing at the Congress 
for his banishment to some place remote from 
Europe. 

For ten months he had been in his miniature 
kingdom. The psychological moment had come 
for the most dramatic action of his life. Leav- 
ing the island with twelve hundred guards, and 
escaping the vigilance of the British cruisers, he 
landed at Cannes on March 1. That night he 
started on the march to Paris and on March 20 
entered the Tuileries, ruler of France once more. 
The return from Elba will always remain one 
of the most romantic episodes of history. With a 
force so small that it could easily have been taken 
prisoner, he had no alternative and no other wish 
than to appeal directly to the confidence of the 
people. Never was there such a magnificent re- 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 363 

sponse. All along the route the peasants received 
him enthusiastically. But his appeal was par- 
ticularly to the army, to whom he issued one of 
his stirring bulletins. " Soldiers," it began, " we 
have not been conquered. We were betrayed. 
Soldiers! Come and range yourselves under the 
banner of your chief: his existence depends 
wholly on yours: his interests, his honor, and his 
glory are your interests, your honor, your glory. 
Come! Victory will march at double-quick. 
The eagle with the national colors shall fly from 
steeple to steeple to the towers of Notre Dame. 
Then you will be able to show your scars with 
honor: then you will be able to boast of what you 
have done: you will be the liberators of your 
country." 

Regiment after regiment went over to him. 
The royalists thought he would be arrested at 
Grenoble, where there was a detachment of the 
army under a royalist commander. Napoleon 
went straight up to them, threw open his grey 
coat, and said, "Here I am: you know me. If 
there is a soldier among you who wishes to 
shoot his Emperor, he can do it." The soldiers 
flocked over to him, tearing off the white cock- 
ades and putting on the tricolor, which they had 
secretly carried in their knapsacks. Opposition 
melted away all along the route. It became a 



364 



NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 




DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 365" 

triumphant procession. When lies would help 
Napoleon told them — among others that it was 
not ambition that brought him back, that "the 
forty-five best heads of the government of Paris 
have called me from Elba and my return is sup- 
ported by the three first powers of Europe." He 
admitted that he had made mistakes and assured 
the people that henceforth he desired only to 
follow the paths of peace and liberty. He had 
come back to protect the threatened blessings of 
the Revolution. The last part of this intoxicat- 
ing journey he made in a carriage attended by 
only a half-dozen Polish lancers. On March 20 
Louis XVIII fled from the Tuileries. That 
evening Napoleon entered it. 

" What was the happiest period of your life as 
Emperor?" some one asked him at St. Helena. 
"The march from Cannes to Paris," he instantly 
replied. 

His happiness was limited to less than the 
"Hundred Days" which this period of his reign 
is called. Attempting to reassure France and 
Europe, he met from the former, tired of war, 
only half-hearted support, from the allies only 
remorseless opposition. When the diplomats at 
the Congress of Vienna heard of his escape from 
Elba they immediately ceased their contentions 
and banded themselves together against "this 



366 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

disturber of the peace of Europe." They de- 
clared him an outlaw and set their armies in mo- 
tion. He saw that he must fight to maintain 
himself. He resolved to attack before his ene- 
mies had time to effect their union. The battle- 
field was in Belgium, as Wellington with an 
army of English, Dutch, Belgians, and Germans, 
and, at some distance from them, Bliicher with 
a large army of Prussians, were there. If Na- 
poleon could prevent their union, then by defeat- 
ing each separately, he would be in a stronger 
position when the Russian and Austrian armies 
came on. Perhaps, indeed, they would think it 
wiser not to come on at all but to conclude peace. 
In Belgium consequently occurred a four days' 
campaign culminating on the famous field of 
Waterloo, twelve miles south of Brussels. There 
on a hot Sunday in June Napoleon was disas- 
trously defeated (June 18, 1815). The sun of 
Austerlitz set forever. The battle, begun at half- 
past eleven in the morning, was characterized by 
prodigies of valor, by tremendous charges of 
cavalry and infantry back and forth over a sod- 
den field. Wellington held his position hour 
after hour as wave after wave of French troops 
rushed up the hill, foaming in and about the solid 
unflinching British squares, then, unable to 
break them, foamed back again. Wellington 



DECLINE AND FALL OF NAPOLEON 367 

held on, hoping, looking for the Prussians under 
Bliicher, who, at the beginning of the battle, were 
eleven miles away. They had promised to join 
him, if he accepted battle there, and late in the 
afternoon they kept the promise. Their arrival 
was decisive, as Napoleon was now greatly out- 
numbered. In the early evening, as the sun was 
setting, the last charge of the French was re- 
pulsed. Repulse soon turned into a rout and the 
demoralized army streamed from the field in 
utter panic, fiercely pursued by the Prussians. 
The Emperor, seeing the utter annihilation of 
his army, sought death, but sought in vain. " I 
ought to have died at Waterloo," he said later, 
"but the misfortune is that when a man seeks 
death most he cannot find it. Men were killed 
around me, before, behind — everywhere. But 
there was no bullet for me." He fled to Paris, 
then toward the western coast of France hoping 
to escape to the United States, but the English 
cruisers off the shore rendered that impossible. 
Making the best of necessity he threw himself 
upon the generosity of the British. "I have 
come," he announced, "like Themistocles, to 
seek the hospitality of the British nation." In- 
stead of receiving it, however, he was sent to 
a rock in the South Atlantic, the island of St. 
Helena, where he was kept under a petty and 



368 NAPOLEON BONAPARTE 

ignoble surveillance. Six years later he died of 
cancer of the stomach at the age of fifty-two, 
leaving an extraordinary legend behind him to 
disturb the future. He was buried under a slab 
that bore neither name nor date, and it was 
twenty years before he was borne to his final 
resting-place under the dome of the Invalides 
in Paris, although in his last will and testament 
he said : " My wish is to be buried on the banks 
of the Seine in the midst of the French people 
whom I have loved so well." 



INDEX 



INDEX 



Abukir Bay, 255, 257 

Acre, 256 

Acton, Lord, opinion of Fred- 
erick the Great, 24 

Aiguillon, Duke d', 122 

Alexander I (Russia), concludes 
Peace of Tilsit, 313-316; and 
Napoleon at Erfurt, 330-331; 
desires to break the Franco- 
Russian alliance, 347-349; en- 
ters Paris, 358 

Alexandria, 254-255 

Alfieri, on Italian nationality, 15 

Alsace, feudal dues in, 159-160, 
168 

America, Seven Years' War in, 
6, 7, 26; revolt of the English 
Colonies in, 11-13; as model 
for France, 133-134, 137, 221- 
222 

Amiens, Peace of (1802), 273- 
274, 288, 297 

Antwerp, 296-297 

Archangel, 37 

Archives, National, 227 

Areola, battle of, 241 

Arrondissements, 140 

Artois, Count of, and the Revo- 
lution, 124, 148, 157; plots 
against Bonaparte, 287 

Asia, Seven Years' War in, 6, 
26; Russia and, 33, 350 

Assembly. See National, Con- 
stituent, and Legislative — 

assignats, 143-144 

Auerstadt, battle of, 311 

Augereau, 236, 276 

August 4, 1789, 121- 123, 159; 
Louis XVI and the decrees of, 
125-126 



August 10, 1792. I73-I7S, 233 

Aulard, on the Convention, 181 ; 
on Robespierre, 213 

Austerlitz, battle of, 301-302, 
3*3, 335, 366; results of, 304- 
308, 323, 333 

Austria, in 1789, 2, 16-19; in the 
Seven Years' War, 6, 27-28; 
and Prussia, 18-19, 21, 24, 26, 
31, 52-53, 244; and Poland, 31, 
53, 244; and Russia, 31, 53, 
244; and the emigres, 156, 
168; France at war with, 168- 
173, 225-226, 229-230, 238-243; 
Prussia aids, against France, 
172-173; and the Treaty of 
Campo Formio, 246-247; joins 
coalition (second) against 
France, 260, 271 ; war against, 
in Italy and Germany, 271-273 ; 
joins England and Russia in 
coalition (third) against Na- 
poleon, 299-302, 318; signs 
Treaty of Pressburg, 302-303; 
not included in the Confedera- 
tion of the Rhine, 315, 339; 
and the Continental Blockade, 
321 ; begins war against France 
(1809), 333-335; makes Peace 
of Vienna with Napoleon, 335- 
337; becomes ally of Napo- 
leon, 339, 349; development of 
nationality in, 342; and the 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 
348; joins Russia, Prussia, and 
England against Napoleon, 
355 ; and the Congress of Vi- 
enna, 359-360, 362; and the 
Waterloo Campaign, 366 

Austrian Netherlands, France in 
possession of, 225, 229. See 
also Belgium 



37i 



372 



INDEX 



Austrian Succession, wars of 
(1740-1748), 26, 52 

B 

Baden, 16; gains of, in South 
Germany, 303 

Bailly, 116, 204 

Baltic Provinces, conquered by 
Russia, 37 

Bank of France, founded by 
Bonaparte, 286 

Barnave, 205 

Bairas, 223-224 

Basel, Treaty of (1795), 225, 
229, 310 

Bastille, 86; fall of, 1 19-120, 129, 
148 

Batavian Republic. See Holland 

Bautzen, battle of, 355 

Bavaria, 16; Austria sends army 
into, 300; gains of, in south 
Germany, 303; becomes a 
kingdom, 303 ; and the Con- 
federation of the Rhine, 308; 
Napoleon fights Austrians in, 
334 

Baylen, 328, 329 

Bayonne, 324 

Beauharnais, Eugene, 349 

Beauharnais, Josephine. See 
Josephine, Empress 

Beaulieu, 239 

Belgium, emigres in, 148; war 
in, 170, 229; Austrian posses- 
sions in, ceded to France, 247 ; 
French conquest of, 274 ; Code 
Napoleon put into force in, 
285; England's jealousy of 
French conquest of, 296, 299; 
Napoleon attacks the allies in, 
366-367. See also Austrian 
Netherlands 

Berg, Murat becomes Duke of, 
305 

Berlin, war party in, 310-31 1; 
Napoleon issues decrees from, 
312; University of, founded, 
343 

Berlin Decrees, 312, 319 

Berthier, 253, 258 



Bliicher, 366-367 

Bonaparte, Caroline, marries 
Murat, 305 

Bonaparte, Charles, 230 

Bonaparte, Elise, becomes Prin- 
cess of Lucca, and Carrara, 
305 

Bonaparte, Jerome, 231, 305- 
306; becomes King of West- 
phalia, 315, 339; flees from 
Westphalia, 356 

Bonaparte, Joseph, becomes 
King of Naples, 304, 323; ab- 
dicates and becomes King of 
Spain, 325, 329, 339 

Bonaparte, Louis, becomes King 
of Holland, 304; refuses to 
enforce the Continental Block- 
ade, 322; forced to abdicate, 
322, 338 

Bonaparte, Lucien, 262, 264-266, 
305 

Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Na- 
poleon 

Bonaparte, Pauline, becomes 
Duchess of Guastalla, 305 

Borodino, battle of, 351, 352 

Boulogne, 298, 300 

Bourbons, banner of the, 120, 
360; House of, in France, 125, 
170; overthrow of, in France, 
168, 323; monarchical party 
desires restoration of, 168, 
220, 281 ; centralization of gov- 
ernment under, 193, 271 ; Eng- 
land and the, 250; Napoleon 
and the, 275, 279, 288; House 
of, ceases to rule in Naples, 
304, 323 ; House of, in Spain, 
323-325; restored in France, 
360-362 

Bourgeoisie, in France, under 
Old Regime, 80-82 

Bourrienne, 252, 264 

Braganza, House of. See Por- 
tugal 

Brandenburg. See Prussia 

Brazil, 323 

Bremen, 322, 338 

Breze, de, 117 

Brienne, 231 



INDEX 



373 



British Isles. See England 
Brumaire, 206; the 18th and 

19th, 263-265, 267 
Brunswick, Duke of, issues 

manifesto, 172-173, 175, 358; 

leads forces against France, 

177 
Buzot, 166 



Cadoudal, Georges, 287, 

Caen, 190 

cahiers, 111-112, 135 

Cairo, French march to, 254-255, 
257 

Calonne, 107-108 

Cambaceres, 269 

Campo Formio, Peace of, 245- 
247, 250, 273, 296, 303, 306 

Canada, acquisition of, by Eng- 
land, 2, 7 

Cannes, 362, 365 

Carnot, 198 

Carrier, 201-202, 206 

Catherine II {1762-1796), 44-46, 
50, 53 

Catholic Church (Roman), posi- 
tion of the clergy of, under 
the Old Regime, 72-76; under 
Louis XVI, 85; Voltaire and, 
85, 94-95 ; clergy of, in the 
States-General, 109-116; atti- 
tude of clergy of, toward the 
National Assembly, 118; clergy 
of, renounce privileges, 122; 
Constituent Assembly and, 
142-147; Civil Constitution of 
the Clergy, 144-147, 154; and 
state separated, 226 ; the Bour- 
bons and, 279; Bonaparte and, 
279-283, 336, 345; position of, 
in Germany altered by Bona- 
parte, 307-308; clergy of, in 
Spain against Napoleon, 327; 
clergy of, and the Bourbon 
restoration, 361 

Ceylon, 274 

Charles, Archduke of Austria, 
242, 334-335 

Charles IV (Spain), abdicates, 
324 



Charter of 1814 (French), 360- 
361 

Chateaux, war upon the, 121, 
148 

Chatham, Earl of. See Pitt 

Chaumette, 206 

Church. See Catholic Church 
(Roman) and Orthodox Greek 
Church 

Cintra, 329 

Cisalpine Republic, 247 ; becomes 
Kingdom of Italy (1805), 294. 
See Italy 

City Council of Paris. See 
Paris, Revolutionary Com- 
mune 

Civil Code, 284 

Civil Constitution of the Clergy. 
See Constitution 

Clement XIV (Pope), 30 

Clergy. See Catholic Church 
(Roman) 

Code Napoleon, 284 

Committee of General Security, 
created, 187, 193; work of, 
195, 217 

Committee of Public Safety, 
created, 187, 193; work of, 
194-217 

Commune (Paris). See Paris 

" Conclusion " of March, 1803, 
307 

Concordat (1802), 280-281, 361 

Conde, Prince of. See Eng- 
hien, Duke d' 

Condorcet, 205 

Confederation of the Rhine 
( 1806), formation of, 308, 315, 
339, 354; members of, desert 
Napoleon, 356 

Congress of Vienna, 359-360, 
362, 365 

Conservatory of Arts and 
Crafts, 227 

Constantinople, seat of Ortho- 
dox Greek Church, 33 ; Russia 
covets, 46, 348; Napoleon's 
ambitions for, 256 

Constituent Assembly, composi- 
tion and character, 118, 153, 
205; comes to Paris, 127-128; 



374 



INDEX 



and the making of the Con- 
stitution, 129-151, 193, 344; 
and the German princes, 160; 
and the codification of the 
laws, 284. See National As- 
sembly 
Constitution, demand for, 112, 
116; making of the, 129-151 ; 
of 1791, 134-Hi, 152, 175, 191, 

221, 270; Civil, of the Clergy, 
144-147, 154; of 179 3, 191-192, 
220; of 1795 (Year III), 221- 

222, 229, 261 ; of the Year 
VIII (1799), 268, 294 

Consulate (1799-1804), 267-289 
Consuls, 265, 267-269. See also 

Consulate 
Continental System, 318-322, 338- 

339, 345-349 
Convention (France), called, 

175-176; work of, 180-229, 

277, 284, 318, 344; becomes 

prisoner of the Commune, 

189; Bonaparte defends the, 

224-225, 233 
Corday, Charlotte, and Marat, 

204 
Cordelier Club, 161-162 
Corsica, Bonaparte and, 230, 

232-233, 235, 259, 359 
corvee, 106 
Council of Elders, 221-223, 262- 

265 
Council of State, 269, 284-285 
Council of the Five Hundred, 

221-223, 262-265 
Counter-revolutionaries, 124, 147 
coup d'etat, 262-263, 265, 268 
Courland, 37 
Couthon, 218 
Crimea, Russia gains, 45 
customary laws, 64 



Dalmatia, handed over to Aus- 
tria, 247; ceded to Napoleon, 

Danton, as a monarchist, 150; 
as a leader, 162, 198; becomes 
head of the provisional ex- 



ecutive council, 176; on the 
importance of Paris, 182; and 
the Jacobins, 183 ; as peace- 
maker, 188-189; dropped from 
Committee of Public Safety, 
193; and the Revolutionary 
Tribunal, 195; and Robes- 
pierre, 209-212, 213; advocates 
moderation, 210 ; fall of, 212; 
on education, 227 

Dantonists, 210 

Danubian principalities, 347. 

David, 215 

Davout, 311 

Dego, 238 

Denmark, and the Continental 
Blockade, 321 

Departments, of France, 140- 
141; civil war in, 190, 225; 
government of, under the con- 
sulate, 271 ; of the Empire, 338 

Desaix, 253, 272 

Desmoulins, Camille, 210 

Diderot, 45, 89 

Diet, German (Imperial), 17, 160 

Directors. See Directory 

Directory, composition of, 222; 
work of, 226, 229-266, 277, 284, 
318; abolition of, 265 

Dresden, battle of, 355 

Ducos, becomes Consul, 265 

Dumouriez, 187 

Dupont, General, 328, 329 



Eastern Question, Russia and, 46 

Education, work of the Conven- 
tion for, 227; system of na- 
tional, reorganized, 286 

Egypt, Napoleon and, 251-256, 
258-260, 271, 280, 317; French 
compelled to evacuate, 273; 
England promises to evacuate, 
274 

Elba, Napoleon sent to, 359; his 
return from, 362, 365 

Elders, Council of. See Council 
of Elders 

Elizabeth (1741-1762), and the 
Seven Years' War, 44 



INDEX 



375 



Emerson, on Napoleon, 291 

Emigres, intrigues of, 156-157, 
168, 172, 184; many, guillo- 
tined, 202; laws against, re- 
laxed, 279 ; Louis XVIII's pol- 
icy toward, 361 

Empire, the, 274 ; early years of, 
290-317; at its height, 31 8-337; 
decline and fall of, 338-368 

Empress Josephine. See Jose- 
phine (Beauharnais), Empress 

Enghien, Duke d', 288, 324 

England, in the eighteenth cen- 
tury, 2-14, 47-48; acquisition 
of Canada and India by, 
2, 7-9; evolution of the par- 
liamentary system of gov- 
ernment in, 3-6; colonial pol- 
icy of, 6; in the Seven Years' 
War, 6-8, 26; territorial gains 
by Peace of Paris {1763), 
7-8; and the American Revo- 
lution, 11-13; young Russians 
sent to, 37; Montesquieu's 
opinion of the government of, 
91 ; Rousseau on the govern- 
ment of, 97; influence of the 
government of, on French 
Constitution, 133, 136-137; at 
war with France, 187, 225-226, 
229, 250-260, 271, 273; makes 
Peace of Amiens with France, 
273-274; French bishops in, 
279; Napoleon and, 296-303, 
312, 314, 3i6, 318-323, 338-339, 
345-346; issues Orders in 
Council, 319; and Portugal, 
320, 323, 334; and Spain, 329- 
333; and the Congress of Vi- 
enna, 359-360, 362; and the 
Waterloo Campaign, 366-367 

Equality, Bonaparte and civil, 
275, 285, 293 

Erfurt Interview (1808), 330-331 

Essling, battle of, 334 

Esthonia, 37 

Europe, Old Regime in, 1-545 
Seven Years' War in, 6, 26; 
emigres eager to embroil, with 
France, 148, 156, 158; Treaty 
of Campo Formio changes the 



map of, 246-247; at peace, 
274; ascendency of France in, 
295 ; Napoleon alters diplo- 
matic system of, 314; and the 
Continental Blockade, 321, 345- 
349; effect of capitulation at 
Baylen upon, 328; Napoleon 
seeks to dazzle, 330; Napoleon 
preeminent in, 339-340; Con- 
gress of Vienna determines 
future organization of, 359- 
360, 362, 365-366 
Eylau, battle of, 313 



Federal Convention (U. S.). 
See Philadelphia Convention 

Ferdinand (later Ferdinand 
VII) of Spain, 324-325 

Feudalism, in Prussia, 19; in 
France, 71, 83; abolished in 
France, 121-123, 275-276; in 
Alsace, 159-160, 168; in Spain, 
332 

Finland, Alexander I and, 314, 
32i, 347 

First Consul. See Napoleon 

Five Hundred, Council of the. 
See Council 

Florida, acquired by England 
from Spain, 1763, 7-8 

Fontainebleau, 359 

Fouquier-Tinville, 217 

Fourteenth of July. See July 
14, 1789 

Fox, and the American Revolu- 
tion, 11 

France, the Old Regime in, 2, 55- 
99 ; and the Seven Years' War, 
7-8, 26-27 ; and the American 
Revolution, 11-12, 100; and 
the Jesuits, 30; aids Prussia 
against Austria, 52; effect of 
the Revolution in the life of, 
56; beginnings of the Revolu- 
tion, 100-128; and the making 
of the Constitution, 129-151; 
government of, under the Con- 
stitution of 1791, 134-141 ; 
Civil Constitution of the 



376 



INDEX 



Clergy of, 144-147 ; Legislative 
Assembly of, 152-179; and the 
emigres, 156-157; declares war 
against Francis II of Austria, 
168; becomes a democracy, 
175 ; Paris becomes dominant 
in the affairs of, 175-178; un- 
der the Convention, 180-228, 
344; republic established in, 
180-181 ; civil war in, 190, 225; 
dechristianization of, 206-209; 
under the Directory, 229-266; 
and Corsica, 230; Savoy and 
Nice ceded to, 238; and the 
Treaty of Campo Formio, 246- 
247; threatened with invasion, 
258, 260; under the Consulate, 
267-289; and the Peace of 
Amiens, 273-274 ; Concordat 
determines relations of church 
and state in, 281-283; Code 
Napoleon, 284-285 ; Bank of, 
founded, 286; early years of 
the Empire in, 290-317; be- 
comes chief Adriatic power, 
303 ; influence of, in South 
Germany, 309; the Empire at 
its height in, 318-337; annexes 
Holland and northern coasts 
of Germany, 322, 338 ; and the 
Papal States, 322, 345; alli- 
ance of, and Russia renewed, 
33i, 333; gains of, by Peace 
of Vienna, 336; the decline 
and fall of Napoleon, 338-368; 
rupture of the Franco-Russian 
alliance, 346-353 ; peace offered 
to, on the basis of the natural 
boundaries, 356-357; allies in- 
vade, 357; Louis XVIII pro- 
claimed King of, 359; and the 
Congress of Vienna, 359"36o, 
362 ; policy of Louis XVIII in, 
360-361; Napoleon returns to, 
362 

Francis I (Austria). See 
Francis II 

Francis II (Holy Roman Em- 
pire), France declares war 
against, 168, 170; retires from 
Vienna, 301 ; becomes Francis 



I (Austria), 309; daughter of, 
marries Napoleon, 336-337 

Frederick II (the Great), 1740- 
1786, 20-32, 50, 310; and the 
Pragmatic Sanction, 53 ; Na- 
poleon visits tomb of, 312 

Frederick William I (Prussia), 
22 

Frederick William II, 32 

Frederick William III (Prussia), 
policy of, 310-313; enters 
Paris, 358 



gabelle, salt tax, 68-69 

Galicia, disposition of, by Peace 
of Vienna, 335 

Gaza, 256 

General Security. See Commit- 
tee of General Security 

" Generalities," in France under 
the Old Regime, 61 

Genoa, in 1789, 2, 14, 47; and 
Corsica, 230 ; becomes the Li- 
gurian Republic, 244; and Na- 
poleon, 248; Massena driven 
into, 271-272 

George I (Elector of Hanover), 
King of England, 1714-1727, 
4-5 

George II, King of England, 
1727-17 60, 4-6 

George III, King of England, 
1760-1820, 8-12; and the Amer- 
ican Revolution, 11-12 

German Empire. See Holy Ro- 
man Empire 

Germany, in 1789, 16-32; Fred- 
erick II and, 31-32; influence 
of, in Russia, 40-41 ; emigres 
in, 148, 156; states of, at war 
with France, 187, 229; France 
in possession of provinces 
west of the Rhine, 225; cam- 
paign through southern, 230; 
congress of states of, 247; 
French driven out of, 260; 
French defeat Austrians in, 
273 ; French bishops in, 279 ; 
Code Napoleon put in force 



INDEX 



377 



in states of, 285 ; Napoleon 
seizes Hanover, 298 ; Napoleon 
sends Grand Army across, 300; 
Bavaria and Baden gain pos- 
sessions in south, 303; trans- 
formation of, by Napoleon, 
306-315, 326, 339 5 northern 
coasts of, annexed to France, 
322, 338; kings and princes of, 
summoned to Erfurt, 330; 
troops from, sent to aid Na- 
poleon, 334-335 ; Napoleon bat- 
tles for supremacy in, 353- 
356; Prussia to have compen- 
sation in northern, 354 

Gironde, 166 

Girondists, personnel, 166-168; 
desire war, 169; and the 
Jacobins, 178, 181-186, 188- 
190; leaders of, expelled from 
the Convention, 189-190, 193, 
205 ; call the departments to 
arms, 190; Lyons and, 200; 
twenty-one, guillotined, 203 ; 
offices open to, 278 

Godoy, 324 

Goethe, 331 

" Governments," in France under 
the Old Regime, 61 

Great Elector (Prussia), 1640- 
1688, 21 

Great Khan, 34 

Great Saint Bernard pass, 272, 
301 

" Great Terror," 205, 217 

Greece, 150 

Grenoble, 363 

Guilds, abolished, 122, 276 



H 



Hamburg, 322, 338 

Hanover, House of, in England 
(17 14 — ), 3; Napoleon seizes, 
298 

Hapsburg, House of. See Aus- 
tria 

Hardenberg, 343 

Hebert, and the Pere Duchesne, 
206; guillotined, 210 



Hebertists, 209; and the Com- 
mittee of Public Safety, 210 

Hohenlinden, battle of, 273 

Hohenzollern, House of. See 
Prussia 

Holland, government of, in 
1789, 2; young Russians sent 
to, 2>7 \ at war with France, 
187, 225; makes peace with 
France, 225, 229; loses colo- 
nies, 273 ; colonies of, restored, 
274; Louis Bonaparte becomes 
king of, 304; and the Conti- 
nental Blockade, 322; annexed 
to France, 322, 338 

Holy Roman Empire, in 1789, 2, 
16-19, 159; comes to an end, 
308-309. See also Germany 

" Hundred Days," 365-367 

I 

Illyrian Provinces, 336 

India, acquisition of, by Eng- 
land, 2, 8; in the Seven Years' 
War, 7; Napoleon and, 251, 
256; Wellesley and, 329 

Industrial Revolution, in Eng- 
land, 3 

Inquisition, in Spain, 332 

Institute, 227 

Intendants, under the Old Re- 
gime, 61-62, 271 

Invalides, 368 

Isnard, 166 

Istria, handed over to Austria, 
247 ; ceded to Napoleon, 303 

Italy, in 1789, 14-16; states of, 
enter war against France, 187 ; 
Bonaparte and, 230, 234, 237- 
250, 326; French driven out of, 
258, 260, 271 ; Bonaparte leads 
army into, 271-272; northern, 
abandoned to the French, 273 ; 
Code Napoleon in force in, 
285; Napoleon King of, 294, 
314, 338; England jealous of 
French domination in, 296- 
299; Austria eager to recover 
her position in, 299; Venetia 
ceded to the Kingdom of, 303; 



378 



INDEX 



and the Continental Blockade, 
320; Napoleon annexes part of 
the Papal States to the King- 
dom of, 322, 338, 345; troops 
from, go to aid Napoleon, 
334 

J 

Jacobin Club, personnel, 161-162, 
196; Robespierre and, 213 

Jacobins, and Girondists, 168, 
178, 181-186, 188-190; desire 
war, 169; organize demonstra- 
tion against the King, 171- 
172; and the insurrection of 
August 10, 1792, 17s; and the 
Commune, 176, 189-190; be- 
come masters of the Conven- 
tion, 190; Robespierre and, 
212; lose power, 220; offices 
open to, 278 

Jaffa, 256 

Jena, battle of, 311, 313, 342, 354 

Jesuits, given refuge by Fred- 
erick II, 30 

Jews, under Louis XVI, 85, 145 ; 
position of, in South Germany 
improved, 309 

Josephine (Beauharnais), Em- 
press, and Napoleon, 233-234, 
245, 30i, 313; crowned, 294; 
divorced, 336 

Jourdan, 230 

Julian calendar, introduced into 
Russia, 41 

July 14, 1789, 1 19-120, 124 

June 20, 1792, 171-172, 233 

Junot, 329 

K 

Kalisch, Treaty of, 354 
" King of Rome," 337 
Kleber, 253, 258 
Kunersdorf, battle of, 28 



Lafayette, and the events of 
October 5-6, 1789, 126-127 ; and 
the Declaration of the Rights 
of Man, 129 



Lamartine, 166-167 

Lannes, 253 

Law of 22nd Prairial, 215-216, 
218 

Law School, of Paris, 227 

Lebrun, 269 

Legendre, 172 

Legion of Honor, 286 

Legislative Assembly, 152-179 

Legislative Body, 269 

Legislature, 269 

Leipsic, battle of, 356 

Leoben, preliminary peace of 
(1797), 242, 245 

Lettres de cachet, 58, 86-87, 93, 
112, 119 

Liberty, political, in France, 87 ; 
Voltaire and, 95; Rousseau 
and, 95-98; Montesquieu and, 
95, 135 ; Louis XVI proclaimed 
the Restorer of French, 123; 
Napoleon and, 275, 277 

Library, National, 227 

Ligurian Republic. See Genoa 

Lisbon, 323; Wellesley lands at, 
329 

Livonia, 37 

Lobau, Island of, 334 

Lodi, 239, 242 

Lombardy, Austria controls, 230, 
239; Austria relinquishes her 
rights in, 247 

Lomenie de Brienne, 108-109 

Louis XIV, 100 

Louis XV, and the Seven Years' 
War, 13 ; extravagance of, 
100; death of, 101 

Louis XVI, government under, 
57-87, 100-128; extravagance 
of, 60, 66; and Protestantism, 
85 ; and the beginnings of the 
Revolution, 100-128; his char- 
acter, 100-103; his ministers, 
102-111; and the States-Gen- 
eral, 113-115; and the National 
Assembly, 115-118; and the 
revolution in Paris, 120; pro- 
claimed the "Restorer of 
French Liberty," 123 ; and the 
decrees of August 4, 1789, 125- 
126; leaves Versailles, 127; and 



INDEX 



379 



the Constitution of 179 1, 134- 
137, 140-141, 270; and the Civil 
Constitution of the Clergy, 
146-147; and the flight to Va- 
rennes, 148-151 ; and the Legis- 
lative Assembly, 153-176; and 
the Declaration of Pillnitz, 
156-157 ; his brothers, 156, 279, 
287; treason of, 166, 170; 
Jacobins and, 171-172, 233; 
Duke of Brunswick and, 172- 
173; seeks safety in the As- 
sembly, 174; suspended, 175- 
176, 180 ; trial and execution 
of, 185-186, 205 

Louis XVIII, legitimate ruler of 
France, 279; proclaimed King, 
359; grants Charter, 360; pol- 
icy of, 360-362; flees, 365 

Louise, Queen, 310 

Louvre, Museum of, 227, 243, 
249 

Liibeck, 322, 338 

Lucca, 305 

Luneville, Treaty of, 273, 296, 
306 

Liitzen, battle of, 355 

Lyons, 190, 200 

M 

Machiavelli, 25 

Mack, General, 300-301 

Madrid, 332 

Malesherbes, 87 

Malta, 254, 274 

Mamelukes, 254-255 

Mantua, siege of, 240; fall of, 
242 

Marat, a monarchist, 150 ; in- 
cites the September Massacres, 
178; and the Jacobins, 183; 
and the Girondists, 188; the 
Commune and, 189; Charlotte 
Corday and, 204 

Marengo, 272, 278, 280, 287, 301 ; 
anniversary of, 313 

Maria Theresa, Empress of Aus- 
tria, 24, 52, 103 

Marie Antoinette, Queen of 
France, extravagance of, 60; 



her influence over Louis XVI, 
101-104, 106, 124-127, 147; and 
the flight to Varennes, 149- 
150; treason of, 166, 170; 
Duke of Brunswick and, 173; 
imprisoned, 176; death of, 
203-204 

Marie Louise, Archduchess of 
Austria, marries Napoleon, 
336-337 

Marmont, 237, 253 

Marseilles, 190, 201 

Marsh, the, 182 

Massena, 235, 271, 276 

Medical School, of Paris, 227 

Melas, 271 

Metz, 147 

Michelet, on the Constituent As- 
sembly, 132 

Milan, capital of Lombardy, 
230; Bonaparte and, 240, 245, 
248; Napoleon issues decrees 
from, 320 

Mirabeau, on Prussia, 20; im- 
prisonment of, 87, 119; defies 
the King, 117; on the Consti- 
tution of 1791, 142; and the 
royal flight, 147; a leader in 
the Constituent Assembly, 205 ; 
compared with Robespierre, 
213 

Modena, Duke of, and Bona- 
parte, 244, 247-248 

Mondovi, 238 

Mongols, 33-34 

Monk, General, 287 

Montcalm, defeated by Wolfe, 7 

Montebello, 245 

Montesquieu, influence of, 81, 
89-92, 95, 135, 193; Rousseau 
and, 97 

Moreau, and the campaigns in 
Germany, 230, 271, 273; and 
Napoleon, 240 

Moscow, ancient capital of Rus- 
sia, 33, 35, 42; Napoleon's 
march to, 350-351 ; his retreat 
from, 352-353 

Mt. Tabor, 256 

Mountain, the, 181. See also 
Jacobins 



38o 



INDEX 



Municipalities. See Communes 

Murat, Joachim, brings cannon 
to the Tuileries, 224; sails with 
Bonaparte, 253; returns to 
France, 258; and the 19th of 
Brumaire, 265; humbly born, 
276; becomes Duke of Berg, 
305; and the army in Spain, 
323; becomes King of Naples, 
325, 339; and the Russian 
Campaign, 349 

Muscovy, Principality of. See 
Russia 

Museum of the Louvre, 227, 243, 
249 

N 

Nancy, Bishop of, 122 

Nantes, Edict of, revoked 
(1685), 85; city of, 202 

Naples, Joseph becomes King of, 
304, 323 ; Murat becomes King 
of, 325, 339 

Napoleon, and the Revolution, 1, 
18, 51. 53; witnesses attack on 
the Tuileries, 174; defends the 
Convention, 224-225; and the 
codification of the laws (Code 
Napoleon), 227, 284-285; and 
the Italian campaign/ 230, 234- 
250; early life of, 230-233; 
career of, under the Directory, 
233-266; as Consul, 265, 267- 
289 ; his religion, 280 ; and the 
Concordat, 280-283; Pius VII 
and, 244, 248, 280-283, 293-294, 
322, 327, 338, 345; and the 
Duke d'Enghien, 288; Consul 
for life, 288; Emperor of the 
French, 288, 290-337 ; " Pro- 
tector " of the Confederation 
of the Rhine, 308; and Fred- 
erick William III, 310-313; 
concludes Peace of Tilsit, 313— 
316; and England, 318-333; 
and Spain, 323-333; and Alex- 
ander I at Erfurt, 330-331 ; 
and Austria, 333-337; divorces 
Josephine and marries Marie 
Louise, 336-337 ; decline and 
fall of, 338-368; Russia, Prus- 



sia, and Austria his allies, 339 ; 
forced to abdicate, 359; re- 
turns to Paris, 362, 365; and 
Waterloo, 366-367; sent to St. 
Helena, 367 ; death of, 368 

National Archives, 227 

National Assembly, Third Es- 
tate declares itself, 115; no- 
bility and clergy join, 118; 
becomes Constituent Assem- 
bly, 118; effect of the Revolu- 
tion in Paris upon, 121-123; 
threats against, 126; goes to 
Paris, 127; sends for Louis 
XVI, 149; adjourns, 151; self- 
denying ordinance, 151, 160. 
See also Constituent Assembly 

National Guard, organized in 
Paris, 120 

National Library, 227 

Nazareth, 256 

Necker, 102; financial reforms 
of, 107-108; recalled, 109; in- 
capacity of, iio-iii, 113; dis- 
missed, 118-119 

Nelson, Admiral, and the 
French, 254-255, 316-317 

Ney, 276, 313, 349 

Nice, ceded to France, 238 

Nile, battle of the, 255 

Noailles, Viscount of, moves the 
abolition of seignorial dues, 
122 

Nobility, in France, under the 
Old Regime, 76-80; position 
of, in the States-General, 109- 
116; attitude of, toward the 
National Assembly, 118; re- 
nounce feudal dues, 122; abol- 
ished, 123, 137, 275 

Non-juring priests, origin, 145- 
146; and the war in the 
Vendee, 154-155 ; murdered, 
178; guillotined, 202; laws 
against, relaxed, 279 

Normal School, 227 

North, Lord, ministry of, 1770- 
1782, 10-12 

Notre Dame, 208, 294, 363 

Nova Scotia, acquired by Eng- 
land, 1763, 7 



INDEX 



38i 



o 



October 5-6, 1789, 126-128 

Old Regime, in Europe, 1-54; in 
France, 55-99, *33, 153, 276- 
277; desire to restore, 155; 
Bonaparte prevents the res- 
toration of, 275 

Oldenburg, Grand Duchy of, 348 

Orders in Council, 319 

Orleans, Duke of, ambition of, 
125 ; death of, 204-205 



Papacy. See Catholic Church 
(Roman) 

Papal States, in 1789, 1 ; Napo- 
leon and, 247, 322, 338, 345 

Paris, Peace of, 1763, 7-8; cap- 
ital of France, 58, 62, 70, 307; 
paupers in (1788), 84; Parle- 
ment of, demands convocation 
of the States-General, 109- 
110; and the events of July 
14, 1789, 1 18-120; organizes 
the National Guard, 120; 
Archbishop of, 123 ; King and 
Assembly come to, 127-128; 
Louis XVI plans to escape 
from, 148-149; celebrates "the 
end of the Revolution," 152; 
political clubs in, 161-162, 196; 
Assembly provides army for 
protection of, 171 ; destruction 
of, threatened, 173; insurrec- 
tion in, 173-174; Revolutionary 
Commune of, 174-178, 188-190, 
205-210, 212, 219; September 
Massacres in, 177-179; the 
Convention and, 180-228; Ja- 
cobins and, 182; executions 
in, 202-205 ; organizes insur- 
rection against the Conven- 
tion, 223, 235 ; Schools of, 
227; Museum of, 227, 243, 249; 
Napoleon and, 231, 233, 234, 
243, 248-249, 252, 259, Z\2, 317, 
362, 365, 367-368; Councils re- 
turn to, 265 ; government cen- 
tralized in, under the Con- 



sulate, 271 ; becomes center of 
German politics, 307-308; ec- 
clesiastical court in, 336; 
capitulates, 358 

Parlemcnts, 79, 106 

Parma, Duke of, and Bonaparte, 
244, 247 

Patterson, Elizabeth, 306 

Peninsula War, 322-333 

Pere Duchesne, 206 

Peter the Great, 1689-1725, 35-44 

Peter III, of Russia, 44 

Philadelphia Convention, 134, 
141 

Philip Equality. See Orleans, 
Duke of 

Piacenza, 239 

Pichegru, 287 

Piedmont, in 1789, 14; emigres 
in, 148; in the war against 
France, 225, 229-230; cedes 
Savoy and Nice to France, 238 

Pillnitz, Declaration of, 156 

Pitt, William, Earl of Chatham, 
Prime Minister of England, 
I757-I76i, 6-7; and the Amer- 
ican Revolution, n 

Pitt, William, the Younger, 273 

Pius VI (Pope), 244, 248 

Pius VII (Pope), and Louis 
XVIII, 279; and Napoleon, 
280-283, 293-294, 322, 327, 338, 
345 

Plain, the, 182 

Plebiscite, 289 

Poland, in 1789, 2; Partitions of, 
3i,45, 52-53, 158,244,315,335; 
Napoleon goes to, 313; Alex- 
ander I and, 348 

Polytechnic School, 227 

Portugal, and the Jesuits, 30; 
Napoleon and, 320, 322-323, 
329, 334; Duke of Wellington 
and, 329, 350 

Potsdam, 312 

Pragmatic Sanction, 53 

Prairial, Law of 22nd, 215-216, 
218 

Press, freedom of, suspended, 
176; liberty of the, and Bona- 
parte, 277 



382 



INDEX 



Pressburg, Treaty of, 302-303 
Protestantism, outlawed in 
France, 85 ; Protestants and 
the Civil Constitution of the 
Clergy. 145 
Provence, Count of, 156-157 
Prussia, in the eighteenth cen- 
tury. 2, 16-32; in the Seven 
Years' War. 6, 26-29: and 
Austria, 18-19, 21, 24. 26, 
31, 52-53, 244; rise of, 19-32, 
46; and Poland. 31, 53, 244; 
and Russia, 31, 53. 244; 
and the emigres, 156; joins 
Austria in the war against 
France, 172-173, 2J5 ; makes 
peace with France. 225, 229, 
310; policy of Frederick Wil- 
liam III of, 310-311; Napoleon 
and, 312-313, 315, 3iS, 339, 
349 ; not included in the Con- 
federation of the Rhine, 315, 
339; and the Continental 
Blockade, 321 ; development of 
nationality in, 342-345 : and the 
Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 348; 
King of, makes treaty of alli- 
ance with Russia, 353 : and the 
Congress of Vienna, 359"36o, 
362 ; and the Waterloo Cam- 
paign. 366-367 
Public Safety. Sec Committee 

of Public Safety 
Pyramids, battle of the, 255 



Quesnay, 89 



Ramolino, Laetitia, 231 

Reign of Terror, 168, 192, 210, 
228; Danton and. 210-211 

Republic, established in France, 
168, 1S0-181 ; under the Con- 
vention, 180-228 ; and the Con- 
stitution of 170?. 222-223; un- 
der the Directory, 229-266; 



under the Consulate, 267-289; 
England recognizes the French, 
273 

Republican Party, in France, 151 

Revolution, American, 11-13, 129; 
beginnings of the French, 100- 
128 

Revolutionary Commune of 
Paris. Set Paris 

Revolutionary Tribunal, created, 
187, 193, 212: Marat and, 188; 
work of, 195-196, 199, 201-205; 
Robespierre and, 212-213, 215- 
216. 218 

Rhenish Confederation. See 
Confederation of the Rhine 

Rhine, French control of Ger- 
man territory west of, 274, 285, 
296, 299, 306-310; Confedera- 
tion of the. See Confedera- 
tion 

Rights of Man, Declaration of, 
129-134, 138, 141, 164, 171, 199- 
200, 276, 344 

Rivoli, 242 

Robespierre, a monarchist, 150; 
leader of the Jacobin Club, 
161, 183; opposes war with 
Austria, 169; overthrow of, 
176, 219, 233, 263; on the Re- 
public, 181 ; demands execu- 
tion of Louis XVI, 185-186; 
and the Girondists, 188; and 
the Commune, 189 ; and the 
Committee of Public Safety, 
193-195: and Danton, 209-212; 
becomes master of the Ja- 
cobins, 212; as dictator, 213- 
217; arrest of, 218 

Roland, Madame, influence of, 
167 ; death of, 203 

Roman Catholic Church. See 
Catholic Church (Roman) 

Romanoff. House of, 1613—. 
See Russia 

Rome. 249. 294, 320; King of, 
337; Napoleon annexes, 338, 
345 

Rossbach. battle of. 28 

Rousseau, Jean Jacques, influ- 
ence and work of, 81, 84, 86, 



INDEX 



383 



89, 95-98, 213-215, 232, 275; on 
Corsica, 235 
Russia, in 1789, 2, 32; in the 
Seven Years' War, 6, 27-28, 
44; early history, 32-46; and 
Poland, 31, 45, 53, 244; and 
Asia, 33-34; Peter the Great 
and, 35-44 ; and Sweden, 37, 40, 
45; and Turkey, yj, 45, 299; 
influence of Germany in, 40- 
41 ; enters war against France, 
187 ; enters new coalition, 260, 
271 ; joins England against 
Napoleon, 299-302, 312; Alex- 
ander I of, concludes Peace of 
Tilsit, 313-316, 318, 321, 330; 
takes Finland, 321 ; Alexander 
I of, and Napoleon at Erfurt, 
330-331 ; alliance of, and 
France renewed, 331, 333, 339; 
gains part of Galicia, 335-336; 
rupture of Franco-Russian al- 
liance, 346-353; makes Treaty 
of Kalisch with Prussia, 354; 
and the Congress of Vienna, 
359-36o, 362 



St. Cloud, 263-2G5 

St. Helena, Napoleon and, 251, 
283, 291, 298, 365 

Saint-Just, 185 ; arrest of, 218 

St. Petersburg, 42-43 

Sans-culottes, 164 

Sardinia. See Piedmont 

Savoy, ceded to France, 238 

Saxony, overrun by Frederick 
II, 27, 29; and the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw, 315 ; and 
the Confederation of the 
Rhine, 339 

Schonbrunn, Peace of, 335-336 

Senate, under the Constitution of 
the Year VIII, 269; approves 
new constitution, 288; dis- 
solves Napoleon's marriage 
with Josephine, 336 ; proclaims 
Louis XVIII King of France, 
359 

September Massacres, 176-179, 
188, 233 



" Septembrists," 178 

Seven Years' War, 1756-1763, 
6-8, 26, 44 

Siberia, Russia conquers, 34 

Abbe, on the Third Es- 
tate, 82; and Bonaparte, 261- 
265; and the Constitution of 
the Year VIII, 268 

Silesia, Frederick the Great 
takes, 24, 26, 29, 52 

Smith, Goldwin, on the Amer- 
ican Revolution, 11 

Smolensk, 350 

Social Contract, by Rousseau, 96- 
98 

Sophia, regent during the minor- 
ity of Peter (later the Great), 
36 

Spain, and the Jesuits, 30; en- 
ters war against France, 187, 
225; makes peace with France, 
225, 229; ally of France, 273; 
colonies of, restored, 274; and 
the war between France and 
England, 320, 322-333, 341 ; 
Charles IV of, abdicates, 324; 
Joseph becomes King of, 325, 
329, 339; development of na- 
tionality in, 342 ' 

Spirit of Laws, 1748, by Montes- 
quieu, 90 

States-General, demand for con- 
vocation of, 109; meets May 5, 
1789, hi, 113-115, 129. See 
National Assembly and Con- 
stituent Assembly 

States of the Church. See Papal 
States 

Stein, 343 

Strassburg, Archbishop of, 74 

Stuarts, in England, 3, 5 

Suffrage, universal, in France, 
175, 191 ; abandoned, 221 

" Suspects," 199 

Sweden, in the Seven Years' 
War, 27; and Russia, 37, 40, 
45; Alexander I and, 314, 347; 
allied with England, 321 

Swiss Guard, 120, 174 

Switzerland, in 1789, 2, 47 

Syria, invasion of, 256-257 



384 



INDEX 



Talleyrand, 307 

Talma, 331 

Taranto, 298 

Tariff, Napoleon establishes high 
protective, 297 

Temple, King and Queen impris- 
oned in the, 176 

Tennis Court Oath, 116 

Terror. See Reign of Terror 
and " Great Terror " 

Thermidor, 206; death of Robes- 
pierre on the 9th of, 217-218 

Third Estate, in France, under 
Old Regime, 80-84; position 
of, in the States-General, 109- 
114; declares itself the Na- 
tional Assembly, 115; swept 
away, 275 

Tilsit, Peace of, 313-316, 318, 
321-322, 330, 347 

Tithes, under the Old Regime, 
71, 83; abandoned, 122, 276; 
abolished in South Germany, 
309 

Tories, in England, 5; and 
George III, 10; in America, 11 

Toulon, suspects in, 201 ; Bona- 
parte and, 224, 233, 253 

Trafalgar, battle of, 316, 318 

Tribunate, 269 

Tricolor, adopted, 120 ; stamped 
upon, 126; cockade, 164; ban- 
ished, 360 

Trieste, Austria retains, 303; 
ceded to France, 336 

Trinidad, 274 

Tuileries, Louis XVI and, 127, 
149-150, 171, 184, 186; at- 
tacked, 173-174; Convention 
meets in, 189, 224, 233; Com- 
mittee of Public Safety in, 
194; Napoleon returns to, 
362, 365 

Turgot, on the taxation of the 
peasantry, 83 ; and Louis XVI, 
102, 104; financial reforms, 
104-107, 108; influence of, on 
Napoleon, 232 

Turin, 238 



Turkey, in 1789, 2; and Russia, 
37, 45, 299; and Egypt, 251, 
254; Sultan of, declares war 
against Bonaparte, 256-258 ; 
Alexander I's designs against, 
314; Alexander I gains the 
Danubian principalities from, 
347 

Tuscany, 359 

U 

Ulm, 300-301, 316 

United States, Constitution of, 
compared with French Consti- 
tution of 1791, 134, 141 



Valengay, 325 

Valmy, 179 

Varennes, flight to, 149, 151, 153, 
161, 162 

Vendee, nobles in, 78; civil war 
in, 146, 154, 187, 190, 201, 261 

Vendemiaire, the 13th of, 224, 
233. 

Venetia, and the Cisalpine Re- 
public, 247 ; ceded to the King- 
dom of Italy, 303 

Venice, in 1789, 2, 14, 47 ; young 
Russians sent to, 37; over- 
throw of, 244-245; disposal of, 
247 ; bronze horses of, 249 

Verdun, besieged, 177 

Vergniaud, 166 

Versailles, life at, 58-61, 74-75; 
government of France directed 
from, 62; States-General to 
meet in, 109, 113, 129; soldiers 
appear near, 118; tricolor in- 
sulted, 126; people march to, 
126-128; King and Assembly 
leave, 128; royalists at, 310 

Vienna, Marie Antoinette and, 
104 ; campaign directed against, 
230, 240; Napoleon enters, 300- 
301, 334; Peace of, 335-336; 
Congress of, 359-36o, 362, 365 

Vincennes, 288 

Volney, Bonaparte and, 281 



INDEX 



385 



Voltaire, influence of, 45, 64, 81, 
84, 89, 232; and the Roman 
Catholic Church, 85, 94-95 ; im- 
prisonment of, 86, 93, 119; 
work of, 91-95 ; compared with 
Rousseau, 95-96 



W 

Wagram, battle of, 335 

Warsaw, Napoleon goes to, 313; 
Grand Duchy of, 315, 335-336, 
339, 348, 354 

Waterloo, 14, 168, 251 ; battle of, 
366 

Wellesley, Sir Arthur (later 
Duke of Wellington), and the 
war in Spain, 329, 356; mili- 
tary tactics of, 350 ; and Napo- 
leon at Waterloo, 366-367 



Wellington, Duke of. See 
Wellesley 

Westphalia, treaties of, 160; 
Kingdom of, and the Confed- 
eration of the Rhine, 315, 339; 
Jerome flees from, 356 

Whigs, rule of, in England, 5 ; 
colonial policy of, 6; and 
George III, 10 ; and the Amer- 
ican Revolution, 11 

Wieland, 331 

Wolfe, defeats Montcalm, 7 

Wordsworth, on Venice, 244 

Worship of Reason, established 
by Commune of Paris, 208- 
209, 215 

Wurmser, 240 

Wurtemberg, electorate of, 16; 
becomes a kingdom, 303; and 
the Confederation of the 
Rhine, 308 



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